

‘Normalizing the norm’

A mixed-methods research on the development of the Responsibility to Protect as an international norm

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Preface

It is with both pleasure and pride that I hereby present my bachelor thesis. It is not only a thesis but also my final research project by which I finish my Bachelor's Interdisciplinary Social Sciences. It is a product of my academic development over the past 3,5 years and hopefully I can exude my enthusiasm, but moreover my fascination with R2P in this study. Other than the fact that this thesis exposed me to mixed-methods research through which I deepened my research skills, it also truly strengthened both my perseverance and self-confidence.

However, I would never have managed to write this thesis in this way without the great support of some people. First of all, I would like to thank Judith van den Boogert for her supervision and empowerment. Every time after we met I had new, positive energy. In combination with her constructive feedback, I was able to conduct this research with great pleasure, while exceeding my own limits of what I thought I was capable of.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my family: my parents who never stopped supporting me mentally and my brother and sisters who provided me with critical questions. Special thanks go to Fleur Ydema, who in the end of my writing process critically reflected upon my writing skills. Last, inherent to concluding this thesis successfully, was the great input that the three respondents Mient-Jan Faber, Jaap de Wilde and Wolfgang Wagner provided me with.

Enjoy reading!

Abstract

This study illustrates the presence of both realist and liberal discourse in the use of R2P as an international norm. An interdisciplinary approach has been used to put R2P in a broader political and historical context. Additionally, a sociological model on international norm dynamics gave a thorough understanding on the normative position of R2P as partly socialized but not yet internalized (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Because the norm has been used very inconsistently between 2004-2015, this study explored the way in which both discourses influence the internalization of R2P.

To this end, firstly a quantitative content analysis has been conducted on four cases, two in which R2P can be referred and two in which R2P has been invoked. Results showed that both realist and liberal discourse have been present in the four cases. However, the liberal discourse appeared to be dominant and had a greater capacity than the realist discourse. In the press releases a clear socialization act has been performed to adhere the international community to the UN's normative stances, which were endorsed as legitimate international behavior. Secondly, interviews have been conducted that demonstrated that the realist discourse impedes, and the liberal discourse improves the internalization of R2P as an international norm.

List of abbreviations

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AI	Amnesty International
AU	African Union
AUHIP	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel
CAR	Central African Republic
CEI	Independent Electoral Commission
CSW	Christian Solidarity Worldwide
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDM	Early Day Motion
EU	European Union
FEMNET	African Women's Development and Communication Network
FIDH	Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Hommes
HRAN	Human Rights Agenda Network
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICRtoP	International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
IDMC	International Displacement Monitor Center
IOM	International Organization of Migration
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IFHR	International Federation of Human Rights
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
FARDC	Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo
MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic
MNLA	National Movement for Liberation of Azawad

MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic Congo
MRGI	Minority Rights Group International
NLD	National League for Democracy
NTC	National Transitional Council
OCHA	Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OTP	Office of the Prosecutor
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SLA	Sudanese Liberation Army
UK	United Kingdom
UNAMI	UN Assistant Mission in Iraq
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC	UN Human Rights Council
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNMISS	UN Mission in South-Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation Côte d'Ivoire
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIS	UN Supervision Mission in Syria
US	United States
WACSO	West African Civil Society Forum
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WFP	World Food Program

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1. Introduction

A terrorist attack in France was expected to arise. Their strong involvement in international conflicts made the country more vulnerable. (NRC, 2015 January 8th).

This quote served to introduce a Dutch newspaper article that discussed the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo on January 7th 2015. The article argues that one of the reasons that this terrorist attack took place in France was because of their involvement in many humanitarian interventions such as Afghanistan, the Sahel, Mali, Libya, Niger and Iraq (NRC, 2015 January 8th).

This statement implies that apparently such humanitarian interventions (deployed by France) are not always internationally approved. In fact, the strong involvement of France in international conflicts has been condemned by the Al-Qaeda through which France risked terrorist attack. As such, if involvement by a nation-state in international conflicts made the nation-state more vulnerable, then why would a nation-state such as France jeopardize their national security?

Ever since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, the international political discourse is built on state sovereignty that has established the legal basis of modern statehood (McGrew, 2011 p.23). The responsibility of states to provide peace and security for their citizens has become the normative structure in the course of the subsequent three centuries (McGrew, 2011 p.23). However, the two World Wars gave rise to the need of international agreements. This compliance had to be ensured by a global institution, which, in 1945, became the United Nations (UN).

Between 1945 and 1999, failed humanitarian interventions in Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Sudan raised questions about the inability of the international community to act collectively (Annan, 1999). In order to improve the international capacity to join forces when a crisis situation occurs, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was ratified in 2005. R2P is an emerging UN norm that on the one hand emphasizes the responsibility of the state to provide peace and security for its citizens. On the other hand, R2P stresses the international community's duty to assist states in this responsibility and to take decisive action when a state does not uphold its responsibility (Evans et al, 2001 p. XI).

In other words, since 2005 a shift has occurred in international political discourse from a state sovereign approach towards the responsibility of both the states and the international community (Evans et al, 2001 p.VIII). However, after nine years 17 cases have

been referred to R2P but in only two cases R2P has been invoked (ICR2P, 2014). However, the academic field failed to adequately address the inconsistent use of R2P as an international norm.

In reaction to this, this research will make a contribution by exploring the development that R2P as an international norm has undergone since its ratification in 2005. Building on a political, historical and sociological context, it will be argued that R2P is embedded in both political theories of realism and liberalism. Additionally, in order to understand the development of R2P, the model of international norm dynamics of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) will be followed. This will define R2P as an international norm that has emerged but that has not yet been internalized in society. Following these insights, this research will analyze **to what extent does the presence of both realist and liberal discourses influence the development of R2P as an internalized, international norm between 2004-2015?**

From a comprehensive study on 17 cases to which R2P can be referred, four cases will be selected (ICR2P, 2014). In these cases, a quantitative content analysis will firstly analyze the presence of both realist and liberal discourses. Secondly, the same type of UNSC resolutions on each case will be consulted to reveal outliers and the spread between realist and liberal indicators. Thirdly, comparisons will be drawn between the cases where R2P has been and hasn't been invoked. Fourthly, the differences throughout time in both discourses will be analyzed between 2004-2015.

Furthermore, the same four analyses will be done on press releases on each case to illustrate how the UN exerts normative influence on society. In addition to this analysis, semi-structured interviews will be conducted with experts on R2P to gain a deeper understanding on the influence of realist and liberal discourses and formulate directives to internalize R2P as an international norm.

This study will be built on an interdisciplinary approach as an overarching framework of political, historical and sociological thoughts on the development of R2P as an international norm. In a broader context, this research will be an attempt to raise global awareness on R2P and improve the normative function of R2P by providing an alternative perspective on understanding R2P as an international norm.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

The world we live in today is a world of increased interconnectedness and interdependence on a global level (McGrew, 2011 p.22). The focus on the development of R2P as an international norm will contribute to the understanding of globalizing world politics. A long historical, social process that inherently influenced international political discourses precluded the current globalizing world. This theoretical framework will serve to explore the historical, political and sociological background. In this way, the context of the international political discourse can be provided in which realist and liberal discourses can be studied in relation to R2P.

The first section will discuss the rise of R2P as an emerging norm, the construction of the legal framework and the guiding principles of R2P. This illustrates how R2P should function as an international norm (HLPR, 2004 p.61-67). No less important are the two normative principles as a foundation of R2P. However, both political theories of realism and liberalism should be discussed first in order to understand the normative framework of R2P.

The second section will introduce realism as a political thought that is still present in one of the two the normative principles of R2P. The emergence of the Westphalian order in 1648 was the first international agreement (McGrew, 2011 p.23). Nation-states became key actors in the political world order where statism, survival and self-help were three characteristics from which a nation-state acted (Dunne&Schmidt, 2012 p.87). This was embedded in realist thought, which was the dominant theory to understand world politics from 1648 until the 20th century.

The third section will illustrate the change in political thinking since the 20th century as a result of the two World Wars. The need to construct peace and security on an international level arose, which has been accompanied by increased interconnectedness and institutionalization (McGrew, 2011 p.22). As a result, nation-states gradually lost prominence as key actors and institutions, and civil society became more and more involved in the political world order. This mutually reinforced the emergence of the humanitarian discourse by which all citizens were given equal human rights (Dunne, 2011 p.102). These developments took place in the context of liberalism as the new dominant, political theory in which R2P as an international norm emerged.

Building on this, the fourth section relates both realist and liberal thought to the two normative principles of R2P. The first principle is the primary responsibility of nation-states to protect their citizens. This illustrates the importance of nation-states in political world order. The second principle calls on the international community that ought to intervene (non)-forcibly when a nation-state doesn't protect its citizens (Evans et al, 2011 p.XI). Hence, both realist and liberal discourse are present in the construction of the R2P framework.

To gain a broader understanding on how R2P should function in the political world order, the institutional context of the UN will be discussed in the fifth section. The institution was constructed as a collective security system to create peace (Dunne, 2011 p.105-106). Embedded in this thought, the UN nowadays constructs peace and security by facilitating R2P.

The sixth section will provide an explanation on the current position of R2P whether it is an emerging or an international norm. Therefore, a model of Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) that studies international norm dynamics in society will be followed. They constructed a three-stage model defined as the 'life cycle of norms' in which an international norm has to go through a norm emergence, socialization and internalization stage to become internationally 'normalized' (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.895). Deriving from this, R2P can be seen as an international norm that has been socialized, but has not yet been internalized.

All sections considered, in order to analyze the development that R2P has undergone, this theoretical framework will illustrate how R2P should function as an international norm. The legal framework, the guidelines and the normative framework appeared to be embedded in both realist and liberal discourse. Furthermore, following the model of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), R2P has partly been socialized but has not yet been internalized as an international norm.

2.2 Responsibility to Protect

2.2.1. Introduction

As stated in the introduction, many humanitarian interventions failed in the '80's and '90's. This marked the inability of the international community to act constructively. Moreover, the UN failed to provide international peace and security as its primary goal (Annan, 1999). The ratification of R2P is the most recent example of an attempt to achieve this goal. R2P

arose in the 90s, when the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the responsibility of the international community. Annan highlighted the importance of forces being joined in order to reach international consensus and prevent a recurrence of these failed humanitarian interventions (Annan, 1999).

This speech by Kofi Annan was the onset of a growing tendency towards the responsibility of the international community to address violations of human rights and human security (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.317). Annan (1999) initiated the normative principles that became officially defined as R2P in 2001, in the Canadian report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

The foundations of R2P can be subdivided in a legal framework, guidelines and two normative principles. This section will firstly discuss the legal framework to which R2P can refer. Secondly, the R2P guidelines will be presented. They consist of four principles that should all be met in order for countries to legitimately intervene militarily. However, the two normative principles are embedded in both realist and liberalist discourse. It is for this reason that in the next section realism and liberalism will first be discussed to understand the two normative principles.

2.2.2 Defining R2P legally

All UN Member States have an active role in facilitating conflict prevention. However, when conflict prevention fails and conflict arises, under which circumstances may collective security require the backing of military force (HLPR, 2004 p.61)? And who authorizes such interventions within the UN?

The UNSC is the principal body that has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security (HLPR, 2004 p.79). The UNSC authorizes binding resolutions and directives for the UN as an international response to uphold this responsibility (AU, 2005 p.9). The permanent members of the UNSC consist of the UN founders in 1945 and have veto power to block a humanitarian intervention: China, England, France, the United States and Russia (UN Charter, 2014 Ch.V Art.23). There are also ten non-permanent members in the UNSC who don't have veto power (London, 2007 par.2).

The UNSC is obliged to follow the UN Charter as the legal framework. This provides broad guidelines and core principles to organize the political world order. More specifically, Chapter VII of the UN Charter fully empowers the UNSC to deal with every kind of

(international) threat that UN Member States confront (HLPR, 2004 p.61). To illustrate this, article 51 of Chapter VII notes that

‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’ (UN Charter, 2014 Ch.VII art.51).

This reveals the primary responsibility of the UNSC to protect individuals and the final decision-making power to legitimately intervene (non)-forcibly. This implies that the authorizing power limits the state’s power, as the norm makes it possible to undermine the right to sovereignty (Evans et al, 2001 p.31). As will become clear in the next section, state sovereignty has been the most important security mechanism of a state since 1648.

When assigning to R2P, the state’s capacity decreases because the UNSC can undermine a state’s right to sovereignty. Nevertheless, all UN Member States ratified R2P in 2005 and therefore agreed upon the reconceptualization of the state to primarily protect its citizens (Stahn, 2007 p.118). This illustrates the growing support for the role of the international community to intervene non-forcibly (Stahn, 2007 p.119). At the same time, as stated in the introduction, international involvement might make the nation-state more vulnerable to (il)legitimate interventions from outside (NRC, 2015 January 8th).

2.2.3 Guidelines R2P

To organize the justification of the use of force, the UN formulated guidelines to maximize consensus within the UNSC and find international support to act appropriately and decisively (HLPR, 2004 p.67). These guidelines are set up by the ICISS report (2001) that formulates four principles that should always be addressed by the UNSC to endorse a military intervention (HLPR, 2004 p.67).

First of all, the *just cause threshold* should be exceeded, which is met when there is serious harm to human beings. Military intervention is warranted when a matter of large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing is ascertained (Evans et al, 2001 p.XII). To illustrate this, in UN resolution 1973 (2011) the situation on Libya's different aspects of large scale loss of life is reported as

'a deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties... Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions' (S/RES/1973, 2011).

The second guideline consists of several *precautionary principles* that all have to be considered. These principles maintain that the UN's primary intention to intervene should be justified of which military intervention should be the last resort (Evans et al, 2001 p.XII). This principle is met when all non-military options such as political or economic sanctions, blockades, diplomatic threats and international criminal prosecutions, are depleted (Evans et al, 2001 p.8). When the use of force is legitimized, another principle is the use of proportional means that correspond to the situation. The last principle is to formulate reasonable prospects to intervene successfully by averting the suffering (Evans et al, 2001 p.XII).

The third guideline is concerned with the *right authority* that should rely on the UNSC as primary authority to assign a situation as a matter of R2P (Evans et al, 2001 p.XII). The ICISS report (2001) emphasizes consistent, decisive action and calls upon the right of states to rule out other means when the UNSC fails to uphold their R2P, for example acting unilaterally (Evans et al, 2001 p.XII). The last guideline, which has four requirements, is *operational*. It holds that clear objectives and a common military approach should be formulated, clear communication structures need to be integrated and rules of engagement that fit the operational concept should be formulated (Evans et al, 2001 p.XII).

In conclusion, the UNSC is the principal decision-making body that, in accordance with the UN Charter as the legal framework, decides when R2P can be legitimately invoked. When assigning R2P to a conflict and legitimize forcible intervention, the four guidelines of the just cause threshold, multiple precautionary principles, the right authority and operational principles should be met. Moreover, R2P can be best understood in the context of two complementary normative principles. As these are embedded in both realist and liberal discourse, these political theories will first be presented before discussing the normative principles.

2.3 Realist discourse

2.3.1 Introduction

As history tells us, realism has been the dominating International Relations theory for almost three centuries. It's only since the last 70 years that this dominance has been

challenged by liberalism. In order to get a good understanding of both political theories and how they relate to one another in the context of R2P, this section will present both the historical and theoretical background of realism. The second section will be concerned with liberalism, after which the two normative principles of R2P can be discussed.

2.3.2 *Peace of Westphalia*

1648 marked an important year in which the Peace Treaties of Westphalia established the first international, legal basis of a political world order in human mankind (McGrew, 2011 p.23). The recognition of nation-states' right to their own territoriality, to rule from self-determination and to be an exclusive legal authority was at the heart of the Westphalian settlement (McGrew, 2011 p.23). This international agreement was built on two primary conditions for a society to function: peace and security (Hobbes, 2012 Ch.1 p.31-32). These three foundations of the Peace Treaties of Westphalia were internationally agreed upon. This made it feasible to legitimately provide peace and security on a national level, without interference from outside the nation-state.

According to Hobbes (2012) a nation-state, provided that there was a power distribution between citizens and government (Hobbes, 2012 p.35). This was embedded in a social contract in which men conferred their power to the government. The government obtained all power legitimately and was therefore said to have authorizing power (Hobbes, 2012 p.35). By creating justice via moral notions and a legal system, peace and security were enhanced on a national level (Hobbes, 2012 p.33, 35). From this agreement, the state obtains sovereignty as their entitlement to rule within their own territory (McGrew, 2011 p.24).

2.3.3 *Realism as a political theory*

To maintain peace and security, these social contracts were the driving force behind the states' conduct on international level. This relates to the realist political theory in which international politics was shaped by states that acted in their own interests (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.85-86). Although realism can be interpreted differently, three core elements can be identified. The first is the principle of *statism* where the state is the legitimate representative of the collective will of its citizens and for this reason will always act in their national interests (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.87). Since 1648, nation-states have become key actors in international political discourse and this realist thought has

been dominant ever since (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.86).

The second element is the realist assertion of *survival* as a pre-eminent goal for states. Everything outside the territorial boundaries of the state is considered as a possible danger and threat to the existence of the state (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.93). On an international level, states organize their power domestically, and compete with other states to accumulate international power in order to ensure a state's security (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.93-94). This makes the state's survival the primary aim (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.94-95).

Realists argue that every state has its own systems of values and beliefs. This makes an international community incompatible, creating a condition of anarchy (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.87). This relates to the last realist element of *self-help* as the primary act of states to ensure national peace and security. Because there is no international authority preventing the use of force, states necessarily act from self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.94-95). For the purpose of self-help, international cooperation is possible. This is because a powerful state can be counterbalanced by states that join forces and create a formal alliance, which is defined as the balance of power (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.87-88).

To summarize, the Peace of Westphalia stipulated a state's right to self-determination (state sovereignty), territorial integrity and the right to be an exclusive legal authority on the basis of their own legal system (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.93). On the international level, realists believe in the anarchic structure by which an overarching authority is impossible. It is for this reason that nation-states act from the three realist notions of statism, survival and self-help, deriving from national interests and international external threats (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.87). Until 2005, the Peace of Westphalia constituted the modern world order by functioning as a normative structure (McGrew, 2011 p.24).

2.4 Liberal discourse

2.4.1 Introduction

This section will discuss the rise of liberalism as a political theory in world politics. Starting with the First World War, historic events will illustrate the gradually decrease of the dominant position of realism, challenged by liberalism. In line with the previous section, the historical background and theoretical foundations will be illustrated. In this way, a good

understanding of both theories can be presented, after which the two normative principles of R2P will be discussed.

2.4.2 Post-war period

From 1648 till the 20th century, realism has been the dominant theory in world politics (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.86). After the First World War, the recognition that peace is a condition that should be constructed on an international level gained in popularity (Dunne, 2011 p.104). To regulate the anarchy that exists within international politics, a global authority had to be created. As a result, the League of Nations was established in 1920 as an association of nations. This was the first international institution that observed the balance of power by enforcing a military preponderance, underpinned by the need for collective security (Dunne, 2011 p.105).

The League of Nations appeared to be ineffective because it consisted of states that acted based on self-interest, leading to obscure negotiations (Dunne, 2011 p.105-106). However, after the First World War Western states started arguing that power politics are subject to change (Dunne, 2011 p.102). This gave rise to the idea that state legislation is based on the authority invested in it by the people became dominant (Dunne, 2011 p.102). As a result, a humanitarian discourse emerged in which citizens are centralized, juridical equal and obtained basic human rights (Dunne, 2011 p.102). If these rights were violated, citizens could invoke human rights against the state authority. This created a greater independence for citizens to provide peace and security.

The emergence of the humanitarian discourse went hand in hand with another development: the rise of institutions. Communication possibilities increased and hence global infrastructures arose (McGrew, 2011 p.22). The degree of social interaction patterns constituted organizations with specified purposes (Baylis, 2011 p.567). Increased interaction between people led to processes of social exchange and fortified social relationships that were embedded in social structures (Calhoun et al, 2012 p.114-116). As will become clear in section 2.6 on international norm dynamics, this institutional development has been crucial for the spread of international norms such as R2P.

Because these social structures arose on a global level, institutions developed (Calhoun et al, 2012 p.116-117). An example is the UN, arising in the aftermath of the two World Wars and the failed League of Nations. There was a great need for international consensus between major powers. This was the renewed idea behind the collective security

system that was central to the rise of the United Nations (Dunne, 2011 p.106).

Since 2005, the UN has been the facilitator of R2P, which means that the norm is embedded in the UN principles. Besides, when presenting a historical overview of liberalism, the UN is indispensable since it has been one of the most powerful, liberal international institutions since 1945. It is for this reason that the construction of the UN will be briefly discussed below.

2.4.3 United Nations

In 1945, 51 Countries assigned themselves as UN member. In 2010, this membership increased to 192 countries (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.312). The UN is an overarching global institution that is made up of a group of international institutions of Specialized Agencies (WHO, ILO et cetera), as well as Programs and Funds (UNICEF, UNDP et cetera) (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.312). This makes the UN a powerful institution that derives its legitimacy from universal membership. It encompasses a comprehensive agenda of economic and social development, enhancing moral and legal justice in relation to conflict (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.312). Ever since 1945, its primary goal has been to maintain international peace and security (HLPR, 2004 p.79).

This collective approval by the Member States legitimizes the power of the UN. In this way, the UN propagates international norms as well as a legal system, and exerts power through which a moral status can be accorded (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.312). Since 1945, the UN has gradually taken both sovereign and humanitarian discourses into account.

However, this humanitarian tendency seemed to run against the doctrine of state sovereignty (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.319). As a result, R2P is an attempt to build a new consensus around governing international security (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2011 p.521). As will be discussed in the section on the two normative principles, this consensus had been formulated by constructing the responsibility of actors within international political discourse.

2.4.4 Liberalism as a political theory

These developments of humanitarian discourse, increased interconnectedness and the rise of institutions, mutually reinforced each other. Additionally, the events of the two World Wars supported the growing tendency towards liberalist prominence in world politics. Although many politicians would acknowledge the wide variety of interpretations of liberalism since

the 20th century, three core elements can be identified.

The first element is the increased *involvement of actors* of which international institutions, transnational corporations and international non-governmental organizations such as civil society started dominating the international order (Dunne, 2011 p.106). This development resulted from increased interconnectedness and began to challenge the dominance of sovereign states (Dunne, 2011 p.106). International institutions such as the UN gained prominence, which had major consequences for the position and power of nation-states in international political discourse (Habermas, 2012 p.472).

The second element is concerned with a *humanitarian tendency on human rights*. This is underpinned by the promotion of democracy in which networks of citizens should be broadened in order to exert influence on society from below. The underlying idea was that equal possibilities for personal liberty and property should exist (Dunne, 2011 p.111-112). As such, there was a growing sentiment towards an increased responsibility of the international community that should address (violations of) human rights (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.317).

Besides human rights, the third element illustrates a *humanitarian tendency within the security* debate. In the aftermath of the two World Wars and the failed League of Nations, the need for collective security was stronger than ever (Dunne, 2011 p.105). However, during the decolonizing process, the states right to independence was valid but gradually became questioned. Since the '70s and '80s, the notion that states are entities of which the interests of citizens should determine the right to sovereignty, has become increasingly supported (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.318). The security debate moved away from the realist thought of providing territorial safety for the nation-states as primary key actors (Evans et al, 2001 p.8). Instead, it was asserted that providing security should be a matter of human needs of those seeking protection (Evans et al, 2001 p.15).

In conclusion, history tells us that the failed League of Nations and the two World Wars gave rise to the belief in equal human rights for all citizens. From the 70s and 80s onwards, this humanitarian tendency increased with the notion that states confer sovereignty on their citizens (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.318). This illustrates a political shift from state security towards human security. At the same time, patterns of global interconnectedness mutually reinforced the rise of different international institutions such as the UN (McGrew, 2011 p.22). Because the UN is built on universal membership and enhances a comprehensive agenda, it has been one of the most powerful institutions since

1945 (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.312).

These institutional and humanitarian developments closely relate to the three liberal elements of increasing involved actors in the political world order and the humanitarian discourse on human rights and human security. In other words, these developments in this historical context created the capacity to challenge realism and promote liberalism as the new dominant theory to understand world politics. However, the next section will present the presence of both realist and liberal discourse in the normative framework of R2P.

2.5 The normative framework

In reaction to the tensions that arose between sovereign and humanitarian claims, R2P has been initiated. In addition to the legal framework and the guidelines as stated in section 2.2, two normative principles clarify R2P further. The first principle is concerned with the state, whose primary responsibility is to protect its citizens (Evans et al, 2001 p.XI). The role of the international community is to assist states in fulfilling their responsibility to protect whereby state sovereignty is observed (Bellamy, 2010 p.143).

This illustrates a reconceptualization of state sovereignty. The ICISS (2001) formulated state sovereignty as a dual responsibility for nation-states (Evans et al, 2001 p.8). The first responsibility is external and states that all nation-states should respect the sovereignty of other states. The second responsibility is internal, and stresses that the state should guarantee the rights of citizens (Evans et al, 2001 p.8). This illustrates a shift from sovereignty as merely a state's right towards a responsibility to observe humanitarian discourse and meeting its obligations towards the international community (HLPR, 2004 p.17). Although state sovereignty has been redefined, this principle centralizes the importance of nation-states, signifying the presence of realism.

The second principle of R2P goes beyond the observance of state sovereignty. This principle enables the international community to intervene when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens. The non-intervention principle then yields to the international R2P (Evans et al, 2001 p.XI). Although the international community will firstly deplete all non-military measures responding to a humanitarian situation, R2P is introduced to legitimize military intervention when needed. The point of adopting the R2P framework is to stimulate international consensus on the (in)action of R2P (HLPR, 2004 p.67).

The UN therefore emphasizes the responsibility of the international

community to take collective, decisive action when states fail to protect their population (GA/RES/60/1 para.138-140). Therefore, this principle seems to be underpinned by the need for collective security. Together with the shift from centralizing the nation-state towards the citizens as key actors in the world order, R2P seems to be practiced in a liberal order (Dunne, 2011 p.102).

This paragraph illustrated the two normative principles on which R2P is founded. The first principle centralizes the dual responsibility of nation-states in which state sovereignty is something that can be obtained by observing humanitarian discourse and considering states as equals (Evans et al, 2001 p.8). This emphasis on nation-states corresponds to the realist discourse. The second principle is concerned with the responsibility of the international community to take decisive action when a state doesn't uphold its R2P. This principle meets liberal thought in which citizens are centralized and a collective security voice is promoted.

Building on these principles, R2P seems to be embedded in both realist and liberal discourse. In order to analyze the development that R2P has undergone in the context of both discourses, a good understanding on the normative position of R2P in society will be valuable. It is for this reason that the next section will present a model to understand the normative development of R2P in international political discourse.

2.6 International norm dynamics

2.6.1 Introduction

So far, the construction of R2P as an emerged norm in the context of two discourses has been discussed in detail. However, in order to study the development of R2P in the context of both discourses, the model of international norm dynamics constructed by Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) is suitable. Based on academic research, Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) argue that norms evolve in a pattern where different behavioural logics dominate different segments in a discourse. This pattern is called the 'life cycle of norms', which is valuable for the understanding of macrostructures (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.888).

For example, the UN is quoted as an institution that has established different norms, but international relations scholarships failed to theorize these normative processes properly (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.889). Therefore, the 'life cycle of norms' is an attempt to analyze these normative processes. Issues in international political discourse that other approaches had been unable to explain satisfactorily can thus be explained (Finnemore &

Sikkink, 1998 p.890).

To explain the pattern of the 'life cycle of norms', first a general definition of a norm should be formulated. Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) define a norm 'as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity' (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.891). As stated in the introduction, R2P has been referred in 17 cases of which R2P has been invoked in only two cases (ICR2P, 2014). This implies that R2P has not yet reached the stage in which its principles have become a standard of appropriate behavior and therefore is not an internalized norm. That R2P has been hardly invoked, questions how a norm can be recognized and evolves in society, which can be constructed by the process of norm evolution in three stages (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.892, 894).

2.6.2 *'life cycle of norms'*

The first stage of the 'life cycle of norms' is called the norm emergence, where a norm-entrepreneur has strong notions about appropriate behavioral rules and tries to persuade a broader public by promoting the new norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.895). With regard to R2P, Kofi Annan can be seen as a norm entrepreneur initiated R2P, who has strong notions about the responsibilities of states and the international community as new rules of conduct.

An important element in this stage is the presence of organizational platforms from which norm entrepreneurs' act (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.899). Examples of such actors and platforms are NGOs or larger transnational advocacy networks, for instance the UN (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.899). In this context, the UN has been an important organizational platform for Kofi Annan to practice influence.

As briefly stated in section 2.4 on liberalism, the institutionalization since 1948 has been essential for international norms in order to reach a broader public is (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.900). To illustrate this, the institutionalization of norms about chemical weapons has been crucial to the coordination of sanctions on Iraq following the Gulf War (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.900). This reveals the institutional capacity to transfer a norm in a certain segment to a different international segment.

Institutionalization may follow the initiation of the norm cascade, which is the second stage of the 'life cycle of norms'. In this stage a different dynamic, in which motives of both the norm entrepreneur and persuaded actors are integrated, is employed. These motives transfer the promotion of the norm into socialization of other actors in order to become a

norm follower (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.902). Important actors are states, international organizations and transnational networks (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.898). They both reproduce and react upon the discourse of appropriate behavior (Habermas, 2012 p.477). Different perceptions of appropriate behavior can be promoted to endorse the new norm. New ways of talking and understanding issues concerning this norm are adopted (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.897).

Socialization ultimately changes identity and norms as the identification with other rules of conduct shifts. The compliance of actors to become norm followers is underpinned by legitimization and conformity as important motivations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.902, 903). With regard to R2P, since its designation by Annan in 1999 it has taken six years for the norm to be ratified by all UN Member States. This is a remarkable short time period given the normal pace at which new rules of conduct become internationalized (Evans, 2006 p.722).

This rapid development can be clarified in the context of the liberal discourse. States were likely to conform to the R2P directives because of their desire to identify themselves with the UN as a powerful, liberal institution. Conformation as a state to the UN identity leads to international legitimization by all UN Member States (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.903-904). This collective legitimization reflects back on the domestic basis of legitimization and thus stimulates its ability to stay in power.

From here a shared identity emerges, which makes a state itself hold a more solid position in the international political playing field because it 'belongs' to the group (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.903). The domestic legitimization is therefore reflected by the state's position in international political discourse. In other words, from a realist perspective of increasing the state's legitimization, nation-states assigned themselves to R2P as a liberal, international norm. The rationale has been realist and nation-centered, but the norm is embedded in liberal discourse.

The last stage of the 'life cycle of norms' is the internalization of the new norm, whereby the norm becomes so widely accepted that the conformance and practice of the norm is almost automatic (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.904). In other words, this stage of internalization makes the new norm 'normal' (Barnett, 2011 p.162). Two important elements to internalize a norm are firstly iterated behavior practiced by political actors. The communication structures in the international political discourse create predictability, stability and habits of trust that become habitual (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.905).

The second element of the internalization stage is institutionalization. Embedded in liberalism, interconnectedness increased in the post-war era, by which global norms became homogenized (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.909). Social mechanisms of shared values, norms, organizing principles, knowledge and skills became institutionalized for the purpose of identity (Calhoun et al, 2012 p.116-117). In the context of R2P, all UN Member States ratified the norm and institutions such as the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect arose to strengthen normative consensus (ICRtoP, 2014). This implies that the emerging norm went through the socialization stage where actors conformed themselves to new rules of conduct.

Although the UN promotes R2P, other states or institutions do not consistently promote the emerging norm and call on the responsibility of the international community. In other words, the rules of conduct in the context of the R2P framework are not internalized and practiced automatically. Concluding, the use of R2P in practice presupposes that the emerging norm is socialized, but the internalization stage has not yet been achieved. Building on this theoretical framework, the problem, research questions and method can be formulated in the next chapter.

3. Problem definition and research questions

3.1 Introduction

As stated above, a detailed context is provided in which R2P should operate as an international norm. This varies from the legal framework, the four guidelines and the two normative principles. Based on both sections on the realist and liberal discourse, R2P exists in an era where both discourse are present. As the first normative principle of R2P presents, nation-states are key actors that have the right to sovereignty when they protect their citizens and respect the sovereignty of other states (Evans et al, 2001 p.8). This principle is therefore embedded in realist elements of statism, survival and self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.93-95).

The second normative principle is concerned with the international community being responsible for assisting nation-states to uphold their R2P, and intervene decisively when a nation-state doesn't protect its citizens (Evans et al, 2001 p.XI). This focuses on a humanitarian approach and the institutional efforts of the UN to strengthen collective consensus on international cooperation, which closely relates to liberalism (Dunne, 2011 p.105-106, 111-112). Additionally, based on the three-stage model of Finnemore & Sikkink (1998), R2P seems to be socialized but not yet fully internalized.

Despite the legal framework, the four guidelines and the two normative principles as directives of R2P to become a humanitarian imperative, the norm has been used inconsistently (Bellamy, 2010 p.148-157). According to Weiss (2004), this inconsistency is due to states' motives of self-defense as a pretext for pre-emption under the guise of humanitarian intervention (Weiss, 2004 p.144). This supports the assertion of realist thoughts on statism and survival as a rationale for nation-states. Bellamy (2010) presents a different perspective by advocating the importance of analyzing speech acts on R2P, to determinate its impact (Bellamy, 2010 p.158-165). Therefore, the UN should establish a joint office that addresses cases to which R2P can be assigned (Bellamy, 2010 p.165, 167).

Since 2009, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P) was founded to strengthen normative consensus on R2P by addressing crisis situations and enforce international coalition (ICR2P, 2014). This institution formulated 17 cases to which R2P principles can be applied, but in only two cases has R2P been invoked (ICRtoP, 2014). It is for this reason that it can be concluded that the use of R2P has been inconsistent.

Little research has been carried out on the development of R2P, let alone in the

context of both discourses and the influence both might have. It is for this reason that this research will be an attempt to analyze the development of R2P in the context of both realist and liberal discourse, in cases to which R2P principles have been referred or invoked. Differences between the cases and the development throughout time will be taken into account in combination with the normative influence that R2P exerted. Building on this, directives on improving R2P can be understood, that fill the gap in the existing literature on the inconsistent use of R2P and how to internalize R2P as an international norm.

3.2 Research questions

R2P seems to have simultaneously arisen with and been embedded in both realist and liberal discourses. Does this relate to the inconsistent use of R2P? Can the presence of both discourses abstain R2P from completely internalizing as an international norm? To answer the previous questions, the following question will be the primary focus of this research: **In which way does the presence of both realist and liberal discourse influence the internalization of R2P as an international norm in international political discourse between 2004-2015?**

This research will explore the development of R2P as an international norm that is being prevented from internalization. The focus will be on the way in which the presence of realist and liberal discourse has an influence on the development of R2P. Based on the 17 cases formulated by the ICRtoP between 2004-2015, four will be analyzed for this research because of limited time. A preliminary study will be carried out to select the cases adequately, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. Resulting from this, the cases in Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Darfur and Libya will be most suitable for this research.

In order to analyze the influence of both discourses on the internalization of R2P as an international norm, first the presence of both discourses need to be determined in each of the four cases. By doing so, comparisons between the cases can be drawn that reveal changes between the presence of both discourses. More specifically, building on these results differences can be illustrated between cases to which R2P has and hasn't been invoked. Likewise, the development of both discourses can be analyzed throughout time in these four cases. As such, several findings from these quantified results will formulate an answer on the presence and differences of both realist and liberal discourse between the four cases.

Additionally, to analyze the influence of both discourses on the internalization of R2P, first the normative influence of R2P in the four cases will be studied. It is for this reason that of each case, a speech focusing on a target audience of international community, will analyze the way in which normative influence is exerted. Secondly, interviews with experts on R2P will be analyzed through which directives can be formulated of which discourse promotes or hinders the internalization of R2P. In order to answer the main question, three sub questions will be examined:

1. Based on the four cases to which R2P has been referred or invoked between 2004-2015, what is the presence of both realist and liberal discourse in each case separately?

This question serves to explore the presence of both realist and liberal discourse in each case. This will be quantified to analyze patterns of normative change in the use of R2P (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001 p.395). To analyze both discourses adequately, similar UN resolutions will be consulted in which the focus will be on the key actors and normative beliefs.

Deriving from this, the realist discourse consists of the three realist dimensions with statism as the key actor, normative beliefs in survival and normative beliefs in self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch.5 p.93-95). The liberal discourse is subdivided in the variety of involved actors as key actor and normative beliefs on human security and human rights (Dunne, 2011 p.105-106, 111-112).

As the indicators will be operationalized in greater detail in the next section, they will be counted and categorized in figure 5 (section results) by which the presence of both discourses in each case per document type can be presented. Consequently, the presence of both discourses in each case per document type can be presented.

2. In which way does both realist and liberal discourse develop between the four cases between 2004-2015?

Building on the results of sub question one, sub question two will discuss the changes in both discourses by analyzing differences between the cases. These differences will focus on outliers and the spread of both realist and liberal indicators in the document types to reveal the capacity of the discourse in relation to its presence. Additionally, two comparisons will be drawn between the presences of both discourses. The first focuses on whether or not R2P has been invoked in each case. This will reveal if the (non-) invocation of R2P relates to changes in both discourses. The second comparison will analyze the development of the realist and liberal discourse throughout the period 2004-2015, since R2P entered into force

up to now. This will analyze the relation between time and the change in both discourses.

3. In which way does both realist and liberal discourse influence the internalization of R2P in the context of press releases on the four cases and the three interviews between 2004-2015?

As sub question one and two consulted similar political documents of which political actors are the target group, this sub question introduces a different document type that is concerned with a target group of citizens. By integrating press releases, the socialization process can be analyzed. Does the UN promote R2P and appeal to conformity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.897, 903)? In which way is normative influence exerted to govern international security (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2011 p.521)? These results are expected to reveal how both realist and liberal discourse influence a socialization process of R2P.

Building on these results, perspectives from experts on R2P will be integrated to understand why R2P is being used inconsistently and what improvements can be recommended. Three interviews will be conducted to formulate directives through which R2P can internalize as an international norm. These three sub questions altogether will provide an answer to the research question how the presence of both realist and liberal discourse influences the internalization of R2P as an emerging norm in international political discourse. By revealing patterns of normative change and analyze why this change happens, the development of R2P as an international norm can be presented (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001 p.395).

3.3 Scientific relevance

As indicated in the theoretical framework and by the 17 conflict analyses of the ICRtoP (2014), R2P has been used inconsistently (Bellamy, 2010 p.148-157). Academic critiques have failed to adequately address the normative development R2P has undergone. Instead, the foundations on which R2P is built are mainly criticized in the context of interests and identity politics.

However, Bellamy (2010) illustrated the need to analyze the functioning of R2P as an international norm. The impact of R2P can be determined by analyzing speech acts in cases to which R2P can be referred that are formulated by a joint office of the UN (Bellamy, 2010 p.158-165). As ICRtoP arose as a joint office and presented 17 cases in combination with five years after Bellamy's statement, it seems achievable to analyze the development of R2P.

In reaction to the gap in existing literature as stated in the introduction, this study is an attempt to open up new avenues of inquiry. Instead of solely clarifying why R2P has been used inconsistently, this thesis will provide an alternative academic perspective on how to understand the current normative function of R2P in international political discourse. More than that, presenting both processes of normative change and discussing the underlying dynamics of why R2P is being used inconsistently, can illustrate directives of both realist and liberal discourse. Which discourse promotes and hinders the internalization of R2P as an international norm? This research herewith contributes to the academic conversation of understanding society (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001 p.394, 395).

3.4 Societal relevance

Although in 2005 192 UN Member States ratified R2P as an international, ten years later R2P hasn't been internalized in society. Why would R2P have been universally assigned to, while no one seemed to invoke it? This illustrates a discrepancy between norms and politics. In order to understand society it is crucial to understand the role norms play in political change (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.888).

The aim of this study is therefore not to create fixed concepts or a 'one size fits all' methodology that should become the dominant approach to analyze international relations. This research is rather an attempt to give insight into the process of norms rising in international political discourse. By studying the development of R2P in the context of both realist and liberal discourses and the model of Finnemore & Sikkink (1998), the effect of R2P as an international norm on society can be understood.

3.5 Interdisciplinarity

Building on the scientific and societal relevance of this research and following the theoretical framework, this study enhances an interdisciplinary approach. Different disciplinary theories and concepts are interwoven because the development of an international norm is embedded in political, historical and sociological developments (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.887). This section will provide an insight into the interdisciplinary approach fundamental to this study.

The central concept is R2P, whose foundations are the UN Charter, the ICISS report (2001) and the institutional context of the UN. These are all related to a political context in which R2P has mainly been discussed in by academics. However, R2P as an international

norm implies normative change in macrostructures that cannot solely be explained by political methodology (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.888). This assertion is supported by the lack in the existing literature of clarification on the inconsistent use of R2P in the context of its normative development. Up to now R2P has not been studied in an interdisciplinary way.

It is for this reason that this study follows an interdisciplinary approach. Moreover, by integrating academic disciplines, the inconsistent use that leaves R2P non-internalized can be clarified (Menken et al, 2014 p.16, 25). R2P arose in a liberal discourse by which the key actors in political world order shifted from nation-states towards more involved actors (Dunne, 201 p.102). This shift is precluded by historical events of the failed League of Nations, two World Wars, the rise of the UN, the Cold War and failed humanitarian interventions in the 80s and 90s. These mutually enforced social developments of internationally constructing peace and security has increased interconnectedness, institutionalization and humanitarian discourses (Baylis, 2011 p.567).

However, the first normative principle of R2P appeals to the responsibility of the nation-states (Evans et al, 2011 p.XI). History tells us that the nation-states in the Westphalian order acted out of self-interest, and for the purpose of self-help and survival in an anarchic international system (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011 p.86, 93-95). This can be understood in the political context of realism. Building on this interdisciplinary context, realist discourse is still present in the construction of R2P.

Additionally, the model on international norm dynamics presented the three stages that an international norm has to go through, in which R2P seems to be socialized but not yet internalized. This model gave insight in how the importance of nation-states, institutionalization and humanitarian discourse constituted R2P and how this affects world politics (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p.394).

Concluding, as no research has been carried out on the development of R2P, this study uses an interdisciplinary approach to study why R2P has not yet been internalized. Its political foundations of the UN Charter and the ICISS reports (2001) and the two normative principles are understood in a political-historical context of events between 1648-1999. These principles have mutually enforced social developments through which R2P arose in a liberal order in which both realist and liberal discourse are present. Lastly, the normative development of R2P can be understood best with the model of Finnemore & Sikkink (1998). This model considers R2P as socialized but not yet internalized. As presented

above, only the integration of political, historical and sociological disciplines can provide a thorough understanding on the development of R2P nowadays.

3.6 Ethical principles

This study will mainly collect data from a quantitative analysis in which ethical considerations are not relevant. However, the interviews with experts do involve ethical considerations. One interviewee is a political activist who has a lot of field experience in humanitarian interventions in the Balkan (Kosovo) and Bosnia (Srebrenica). Many personal stories resulted from these missions, which may enforce a stronger political perspective on R2P than the other interviewees who are political scientists.

Especially because the interviews are not anonymous, it is important that when integrating Fabers' perspective in the data analysis, these are not noted as reprehensible acts (Diener & Grandall, 1978; Bryman, 2008 p.118). Logically, the same applies to the other respondents, but they are expected to speak less strongly on the matter. Furthermore, all interviewees are informed in the same, transparent way about what has been aimed for in the interview and this research. Moreover, as none of the respondents are questioned about a private matter, other ethical principles are not expected to occur (Bryman, 2008 p.118).

3.7 Research positionality

My position as a researcher is of course an inextricable part of this study, because I was forced to restrain myself not to address my broad area of interest. I spoke with a lot of people to reflect upon my interest in relation to the object of study and therefore had to demarcate my sources and research. This made me delete a lot of articles and written pieces. Moreover, I have been studying R2P for two years, which influenced this study likewise. I try to keep moral distance so that certain moral judgments will be evaded.

4. Methods

4.1 Research strategy, epistemology and ontology

In order to analyze both the presence of both realist and liberal discourse and its influence on internalizing R2P, a mixed-methods research will be carried out. As will be discussed below, the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is most suitable to this study. Also, no mixed-methods research has been done on the development of R2P yet.

Instead of a fixed outcome, the goal of this research is to gain new insight into the position of R2P in the political world order. The results deriving from both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis are expected to be concerned with subjective experience. Building on the theoretical framework and the data analysis, R2P will be defined as a type of social action (Bryman, 2008 p.16, 550). This study therefore follows an epistemology of interpretivism.

Following the theoretical framework, this research builds on societal processes that are constantly in a state of revision, to examine the extent to which R2P has been internalized as an international norm after ten years (Bryman, 2008 p.19). These societal processes are also prominently present throughout this research, as R2P will be studied according to four different cases between 2004-2015. The used ontology is therefore constructivist, since it asserts that collectively held norms construct identities that are useful to understand social life (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001 p.392).

4.2 Research design, research methods and data analysis

Although comparisons will be drawn between more than two cases, this research will follow a comparative design because identical research methods will be used (Bryman, 2008 p.58). A better understanding is provided when the presence of both realist and liberal discourse is analyzed in more than one contrasting case (Bryman, 2008 p.58).

With regard to the research methods, as argued in the formulation of the research questions, a good understanding is needed from the different cases in which R2P is referred. In order to draw adequate comparisons to analyze the development of R2P and its discourses, the first research method is a document analysis. Appendix I provide a preliminary study of all 17 cases since 2005, to which R2P can be referred or invoked (ICRtoP, 2014).

Revealing the presence of both discourses requires a repetitive and transparent

method to collect standardized data, which stimulates a high reliability (Bryman, 2008 p.60). It is for this reason that the data analysis will elaborate on the performance quantitative content analysis, which is the second research method (Bryman, 2008 p.288). As will be discussed in the operationalization, both realist and liberal discourse will be subdivided into two dimensions and nine or ten indicators each. These indicators can be counted in UN resolutions on each case. The meanings that lie beneath the superficial indicators can be quantified consistently, which contribute to an alternative understanding of a social phenomenon (Bryman, 2008 p.275). Throughout all four cases the same type of documents per case will be used in order to draw comparisons.

The first and last UNSC resolutions on each case from the moment of escalation will be used to reveal possible changes in discourses when the conflict deteriorates. To reveal the response of the international community, the UNSC resolutions will be analyzed where the UN mission is deployed, whether this is under the guise of R2P or not. To substantiate these results, the resolution that preceded the deployment of the UN mission and the first follow-up resolution on the UN mission will also be analyzed.

All in all, five similar document types will be studied for each case: the first resolution, the resolution before the deployment of the UN mission, the resolution where the UN mission is deployed, the first follow-up resolution on the UN mission and the most recent resolution on each case. These documents will be analyzed in order to answer sub question one and two. Additionally, a sixth document type of press releases will be integrated to analyze the socialization process by how its normative influence is exerted in the document. This analysis will be used to formulate a partial answer on sub question three.

Comparisons of these six different document types between the four cases will be drawn from coding manuals and schedules that are constructed in line with the guidelines in Bryman (Bryman, 2008 p.280, 285). As the documents differ in length, all absolute data have been converted to percentages. The coding schedules illustrate quantified and categorized results in appendix III-VI, of which the most important coding schedules will be included in the data analysis. As such, quantitative content analysis is the most objective and systematic approach to uncover the content of these documents (Bryman, 2008 p.274).

The third research method will be concerned with conducting semi-structured interviews to formulate recommendations on which discourse might improve or hinder the internalization of R2P. Without explicitly questioning the presence of both realist and

liberal discourse in the use of R2P, the interviewees will be asked to present their perspective on the inconsistent use of R2P. Following these perspectives, they will be questioned about possible recommendations to internalize R2P. The results deriving from these interviews will be put in the context of both realist and liberal discourse in order to formulate a directive on what improves or hinders R2P from internalizing.

The interviews will be conducted with three experts that all have completely different stances on and relations to R2P. Although a standardized questionnaire will be designed, these interviews will be flexible by giving the researcher a certain space to ask specified questions to the interviewees (Bryman, 2008 p.438). This creates areas of immersion that acknowledges differences in professional objectives from their perspectives. These semi-structured interviews will all be transcribed to become aware of similarities and differences between the interviewees in order to relate them to key themes in the theoretical framework (Bryman, 2008 p.456).

In the light of the interdisciplinary approach, the theoretical framework will not solely serve as a background for the subject. More than that, as the operationalization scheme will illustrate, it provides analytical reference points on which data collection will be based. This implies that the theoretical framework, data collection and data analysis stand in close relationship to one another and therefore meet the characteristics of a grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:22 p.541).

By gathering data systematically throughout the research process, new categories are expected to arise that interrelate so that a formal theory develops (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:22 p.544). To achieve this, theoretical saturation will be used as a tool to obtain validated categories in the conducted interviews. When a category is not saturated with data, either the data analysis or the research questions should be adjusted (Strauss & Corbin, 1998 p.416).

4.3 Operationalization

4.3.1 Operationalization quantitative data analysis

As stated above, the quantitative content analysis will study the presence and differences of both realist and liberal discourse between the cases. Figure 1 and 2 provide a structured overview that illustrates the operationalized linkages between the concepts, dimensions and indicators. To operationalize both discourses, a distinction will be made between the key actors and the normative beliefs.

The first concept is the realist discourse that, building on the theoretical framework, can be subdivided in dimensions of statism as key actor and normative beliefs of both survival and self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.87). In order to count the dimension of statism, it will be indicated by the reference to nation-state as key actor and the assignation of the responsibility of the nation-state or government.

The second dimension is the normative belief of survival (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011 p.93). This will be analyzed by the importance of territorial integrity of the nation-state, the provision of the state's security, and the degree to which events outside the national boundaries are framed as external threats. Furthermore, the principles of non-intervention and the legal equality of states are integral to the realist discourse.

The third dimension of the concept of realist discourse is the normative belief of self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011 p.95). The indicators of this dimension are the belief of an anarchic international system, a state's need to be politically independent and the self-determination of states (state-sovereignty). Building on this, the following operationalization scheme can be constructed:




Figure 1 – operationalization scheme of the realist discourse

The liberal discourse is embedded in both processes of increased interconnectedness and institutionalization in the post-war era (Dunne, 2011 p.106). Resulting from this, the political world order became challenged by the involvement of more non-state actors, which is the first dimension of the liberal discourse. International institutions became more prominent and promoted collective responsibilities (Evans et al, 2001 p.8). Moreover, institutions formulate shared values and norms to create conformity, identity and legitimacy (Calhoun et al, 2012 p.116-117).

It is for these reasons that the variety of involved actors will be indicated by international institutions, shared values and norms (emphasis on 'we' or 'us'), the importance of and reference to the UN, and the cooperation with (non-) state actors. This study uses a broad definition of the UN of which all resolutions, different UN bodies and UN missions relate to the indicator of the UN.

The following dimensions derive from the humanitarian discourse of which the political focus has been put on citizens instead of nation-states (Dunne, 2011 p.102). The second dimension is normative beliefs on human security. In the aftermath of the two World Wars and the failed League of Nations, the need for collective security was stronger than ever (Dunne, 2011 p.105). This will be analyzed by the responsibility of the international community, the need to protect citizens, the threat to international peace and the importance of collective security.

The third dimension is normative beliefs on human rights, because equal possibilities for personal liberty and property should exist (Dunne, 2011 p.111-112). The indicators of this dimension are the amount of quotations to basic human rights. This underpins the importance of equality of opportunity for everyone and the tendency towards a humanitarian approach as dominant in the context of the liberal discourse (Dunne, 2011 p.102). Building on this, the following operationalization scheme can be constructed.




Figure 2 - operationalization scheme of the liberal discourse

4.3.2 Operationalization qualitative data analysis

As stated in the methods chapter, the interviews will be conducted in a semi-structured way to allow the interviewees to bring in their personal perspective on the matter of R2P. It is for this reason that the interview questions are relatively normative, focusing on three themes. The first is how the interviewees view the underlying idea of the responsibility of both nation-states and the international community to protect citizens. This forces the respondents to participate in the public discussion and respond freely (Bryman, 2008 p.438).

Secondly, after presenting the inconsistent use of R2P, the respondents will be asked to explain this inconsistency and how R2P ideally should work. Again, it is of great

importance that no directives are given and that free input on this topic is possible. Thirdly, the ultimate contribution to this study is recommendations to use R2P more consistently as an international norm, and for it to become internalized. In the light of current alternative approaches from the academic field to improve the use of R2P, the respondents will be questioned what their recommendations would be.

Finally, these outcomes will be related to the results of the quantitative content analysis in the context of both discourses. An answer can be formulated on which way both discourses influence the internalization of R2P. The interview guide can be found in appendix VII (Dutch) and the transliterations of the interviews (English or Dutch) in appendix VIII.

4.4 Data preparation

4.4.1 Introduction

As described in the formulation of the research question, a preliminary study will be carried out to select four from the seventeen cases to which R2P can be referred (ICRtoP, 2014). With this, the presence and differences of both realist and liberal discourse on these four cases can be analyzed to answer sub question one, two and partly three. This section will be concerned with selecting the four cases adequately.

4.4.2 Three selection criteria

The four cases that will be studied in this research are selected according to two criteria, of which the first is whether or not R2P has been invoked. Two cases in which the UNSC invoked R2P as singular body legitimizing a military intervention will be selected. This will be compared with two cases where the UNSC didn't invoke R2P. Following this criterion, differences in both discourses between the cases to which R2P has and hasn't been invoked can be identified.

With regard to the document types, selecting cases according to this criterion will be determined by the UN resolutions in which a UN mission has been deployed. This document type presents the decisive action of the UNSC and illustrates whether military force is legitimized under the guise of R2P. Below, figure 3 presents the five document types on the four cases.

The second criterion is the date in which each case embroiled in conflict. The cases will also be selected according to the period of time that R2P has been ratified, from 2005

to 2015. With this criterion, the development that R2P has undergone in the context of both discourses can be analyzed throughout the years. To determine when each case embroiled in conflict, the column on ‘the period of crisis’ in figure 4 will be decisive.

	First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Most recent Resolution	Press releases
DRC	Resolution 1592 30/03/2005	Resolution 2078 28/11/2012	Resolution 2098 28/03/2013	Resolution 2136 30/01/2014	Resolution 2147 28/03/2014	28/03/13 US Department of State
Darfur	Resolution 1556 30/07/2004	Resolution 1755 30/04/2007	Resolution 1769 31/07/2007	Resolution 1779 28/09/2007	Resolution 2173 27/08/2014	09/03/2006 Save Darfur Coalition
Côte d’Ivoire	Resolution 1962 20/12/2010	Resolution 1962 20/12/2010	Resolution 1962 20/12/2010	Resolution 1967 19/01/2011	Resolution 2162 25/06/2014	03/04/2011 International Crisis Group
Libya	Resolution 1973 17/03/2011	Resolution 1973 17/03/2011	Resolution 1973 17/03/2011	Resolution 2009 16/09/2011	Resolution 2174 27/08/2014	28/03/2011 President Obama

Figure 3 – Each document type per case upon which the quantitative content analysis will be conducted (appendix III–Document types)

4.4.3 *Selecting four cases*

To substantiate the selection of four cases from all 17 in which R2P was referred or invoked, an extensive conflict analysis on each case has been given in appendix I. Based on the information of ICRtoP (2014), the background of each conflict has been described. Also, the actions by the UN, civil society organizations and other actors are presented that did not refer to R2P. This is followed up by a discussion of all actions to which R2P has been referred or invoked. Deriving from this conflict analysis of each case, an overview is presented in figure 4 below (appendix II).

Building on the aforementioned criteria, figure 4 presents two cases where the UNSC invoked R2P: in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. In Libya, this is based UN Resolution 1973 where a UN mission was deployed (2011, figure 3), stating:

‘ Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. Authorizes Member States..to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians.’ (RES/1973/2011)

The notification of taking all necessary measures in line with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was enables the invocation of R2P legitimately. Likewise, in Côte d’Ivoire a UN mission was deployed in UN Resolution 1962 (2010, figure 3) noting that:

‘ Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

14. Recalls its authorization given to UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate.

17. Decides to extend until 30 June 2011 the authorization the Security Council provided to the French Forces in order to support UNOCI.’ (RES/1962/2010)

Following this mandate, on April 4th 2011 UN peacekeepers and French forces fired Gbagbo’s troops (ICRtoP, 2014). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, military intervention was legitimized in the deployment of both UN missions to protect civilians, under the guise of R2P (figure 3, RES/1973, 2011 and RES/1962/2010). It is for this reason that these two cases will be used to conduct a quantitative content analysis.

Following criterion two on the development of R2P throughout time, as both invocations of R2P in these cases are relatively in the middle of R2P’s existence (2010-2011), the most recent case as well as one case around 2005 will be selected. This excludes all cases around 2010-2011, which leaves Burma, CAR, Darfur, the DRC, South-Sudan and Sudan as optional cases. Of these, Burma, CAR and Darfur are cases that embroiled in conflict around 2005. However, the grounds on which R2P has been referred to the case in Burma are dubious because they were based on both ethnical principles and the natural disaster Cyclone Nargis (ICRtoP, 2014). In the CAR, no peace deal has been signed yet and thus this conflict technically continues (ICRtoP, 2014). It is for this reason that the case on Darfur, as the first case since R2P has been ratified, has been selected for the data analysis.

The three selected cases, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Darfur, peaked with a period of crisis of one to four years (figure 4). In order to analyze the change of both discourses in each case throughout time, the period of crisis should be diverse for the purpose of a representative, systematic sample (Bryman, 2008 p.278). The other cases are the DRC, South-Sudan and Sudan, of which the periods of crisis in South-Sudan and Sudan are one year (figure 4). As the conflict in the DRC has been ongoing for 16 years, the DRC is

expected to have an added value on the data analysis. Concluding, the quantitative content analysis will be conducted according to the cases Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur and the DRC.

It is important to note, before discussing the findings that the international community responded rapidly in the case of Libya and Côte d'Ivoire. It is for this reason that the first resolution, the resolution before the deployment of the UN mission and the resolution on the deployment of the UN mission, are one and the same document. A different remark is on the case of Darfur, of which the first resolution was published in 2004. It is for this reason that the cases will be compared over the period 2004-2015 instead of the ratification of R2P in 2005. Building on this data preparation, the quantitative content analysis can be carried out its findings will be discussed in the next chapter.

Case	Period of crisis/crises 2005-2015	R2P invoked by UNSC yes/no
1. Burma	2006-2014	no
2. CAR	2005-2014	no
3. Côte d'Ivoire	2010-2011	yes
4. Darfur	2003-2007	no
5. DRC	1996-2013	no
6. Guinea	2008-2010	no
7. Kenya	2007-2010	no
8. Kyrgyzstan	2010	no
9. Iraq	2006-2008 and 2011-..	no
10. Libya	2011	yes
11. Mali	2011-2012	no
12. Nigeria	2010-..	no
13. South-Sudan	2013-2014	no
14. Sudan	2012-2013	no

15. Sri Lanka	1983-2009	no
16. Syria	2011-2013	no
17. Zimbabwe	2008	no

Figure 4 - Table of all 19 cases formulated by the ICRtoP based on appendix I (see appendix II)

5. Results

5.1 Introduction

The findings of the quantitative analysis will be discussed in accordance with the three sub questions. As such, the first section will be concerned with the first sub question on the presence of both realist and liberal discourse in each document. Building on the outcomes, the second section will discuss three elements in order to answer the second sub question on the development between the four cases in 2004-2015. Firstly, two general observations in each discourse will be presented that issue an outlier and the spread of the indicators throughout each case. Secondly, the results from the comparison between the cases in which R2P has and where it hasn't been invoked will be discussed. Thirdly, the development of both discourses throughout the period of 2004-2015 will be analyzed.

The third section is concerned with answering the third sub question on the influence of both discourses on the internalization of R2P. To answer this question, this section is subdivided in a quantitative content analysis and complementary, qualitative semi-structured interviews. By means of the same analysis as described above the press releases on each case will be quantified in order to analyze the normative development of R2P.

In addition to the quantitative content analysis, three interviews will be incorporated with experts on R2P. These will be discussed in order to detect a directive of which discourse promotes or hinders R2P from internalizing. As will be indicated, the most important coding schedules will be included in the research. The interview guides and transliterations can be found in appendix VII and VIII.

5.2 Research findings

5.2.1 Development of both discourses within each case

Based on the dates of all UN resolutions, in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire the situation escalated in a short period of one or two years. In contrast to these cases, the DRC and Darfur had an open, military conflict for four years or longer. As R2P has been in force for nine years, these cases have a relatively long duration of conflict. Analyzing the development of R2P within each case may therefore reveal a certain shift in both realist and liberal discourses.

Following figure 5 as presented below, in the case of Libya document types referred to the liberal discourse with 59,65% in the first three document types. The fourth document type illustrates a presence of the liberal discourse of 57,36% and the fifth document type of

57,14%. This reveals a slight decrease in dominance of the liberal discourse. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the first three document types present a percentage of 71,64% of the liberal indicators. This increased enormously in the fourth document type with 92,19%, but decreased with 63,28% in the fifth document type. The presence of the liberal discourse in the case of the DRC has sequential percentages of 63,74%, 65,67%, 71,1%, 64,02% and 70,99% throughout the five document types. The percentages of the liberal discourse in the five document types on Darfur are 65,41%, 82,35%, 85%, 82,93% and 79,30%.

In conclusion to sub question one, this section revealed the presence of both realist and liberal discourses in each case. No clear pattern of increase or decrease of both discourses in each case can be found. However, the liberal discourse was clearly present in each case separately. Throughout all five document types, at least 57,14% represented a liberal discourse in the fifth document type of Libya. At most, 92,19% is covered by the liberal discourse in the fourth document type on Côte d'Ivoire. In other words, these results support the dominance of the liberal discourse in UN resolutions on humanitarian situations. With these results, comparisons can be drawn between the cases.

		First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution
Libya	realist discourse	92 (40,35%)	92 (40,35%)	92 (40,35%)	84 (42,64%)	42 (42,86%)
	liberal discourse	136 (59,65%)	136 (59,65%)	136 (59,65%)	113 (57,36%)	56 (57,14%)
	both discourses	228 (100%)	228 (100%)	228 (100%)	197 (100%)	98 (100%)
Côte d'Ivoire	realist discourse	38 (28,36%)	38 (28,36%)	38 (28,36%)	5 (7,81%)	130 (36,72%)
	liberal discourse	96 (71,64%)	96 (71,64%)	96 (71,64%)	59 (92,19%)	224 (63,28%)
	both discourses	134 (100%)	134 (100%)	134 (100%)	64 (100%)	354 (100%)
DRC	realist discourse	33 (36,26%)	69 (34,33%)	152 (28,90%)	95 (35,98%)	159 (29,01%)
	liberal discourse	58 (63,74%)	132 (65,67%)	374 (71,10%)	169 (64,02%)	389 (70,99%)
	both discourses	91 (100%)	201 (100%)	526 (100%)	264 (100%)	548 (100%)
Darfur	realist discourse	55 (34,59%)	15 (17,65%)	36 (15%)	14 (17,07%)	65 (20,70%)
	liberal discourse	104 (65,41%)	70 (82,35%)	204 (85%)	68 (82,93%)	249 (79,30%)
	both discourses	159 (100%)	85 (100%)	240 (100%)	82 (100%)	314 (100%)

Figure 5 - Proportion realist and liberal discourse per document type on each case (calculated on the basis of appendix III)

5.2.2 Development of both discourses between all four cases

In order to formulate an answer to the second sub question, firstly two general observations will be discussed that apply to both realist and liberal discourse. Following figure 6, the first observation is concerned with outliers that emerge in each discourse throughout all document types. The second observation illustrates a disparity between the spread of realist indicators as to the liberal indicators. Secondly, a comparison will be drawn of both discourses between the cases in which R2P has been and hasn't been invoked in order to reveal possible differences. Thirdly, both discourses in all four cases will be analyzed between 2004-2015 to illustrate the development of both discourses throughout time.

With reference to the realist discourse, the first observation is the enormous reference to nation-states, realist indicator 1. Below, figure 6 is based on appendix IV-1 that presents a coding schedule on the presence of realist indicators per document type in relation to all cases. Following figure 6, the reference to realist indicator 1 representing nation states covers 81,19%, 79,91%, 79,87%, 83,84% and 88,13% of the realist discourse. This implies that realist indicator 1 representing nation-states is the most important when realist discourse is present in a UN resolution.

This observation closely relates to the second observation, which is concerned with the spread of the discourse. Throughout the five document types a similar pattern has been discovered on the spread of indicators within the realist and liberal discourses. Following figure 6, apart from the dominance of realist indicator 1, indicator 7 and 8 were not counted at all. This leaves seven indicators that throughout all document types represents between 0,51% and 8,18% (figure 6).

In other words, a very uneven distribution of realist indicators is illustrated because apart from indicator 1, the other realist indicators are rarely present throughout all five document-types of the four cases. Hence, it can be concluded that the capacity of the realist discourse throughout these UN resolutions is quite low. There have been a lot of references to nation-states in international political discourse, but other realist indicators are relatively underrepresented.

With reference to the liberal discourse, the first observation illustrates a dominance of liberal indicator 3, the reference to the UN. Following figure 6, liberal indicator 3 covers 45,69%, 50,69%, 48,15%, 56,27% and 52,40% of the liberal discourse. These percentages reveal the emphasis on the UN as an international institution throughout the five political documents on all four cases. Although more reference has been made to realist indicator 1

regarding its percentages, liberal indicator 3 is still dominant as to the other liberal indicators. These results imply that the UN is framed as a central actor in international political discourse, embedded in the liberal discourse.

The second observation issues the spread of the liberal indicators. In contrast to the realist discourse, a much more equal distribution of liberal indicators can be observed in figure 6. Liberal indicator 2 is not mentioned at all, which apart from liberal indicator 3 leaves seven indicators uncovered. Following figure 6, these seven indicators represent between 0,23 % and 18,89% throughout all document types.

In other words, on average 96,25% of the liberal discourse is spread over five liberal indicators (excluding indicator 2, 7 and 8). This distribution is more equal than the realist discourse whereby on average realist indicator 1 covers 83,11% (figure 6). These results illustrate that apart from many references to liberal indicator 3, throughout all resolutions the other liberal indicators are much more present than the realist indicators apart from realist indicator 1. Hence, the liberal discourse has much more capacity than the realist discourse because its indicators are distributed more proportionally.

	First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution	Total
1. Nation state	177 (81,19%)	171 (79,91%)	254 (79,87%)	166 (83,84%)	349 (88,13%)	1117 (83,11%)
2. Responsibility of the nation state	15 (6,88%)	13 (6,07%)	16 (5,03%)	16 (8,08%)	18 (4,55%)	78 (5,80%)
3. Territorial integrity	5 (2,29%)	5 (2,34%)	7 (2,20%)	3 (1,52%)	5 (1,26%)	25 (1,86%)
4. State's security	11 (5,05%)	14 (6,54%)	26 (8,18%)	4 (2,02%)	12 (3,03%)	67 (4,99%)
5. External threats outside the state's boundaries	1 (0,46%)	1 (0,47%)	1 (0,31%)	1 (0,51%)	-	4 (0,30%)
6. Principle of non-intervention	1 (0,46%)	2 (0,93%)	3 (0,94%)	2 (1,01%)	3 (0,78%)	11 (0,82%)
7. Legal equality of states	-	-	-	-	-	-

8. International system as anarchy	-	-	-	-	-	-
9. Political independence	4 (1,83%)	4 (1,87%)	4 (1,26%)	3 (1,52%)	4 (1,01%)	19 (1,41%)
10. Self determination (state sovereignty)	4 (1,83%)	4 (1,87%)	7 (2,20%)	3 (1,52%)	5 (1,26%)	23 (1,71%)
Total	218 (100%)	214 (100%)	318 (100%)	198 (100%)	396 (100%)	1344 (100%)

	First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution	Total
1. International institutions	66 (16,75%)	65 (14,98%)	153 (18,89%)	52 (12,78%)	103 (11,22%)	439 (14,82%)
2. Shared values and norms ('we' or 'us')	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Importance of and referring to the UN	180 (45,69%)	220 (50,69%)	390 (48,15%)	229 (56,27%)	481 (52,40%)	1500 (50,62%)
4. Cooperation with (non-) state actors	32 (8,12%)	33 (7,60%)	68 (8,40%)	35 (8,60%)	52 (5,66%)	220 (7,42%)
5. Responsibility of the international community	5 (1,27%)	12 (2,76%)	6 (0,74%)	9 (2,21%)	18 (1,96%)	50 (1,69%)
6. Protection of citizens	68 (17,26%)	71 (16,36%)	126 (15,56%)	52 (12,78%)	165 (17,97%)	482 (16,28%)
7. Threat to international peace and security	9 (2,28%)	8 (1,84%)	14 (1,73%)	4 (0,98%)	12 (1,31%)	47 (1,59%)
8. Collective security	1 (0,25%)	1 (0,23%)	3 (0,37%)	3 (0,74%)	6 (0,65%)	14 (0,47%)

9. Human rights and international humanitarian law	33 (8,38%)	24 (5,53%)	50 (6,17%)	23 (5,65%)	81 (8,82%)	211 (7,12%)
Total	394 (100%)	434 (100%)	810 (100%)	407 (100%)	918 (100%)	2963 (100%)

Figure 6 – Coding schedule of both realist and liberal discourse per document type on all cases (appendix IV-1)

Apart from these two general observations throughout all document types, this content analysis also uncovered differences between the cases in which R2P has been invoked and where it hasn't. With regard to figure 5, the liberal discourse is dominant in all document types on each case. In the R2P case of Libya, the liberal discourse is constantly present between 57,14% and 59,65% referring to all five document types (figure 5). As to the document types on Côte d'Ivoire where R2P had been invoked as well, the liberal discourse was present between 63,28% and 92,19% as to the realist discourse (figure 5). These results illustrate no correlation between the two R2P cases Libya and Côte d'Ivoire as the presence of both liberal discourses do not correspond.

With regard to the two cases in this study where the R2P principles are applicable but R2P hasn't been invoked, the liberal discourse in the case of the DRC was constantly present between 63,74% and 71,10% as to the realist discourse (figure 5). A similar pattern can be observed in the case of Darfur, where the liberal discourse covered between 65,41% and 85% throughout the five document types. Despite the fact that the presence of the liberal discourse in both cases where R2P hasn't been invoked overlap one another in terms of percentages, no clear disparity can be found between the cases where R2P has and hasn't been invoked. Concluding, as throughout all four cases the liberal discourse was quite equally present, no relation between the use of a discourse and the invocation of R2P can be revealed.

The third analysis studied the differences in both discourses throughout the period 2004-2015. Appendix V 1-4 is concerned with the division of all documents into three categories of a similar period of time. Deriving from these results, figure 7 presents a changing pattern of both realist and liberal discourse in the three categories. The presence of the liberal discourse in category 1 is 76,71%, in category 2 it decreases to 71,90% and in category 3 to 68,19%.

Although all five document types are dominated by the liberal discourse, this analysis illustrated a decreased presence of the liberal discourse. In other words, these results

suggest a greater prominence of the realist discourse. As such, the development of R2P as international norm throughout time doesn't directly go hand in hand with an increased presence of the liberal discourse, in which R2P is embedded.

	Cat. 1 8/2004 – 11/2007	Cat. 2 12/2007 – 3/2011	Cat. 3 4/2011 – 8/2014
Total realist discourse	153 (23,29%)	295 (28,10%)	796 (31,81%)
Total liberal discourse	504 (76,71%)	755 (71,90%)	1706 (68,19%)
Total both discourses	657 (100%)	1050 (100%)	2502 (100%)

Figure 7 - Proportion realist as to the liberal discourse on average per period (appendix V-5)

In conclusion to sub question two on the development of both discourses between the four cases, four results derived from the content analysis. Firstly, this research illustrated an emphasis on referring to realist indicator 1 representing nation-states and revealed an unequal distribution as to the other realist indicators. Secondly, in the context of the liberal discourse references to liberal indicator 3 representing the UN have also been dominant. However, the presence of other liberal indicators is more proportionally.

Thirdly, with respect to the invocation of R2P there is no pattern between the cases in which R2P has (not) been invoked and the proportion of both realist and liberal discourses. Fourth, concerning the comparison throughout the period 2004-2015, the dominance of the liberal discourse decreases over time. As all document types were UN resolutions, the next section will analyze the socialization process that is being exerted on the four cases. In addition, interviews will be discussed with experts reflecting upon the use of R2P.

5.2.3 Beyond UN resolutions

The third sub question is concerned with the influence of both discourses on the internalization of R2P. Therefore the quantitative results from the content analysis will be discussed firstly in order to analyze the normative development of R2P in the context of both discourses. For this purpose, the same analysis as the one that was used on the four cases will be conducted. The presence of both discourses will be studied in the press releases. Consequently, two general observations concerning an outlier and the spread of the indicators will be presented. Furthermore, results will be discussed from the comparison

between the cases where R2P has and where it hasn't been invoked. Last, the development of both discourses throughout the period 2004-2015 will be analyzed.

Secondly, this analysis will be followed up by three interviews with experts on R2P. Quotes will illustrate the opinion of the interviewees on why R2P is used inconsistently and how to improve the international norm. As the quantitative content analysis illustrated the normative influence and presence of both discourses, the interviews will provide a directive of both discourses, which promotes and hinders the internalization of R2P as an international norm.

5.2.3.1 Press releases

Firstly, the presence of both discourses in each case and two general observations will be discussed. In line with the five document types on each case, figure 8 presents the dominance of the liberal discourse in each press release per case. To illustrate, in Libya the liberal discourse covered 71,56%, in Côte d'Ivoire 75%, in the DRC 76,47% and in Darfur 81,48% (figure 8).

Consequently, figure 9 is concerned with the presence of both realist and liberal indicators. With regards to the realist discourse, just as the five document types, figure 9 reveal the dominance of realist indicator 1 representing nation-states. In Libya realist indicator 1 covers 91,58% in Libya, 66,67% in Côte d'Ivoire, 83,33% in the DRC and 100% in Darfur (figure 9). As to the spread within the realist discourse, a similar minimal presence of other realist indicators can be noticed. Seven realist indicators out of ten are not counted at all, which illustrates a low capacity of the realist discourse (figure 9).

With respect to the liberal discourse, in contrast to the five document types, liberal indicator 3, representing the UN, doesn't dominate throughout the press releases. Instead, liberal indicator 2 on 'shared values and norms' is very present throughout all press releases. To illustrate this observation, in Libya 55,23% of all results was referred to liberal indicator 2. In Côte d'Ivoire this percentage is 33,33%, in the DRC 23,08% and in Darfur 22,73%.

These high percentages can be clarified by the enormous use of 'we' and 'us' in all press releases. These words appeal to conform with the speech actor on behalf of the institutions who responded to one of the four cases. It stimulates collective consensus, which implies that through these press releases normative influence is exerted to socialize the target audience. In other words, the action of international community is conveyed,

along with encouraging collective approval.

What does correspond to the five document types is the spread of the liberal discourse. Following figure 9, each indicator has been counted in at least one case. In the column total, realist indicator 1 covers 89,83% of the realist discourse and liberal indicator 2 covers 47,80% (figure 9). The other liberal indicators represent between 0,94% and 16,35% of the liberal discourse. Hence, it can be concluded that the liberal discourse is much more proportionally distributed and therefore has a greater capacity in the press releases than the realist discourse.

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur
Total realist discourse	95 (28,44%)	6 (25%)	12 (23,53%)	5 (18,52)
Total liberal discourse	239 (71,56%)	18 (75%)	39 (76,47%)	22 (81,48%)
Total	334 (100%)	24 (100%)	51 (100%)	27 (100%)

Figure 8 - Proportion realist and liberal discourse in press releases per case (appendix VI-2)

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. Nation state	87 (91,58%)	4 (66,67%)	10 (83,33%)	5 (100%)	106 (89,83%)
2. Responsibility of the nation state	5 (5,26%)	2 (33,33%)	2 (16,67%)	-	9 (7,63%)
3. Territorial integrity	-	-	-	-	-
4. State's security	3 (3,16%)	-	-	-	3 (2,54%)
5. External threats outside the state's boundaries	-	-	-	-	-
6. Principle of non-intervention	-	-	-	-	-
7. Legal equality of states	-	-	-	-	-
8. International system as anarchy	-	-	-	-	-
9. Political independence	-	-	-	-	-
10. Self determination	-	-	-	-	-

(state sovereignty)					
Total	95 (100%)	6 (100%)	12 (100%)	5 (100%)	118 (100%)
	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. International institutions	7 (2,93%)	3 (16,67%)	1 (2,56%)	9 (40,91%)	20 (6,29%)
2. Shared values and norms ('we' or 'us')	132 (55,23%)	6 (33,33%)	9 (23,08%)	5 (22,73%)	152 (47,80%)
3. Importance of and referring to the UN	5 (2,09%)	2 (11,11%)	16 (41,03%)	2 (9,09%)	25 (7,86%)
4. Cooperation with (non-) state actors	22 (9,20%)	1 (5,56%)	2 (5,13%)	1 (4,55%)	26 (8,17%)
5. Responsibility of the international community	18 (7,53%)	4 (22,22%)	3 (7,69%)	-	25 (7,86%)
6. Protection of citizens	40 (16,74%)	1 (5,56%)	7 (17,95%)	4 (18,18%)	52 (16,35%)
7. Threat to international peace and security	3 (1,26%)	-	-	-	3 (0,94%)
8. Collective security	4 (1,67%)	-	-	-	4 (1,26%)
9. Human rights and international humanitarian law	8 (3,35%)	1 (5,56%)	1 (2,56%)	1 (4,55%)	11 (3,46%)
Total	239 (100%)	18 (100%)	39 (100%)	22 (100%)	318 (100%)

Figure 9 - Coding schedule of both realist and liberal discourse of the press release per case (appendix VI-1)

Secondly, this study analyzed differences in both discourses in cases where R2P has been and hasn't been invoked. In line with the five document types, figure 8 presents a decrease of the liberal discourse in the cases where R2P has been invoked. In the case of Libya, the liberal discourse dominated with 71,56% and in the case of Côte d'Ivoire it was 75%. The two cases where R2P has not been invoked illustrate an increase of the liberal discourse of 76,47% in the DRC and 81,48% in Darfur. Based on these results, it can be noticed that the

liberal discourse was a little more dominant in the cases where R2P was not invoked.

Thirdly, the development of both discourses throughout time is also studied in the press releases. In figure 3 (section Data preparation), providing the date of each press release can be found. The first was in 2006 on the case in Darfur, in which the liberal discourse was most dominant with 81,48% compared to the other three cases. The second press release was on Libya in 2011 and presents a less dominating liberal discourse with 71,56%.

Subsequently, one week later the third document on Côte d'Ivoire covered 75% of the liberal discourse, was released. The last press release on the DRC was in 2013, and covered 76,47% of the liberal discourse. In other words, the press releases over time do not illustrate a certain pattern of increasing or decreasing presence of both discourses.

In conclusion, the content analysis illustrated a dominance of the liberal discourse in the press releases on the four cases (figure 8). As to the outliers and distribution within both discourses, apart from referring to nation-states the realist discourse was not broadly supported in international political discourse. The liberal discourse in the press releases illustrated an emphasis on liberal indicator 2 representing 'shared values' by which normative influence is exerted on society (figure 9). This appeal to collective approval can be seen as a socializing act of persuaded actors promoting international action as appropriate behavior. In combination with a rather proportional distribution of the liberal indicators, this discourse had a greater capacity in international political discourse than the realist discourse.

When comparing the cases in which R2P has been and where it hasn't been invoked, the liberal discourse appeared to be more dominant in the cases where R2P hasn't been invoked. With regard to the normative development of R2P throughout time, no correlation has been observed between the period of time and a change in both discourses. These two comparisons on whether or not R2P has been invoked and the development throughout time, parallels the outcomes of the five document types in sub question 2.

5.2.3.2 Interviews with experts

Other than the quantitative content analysis, a reflective perspective from three experts on R2P. Three semi-structured interviews were arranged through e-mail, after which Mient-Jan Faber (respondent 1) and Wolfgang Wagner (respondent 2) were interviewed in real life and Jaap respondent 3 (respondent 3) by phone. The interviewer and interviewees met either on

the University of Amsterdam or in a café, which created an environment suitable for an interview about their personal view on R2P. As the outcomes appeared to differ widely, the results are not categorized. The transliterations of the interviews can be found in appendix VIII.

Based on the observations and recommendations of the interviewees, the researcher has aimed at formulating a directive of both discourses of which promote and hinder the internalization of R2P as an international norm. It is for this reason that the outcomes will be subdivided in reasoning behind the inconsistent use of R2P and recommendations to internalize R2P as an international norm.

In the context of R2P being used inconsistently, respondent 1 took a strong stance on the Dutch troops in Srebrenica where a humanitarian disaster raged and human right abuses were observed. Respondent 1 argued that these troops should have stayed and the fact they left is a disgrace to the Netherlands. This view that these troops should have stayed implies a certain sentiment of the responsibility to protect. However, he argued that an internationally constructed concept such as R2P doesn't exist, because these failures of the international community to act adequately in the 80s and 90s caused avoidance of getting involved in humanitarian situations. This has led to inconsistent use of R2P (respondent 1, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam). As respondent 1 stated:

‘En dan, die mislukkingen leiden er niet toe normaal gesproken dat je daarvan leert. Nee die mislukkingen leiden ertoe dat je ze voortaan vermijdt. En dat je dus zegt van doe dat dus nooit meer dan kunnen we ook niet meer in zo'n situatie belanden.’ (respondent 1, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam).

In addition to avoiding humanitarian intervention, when states consider intervening, the costs for them are very difficult to calculate. When asked why people don't intervene, respondent 1 answered:

‘Omdat men de prijs van interventie niet kan berekenen. Men weet niet wat het kost, als je daar een keer in gaat zitten nou ja enfin. Want je kunt het ze, je weet niet waar je in terecht komt, je kunt je er niet goed op voorbereiden.’ (respondent 1, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam)

According to respondent 1, this avoidance in combination with the capriciousness of the price of intervention is hindering consistent use of R2P. However, a different argumentation

is presented by respondent 3, who clarified the inconsistent use of R2P by the necessity of political or geographical nearness of a humanitarian crisis situation. Closely related to this are the state's interests as an important element when turning to humanitarian intervention. As respondent 3 put it:

‘Nou het heeft natuurlijk met de situatie te maken... En verder is het gewoon nabijheid. Ik bedoel, Congo ligt niet aan de Middellandse Zee en heeft geen gas, olie en gas. En Libië wel... Dus dan komen er gewoon andere belangen bij waardoor je denkt van ja dan moeten we dit toch als een urgenter probleem definiëren dan Congo.’ (respondent 3, interview May 18th 2014 Amsterdam).

Respondent 2 states that the concept of R2P is embedded in the liberal democratic system of which its principles are easily accommodated in the (Western) value system with liberal democratic states. However, it is precisely the problem of the inconsistent use of R2P that it lacks capacity. R2P is more difficult to accommodate in non-liberal democratic systems such as Russia or China, which hinders universalized application (respondent 2, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam):

‘Well I think it is a bit a problem of empathy on the part of say the liberal democratic states and the liberal democratic community... That too many people have not enough sensitivity for the legitimate concerns of key players such as Russia and China and they are.. There is a tendency to denigrate because they are not ruled democratically and have all kinds of other problems probably. But in the current system they are legitimate actors under international law and some of their interpretations of what R2P entails, might be quite accurate actually.’ (respondent 2, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam)

Besides this view on R2P as not being easy to apply universally, practical constraints do also prevent R2P from being used consistently. Once decided to intervene militarily, various expectations between the targeted citizens and the intervening actors creates a discrepancy with the primary responsibility to protect citizens. This creates a political dynamic in its own that is very difficult to steer and manage, which retains states from intervention. This closely relates to the capriciousness from a state's perspective that was mentioned by respondent 1. As respondent 2 stated:

‘And this debate is often detached from considerations of what it really brings to the people, what it really contributes to the human security et cetera. So this is a dynamic of its own that is difficult to

control once it's launched.' (respondent 2, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam)

Apart from diverse argumentations on the inconsistent use of R2P as an international norm, all three interviewees also came up with recommendations on how to improve the internalization of R2P. According to respondent 1, instead of the current concept of R2P the responsibility to protect should take place on a local level. He supported this argumentation with the successful efforts of the African Union to address humanitarian situations and sending troops. Being included in local networks creates identification and therefore the commitment to take responsibility:

'Als je echt in dat soort conflictgebieden een verschil wil maken, dien je je toch in sterkere mate te identificeren met de mensen in het land... En een internationaal model werkt niet, heel slecht omdat je dan al dat gesodemieter krijgt met de Veiligheidsraad en weet ik wat van vetorechten enzovoort en zo meer. Het móet lokaal worden opgepakt.' (respondent 1, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam).

According to respondent 1 this is the condition under which principles of protecting each other and humanitarian intervention can be observed consistently. A different recommendation on improving the internalization of R2P is presented by respondent 3. He strongly advocates analyzing the function of states in world politics. By studying the use of R2P in speech acts of world leaders, the development of R2P as an international norm can be understood and its functioning improved:

'Interessanter om te kijken waarom ze bepaalde dingen wel en waarom ze bepaalde dingen niet doen. En dan zie je dus dat er de afgelopen decennium het principe van RtoP is ontstaan waarvan het nog heel onduidelijk is wat het eigenlijk precies voorstelt... Waar het meer om gaat is waarom gebruikt men dat soort argumenten, waarom noemt men het complex. "Het is zo complex, dan kunnen we het maar beter niet doen." Nou, misschien is dat wel, heeft dat wel een hele andere functie dan waar de woorden werkelijk voor staan... En dan hoop je als wetenschapper dat als we er maar genoeg discussie over blijven hebben dat er dan ook aandacht voor blijft in de praktijk en dat je daardoor dan toch iets opschiet.' (respondent 3, interview May 18th 2014 Amsterdam)

In line with this argument, equally important are the critical voices in society from papers, talk shows and universities (respondent 2, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam). These contribute to the necessary self-reflection of what R2P actually is and what is not. As

respondent 2 stated, these critical reflections thrive best in a liberal democratic environment:

‘The second way of this gap would be a public discussion, critical voices and this thesis can be part of this. Not the one single statement.. But this is one of the key merits of liberal democracies that they allow these debates and there are critical voices that you can read from papers and hear from talk shows and just have them discussed at universities. And that is important because it contributes to the necessary self-reflection on what R2P actually is and what it’s not.’ (respondent 2, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam).

Lastly, respondent 2 strongly advocates improving the formalized procedures of R2P in order to stimulate consistent use. In contrast to respondent 1, respondent 2 does promote the concept of R2P on a global level, provided that the self-entitlement of the UNSC to justify and authorize R2P is reconsidered (respondent 2, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam). This implies that the internalization of R2P as an international norm requires international cooperation to improve the procedures of R2P. As respondent 2 put it:

‘No I mean, it has to be bridged by procedures. And in principle the procedures are in place. Because even when there is a new norm of R2P, the monopoly of the United Nations Security Council to authorize use of force remains.’ (respondent 2, interview May 20th 2014 Amsterdam)

In conclusion, although the observations and recommendation of all three experts on the functioning of R2P vary widely, a certain pattern can be revealed. According to respondent 1, respondent 2 and respondent 3, R2P is being used inconsistently because of the failed humanitarian interventions causing avoidance of involvement, the capriciousness of the price of intervention, the lack of nearness, conflicting interests, unpredictability of a humanitarian intervention and difficulties of universal application.

All arguments can be related to the importance of states when considering humanitarian intervention. Apparently, these remain crucial actors in world politics of which their characteristics are embedded in realist discourse. In other words, the inconsistent use of R2P can be understood in the context of nation-states that are unwilling or hesitant to intervene because it is unclear to what extent it will affect the nation-state. These realist elements hinder the internalization of R2P as an international norm.

In addition to the perspectives on inconsistent use of R2P, different recommendations

are suggested in order to improve consistent use of R2P. These vary from enforcing local networks, analyzing the function and relations of states to one another, stimulating critical voices in society on the functioning of R2P or improve the UN procedures on R2P. The arguments of local networks and improving UN procedures are underpinned by liberal principles of (international) cooperation. Here, inclusion can be created in networks in which states have a less prominent role. Furthermore, these arguments illustrate the need for collective responsibility of which the UN might be an important institution to facilitate R2P.

The other two arguments are concerned with the need to analyze state's dynamics and critically reflect upon the practice of R2P. By means of these two recommendations, collective consensus can be strived for to enhance R2P as an international norm and maintain international peace and security. In other words, the arguments that hold that R2P is used inconsistently reveal the presence of realist discourse that prevents R2P from internalizing. The recommendations on how to improve R2P as an international norm are underpinned by liberal indicators. As such, internalizing R2P can be enforced by increased prominence of the liberal discourse.

6. Conclusion

This mixed methods research followed an interdisciplinary approach, conducted a quantitative content analysis and three semi-structured interviews. The obtained results were used to try to formulate an answer to the main research question: **In which way does the presence of both realist and liberal discourse influence the internalization of R2P as an international norm in international political discourse between 2004-2015?** In order to answer this question, the findings on the three sub questions have been discussed in the light of previous research on R2P.

The first sub question is: *Based on the four cases to which R2P has been referred or invoked between 2004-2015, what is the presence of both realist and liberal discourse in each case separately?* As the quantitative content analysis presented with regard to appendix III and figure 5 (appendix IV-3), both realist and liberal discourse are present. However, the liberal discourse has been dominant throughout each document type on Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC and Darfur.

These results illustrate that the cases to which R2P can be referred, are congruent with the liberal order in which R2P arose. These UN resolutions on humanitarian situations were underpinned by basic ideas of human dignity, equality and protecting vulnerable groups from bodily harm. Such ideas have more transnational resonance since they correspond to the liberal discourse (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.907).

As the first sub question was issued with findings on each case separately, the second sub question has drawn different comparisons, and goes as follows: *In which way does both realist and liberal discourse develop between the four cases between 2004-2015?* The first observation with regards to the realist discourse is concerned with realist indicator 1 in which a lot of reference has been made to nation-states. Here, nation-states are prominent actors in the international political world order, which corresponds to the first realist element of statism (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.86).

However, the second observation of the quantitative content analysis on the realist discourse reveals a very limited use of the other realist indicators, representing the two dimensions of normative beliefs on survival and self-help. This implies that the distribution of the realist discourse is disproportionate, by which its realist capacity throughout the four cases is quite low. The presence of the UN as an international authority can clarify this. Following the realist dimension of survival in the quantitative content analysis, states do not

consider everything outside their territorial boundaries as possible threats. Furthermore, the realist dimension of self-help reveals that the primary act of states is not to provide national peace and security anymore, because the UN ensures international peace and security (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.93-95).

As to the liberal discourse, the first observation reveals many references to liberal indicator 3 on the UN. The UN can therefore be seen as a prominent actor in international political discourse. This relates to the powerful institution that the UN is through its universal membership, a comprehensive policy agenda and propagation of international norms (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.312). The second observation illustrates a much greater capacity of the liberal discourse than the realist discourse. All liberal indicators are proportionally distributed in each case. This supports the three liberal dimensions of involved actors and the normative beliefs on both human rights for everyone and human security, which should be collectively addressed (Evans et al, 2001 p.15).

In other words, these observations on both discourses correspond to the reconceptualization of state sovereignty in the normative framework of R2P. Nation-states are important actors in order to provide peace and security, but instead of state sovereignty as a state's right it became a responsibility to the international community to observe humanitarian discourse (HLPR, 2004 p.17). In addition to these observations, with respect to the invocation of R2P there is no correlation between the cases in which R2P has (not) been invoked and the changing proportion of both discourses. The last analysis on the four cases between 2004-2015 illustrates a slight decrease of the liberal dominance over time, which doesn't correspond to the liberal order in which R2P finds itself.

The third sub question of this study is: *In which way does both realist and liberal discourse influence the internalization of R2P in the context of press releases on the four cases and the three interviews between 2004-2015?* Here, press releases have been studied to reveal the socialization process, in which the liberal discourse was again constantly dominant. In line with the aforementioned analyses, a lot of reference has been made to nation-states, but the realist discourse is distributed very disproportionately. In contrast, the presence of almost all liberal indicators reveals a high performance of the liberal discourse in each case.

Remarkable have been the many references to liberal indicator 2 of shared values and norms. This illustrates an appeal to collective responsibility, in which the UN endorsed its normative stances as legitimate international conduct in each case. These press releases are

a socializing act, in which the UN framed its response to the humanitarian situation as appropriate behavior to persuade and socialize the international community to adhere to (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.902). In combination with the far-reaching global capacity of the UN, it exerts normative influence on international political discourse (Taylor & Curtis, 2011 p.312).

With regard to the comparison drawn between cases where R2P has been and where it hasn't been invoked, the liberal discourse was a little more dominant in the cases on the DRC and Darfur, in which R2P hasn't been invoked. As to the differences in both discourses throughout 2004-2015, no correlation has been discovered between the period of time and the development of both discourses.

In addition to the quantitative content analysis, the semi-structured interviews presented specific recommendations through which directives can be formulated to internalize R2P as an international norm. Firstly, the three interviewees suggested six different reasons for the inconsistent use of R2P. Apart from the reason of the difficulty to apply a liberal concept such as R2P universally, the other five are reasons were underpinned by a hesitant attitude of states towards intervention. They relate to either the realist element of statism, acting from their own interests, or survival in which external threats exist outside the nation-state, or self-help to ensure a state's security (Dunne & Schmidt, 2012 Ch. 5 p.95-95). In other words, the arguments that impede consistent application of R2P are embedded in realist discourse.

Additionally, all recommendations by the interviewees on developing R2P as an international norm correspond to the liberal discourse. Although R2P is issued on a global level, the recommendation of promoting local networks to create inclusiveness and identification coincide with the increased degree of social interaction patterns that create organizations (Baylis, 2011 p.567). As this recommendation moves beyond the importance of nation-states, both liberal indicators of institutions and cooperation with non-state actors to ensure security collectively are covered in this recommendation.

Improving the UN procedures on R2P has also been mentioned, which closely relates to the UN as an important institution and the responsibility to cooperate internationally that should be observed for this (Calhoun et al, 2012 p.116-117). Two other recommendations have emerged that stimulate academic analyses on the state's function, and promote critical voices from the academic and societal field. As democracy is a humanitarian condition for personal liberty and freedom of speech, a liberal order will allow such debates best when

enhancing both recommendations (Dunne, 2011 p.111-112). All in all, the interviewees seem to promote the liberal discourse, but realist discourse impedes the internalization of R2P as an international norm.

Now that the sub questions central to this study have been answered, the main question can be answered: **In which way does the presence of both realist and liberal discourse influenced the internalization of R2P as an international norm in international political discourse between 2004-2015?** This study showed that R2P has been an attempt to govern international security by redefining the responsibility of both nation-states and the international community (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2011 p.521). Building on the theoretical framework, the four cases to which R2P can be referred are embedded in both realist and liberal discourse, following the quantitative content analyses on the five document types. Furthermore, by analyzing the press releases the liberal socialization act of the UN has been detected, which aimed for collective consensus and approval of the UN's behavior. Following the interviews, in order to internalize R2P as an international norm, the liberal discourse should be enhanced and realist discourse should abate.

6.1 Discussion

This study has aimed at filling the gap in the existing literature between the inconsistent use of R2P and how to improve the development of R2P as an international norm. No in-depth research has been conducted on the inconsistent use of R2P; it has been merely criticized. Improvements that are formulated to enhance the use of R2P were confined to analyzing the normative impact of R2P and establishing a joint office that addresses cases to which R2P can be referred (Bellamy, 2010 p.158-165, 167). This study has performed these recommendations by analyzing its normative impact according to cases formulated by the ICRtoP (2014). To this end and by building from an interdisciplinary approach, this study contributed to both the academic and societal field.

Academically, this study provided well-founded results deriving from both quantitative and qualitative methods, in which the realist and liberal discourse are evidently present. More than that, reasons for R2P being used inconsistently can be traced back to the realist discourse. Additionally, in order to internalize R2P as an international norm, the liberal discourse should be promoted. These results provide completely new avenues of inquiry, by which new studies should be set in motion to analyze the influence of both discourses extensively in more cases. Another recommendation would be to study the realist

motives that exist on state level, which, as presented by the interviewees, enforce a hesitant attitude towards getting involved in humanitarian situations.

With regards to the societal field, the enhancement of the interdisciplinary approach did not only give a broader, political-historical understanding on R2P in the context of both discourses. More than that, the integration of a sociological model of international norm dynamics opens up conversations on the influence of international norms such as R2P on ethics within the political landscape (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.915-916).

Understanding where these 'oughtness' claims come from and how they relate to one another in a sociological context, appeared to be vital to understanding both world politics and societal structures.

To elaborate, the use of R2P is not only determined by political interests but also by underlying normative structures of legitimization, identity and conformity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.903). For this purpose, it is interesting to study the capacity of international norms such as R2P that actually internalize the identity of involved actors in international political discourse. Therefore, this study contributed to the societal world by building on a model in which international norms and political change mutually reinforce each other. Hence, it can be concluded that an interdisciplinary approach integrating a historical, political and sociological context, has been a precondition to analyze the influence of R2P on society and vice-versa.

Regardless the relevance and contributions of this study, several shortcomings can be noted. Firstly, the construction of both discourses, the selection of the four cases and the discussion of the outcomes of the interviews, has been highly subjected to interpretation. Although the theoretical framework has justified everything, no research has been conducted on this specific area of interest, which increases its subjective understanding.

Secondly, as the cases to which R2P has been referred vary widely, no generalization can be made from this study. The same applies to the three interviewees reflecting upon R2P from a subjective perspective, which is expected to have caused a bias in the results. Thirdly, a different bias can be noted in the selection of the document types. As to both cases of Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, the UN resolutions 1973 (2011) on Libya, and 1962 (2010) on Côte d'Ivoire, served as data of the first three document types. This directly biased the results of the quantitative content analysis.

6.2 Reflection

It is important to note that the research process was predominantly inductive. I started this research with an enormous fascination of the function of R2P as international norm. More specifically, the multiple critiques on its inconsistent use made me endeavor to expose this discrepancy between an international norm and the limited implementation in practice. However, this discrepancy can be influenced by many complex factors. It is for this reason that I focused on analyzing the normative development of R2P as research object, in the context of both realist and liberal discourse.

It is for this reason that the guidelines of the research process, as prescribed in the *Algemene Sociale Wetenschappen (ASW)* manual, have not been strictly followed. After writing the theoretical framework, I initially planned to conduct qualitative discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews. However, analyzing political language in UN resolutions in a discourse analysis appeared to be ambiguous and too much subject to interpretation.

By conducting a quantitative content analysis, drawing different comparisons between four cases appeared to be more transparent and consistent, following the coding schedules. Based on the results that emerged, relevant theories were selected through which large parts of the theoretical framework and the research questions have been rewritten. Hence, the generation of theory became highly iterative and inductive in this study. This exposed me to both quantitative and qualitative research methods. In the end, I can now say that following a mixed-methods research and an interdisciplinary approach truly increased the reliability of this study. Both methods mutually reinforced the results and therefore improved the contribution of this research to the academic field.

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8. Annexes

8.1 Appendix I – Data preparation, preliminary study

An overview of all cases where ICRtoP was referred to or invoked by the UN, civil society and NGO's.

Case 1 – Burma

Situation: Since the military coup d'état in 1962, the Burmese people have been subjected to widespread human rights abuses. In 1990 the landslide victory of the national elections by the National League for Democracy (NLD) exacerbated repression by the military junta (Eberhard, 2014). Demonstrations by Burmese people were violently cracked down and brought the humanitarian crisis in Burma to international attention. In addition, after the cyclone Nargis in 2008 the military junta blocked international humanitarian aid (Eberhard, 2014). However, after the national elections in 2010 it seemed that Burma was heading towards a period of positive reform. Nevertheless, ethnic clashes continued which the Burmese government neglected. All in all, this enforced international concerns and debate around the humanitarian situation in Burma (Eberhard, 2014).

International action other than R2P: In 2006, the first resolution was proposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that called upon the cessation of violation of human rights. However, this resolution was blocked by China and Russia claiming that Burma was not a threat for international peace and security (Eberhard, 2014). At the third meeting in 2007, the UNSC produced a Presidential Statement that called upon a peaceful solution. In the context of NGO's, in the period of the post-cyclone Nargis an increasing amount of reports and analyses emerged that generally illustrated the violations of human rights in Burma (Eberhard, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: Many NGO's referred to both Burma and the UN to uphold their R2P and take concrete measures. The first NGO was the Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH) that in 2007 called upon the UNSC to ensure the cessation of violence by their responsibility to protect (Eberhard, 2014). In 2012, the Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) called on the international

community to act from the principles of R2P, in contrast to the Global Centre for R2P that in 2013 emphasised the R2P of the Burmese government (Eberhard, 2014).

Other than NGO's people also referred to R2P individually, such as the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Jonathan Aiken, Honorary President of the CSW (Eberhard, 2014). Kouchner stated in 2008 and Aiken in 2009 that the UN should non-forcibly intervene in Burma with regard to R2P. This was followed up by a British Early Day Motion (EDM) that was signed by 60 permanent British members of the parliament that urged for the application of R2P by the UN (Eberhard, 2014).

Case 2 – Central African Republic (CAR)

Situation: Ever since the political independency in 1960, CAR experienced political instability (Eberhard, 2014). Human rights abuses by the state authority, (re)-elections, peace deals and ceasefire agreements alternated each other. 2012 gave rise to a rebel organization Seleka that initiated a military campaign to overthrow the government, under the guidance of president Bozize (Eberhard, 2014). Due to the malfunctioning of Bozize's regime, Seleka was able to practice influence in CAR in a short period of time. This resulted in power-sharing agreements between Bozize's regime and Seleka in 2013, which Bozize failed to carry out (Eberhard, 2014). This was followed up by a coup d'état, an interim president who was internationally heavily criticized and a continuously incompetence of law enforcement in CAR. People reacted by forming self-defense militias that intensified clashes with Seleka since 2013, leaving thousands of people dead (Eberhard, 2014).

International action other than R2P: The African Union (AU) initially tried to address the situation without international assistance and acted from the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) in 2002 and decided to send troops in 2008 (Eberhard, 2014). However, the Seleka violence eventually overwhelmed these troops whereupon the UNSC amended a mandate in 2013 (Eberhard, 2014). Throughout this year the UNSC and AU increased their troop levels and later on authorized the deployment of a European Union (EU) force. Furthermore, 2013 and 2014 is marked by increased reports on the humanitarian situation in CAR by Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, UNICEF, UNHRC, FIDH that confirmed the widespread violations of human rights (Eberhard, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: It wasn't until 2013 that the FIDH, Amnesty International and Global Centre for R2P claimed for the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping force. In addition, in 2014 a UN Special Adviser Adama Dieng affirmed both the primary responsibility of CAR as a nation-state and the responsibility of the international community to assist CAR with concrete measures (Eberhard, 2014).

Case 3 – Côte d'Ivoire

Situation: In 2010 a presidential election was held between the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo and the opposition member Alassane Ouattara. Loyalists had been split along ethnic, regional (north versus south-western) and religious grounds (ICRtoP, 2014). The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) declared on December 2nd 2010 Ouattara the new president. Because the CEI did not release the results by the December 1st deadline, the Gbagbo ally declared this outcome invalid (ICRtoP, 2014).

A disastrous situation followed wherein both Gbagbo and Ouattara had military support that resulted in human rights violations. In reaction to this failure of presidential election, the UNSC adopted Resolution S/res/1962 on December 20th, 2010. This resolution extended the mandate of UNOCI and provided additional troops in December 2010 (ICRtoP, 2014). In January the AU established a High-Level Panel for experts to evaluate the crisis and formulate a solution. In March 2011, the UNSC called upon the R2P of states and April 4th is marked as the onset of a military R2P mission to take necessary measures, stated by the UN Secretary-General (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: Right after the violent outbreak resulting from the elections, many (non-governmental) organizations started reporting about the situation. Examples are the UNHCR, HRW, ICRC, ECOWAS, ICG, AI and IFHR who all confirmed the gross human rights violations targeting unarmed civilians (ICRtoP, 2014). Deriving from this, the statement of attacks against the population as crimes against humanity have been confirmed by the EU and echoed by Kouadio Adjoumani, who spoke on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire in the end of March 2011 (ICRtoP, 2014). In addition to NGO's, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) expressed its concerns for the ICC. A media release has also been published by the ICG, one day before the R2P mission started, demanding effective international response on the situation (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: First, on December 17th the Global Centre of R2P warned that the political crisis could lead to mass atrocities and upon which was called on national governments, AU, ECOWAS and the UN to respond in the context of R2P (ICRtoP, 2014). As a reaction, two special advisers of the Secretary-General on Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect released joint statements on December 29th 2010 that reminded all parties of their R2P including their incitement. This evolved in more forceful language in January 29th 2011 where both advisers stated that urgent steps should be taken in line with R2P (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 4 – Darfur

Situation: In the context of exacerbated feelings of economic and political marginalization by non-Arabs in Sudan, Darfur embroiled in conflict in 2003 (Dullaghan, 2014). Governmental policies seemed to continuously segregate and non-Arabs and neglected their interests. As a result, different rebel groups were established where two major rebel groups SLA and JEM, joined forces to overthrow the Sudanese government. By surprise they took the Sudanese government in 2003, which was responded by the military force SAF and other rebels to fight against SLA (Dullaghan, 2014).

Civil society and governments advocated action, whereupon the UNSC transited the African AMIS mission into a UN-AU mission in 2005 to monitor the DPA between the Sudanese government and rebel groups (Dullaghan, 2014). In May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed after which in August, both the mandate and the force size of the AMIS mission were expanded. The Sudanese government was opposing this mission and in reaction to this, the UNSC transited a joint mission from AMIS to UNAMID where both the UN and the AU carry the same responsibility. This mandate has been extended in 2010 and 2013, which is still valid.

International action other than R2P: In 2003, both AI and HRW designated the engagement of the militias SLA, JEM and SAF as an ethnically targeted campaign (Dullaghan, 2014). Together with the ICG, these organizations were among the first to draw international attention to the situation in Darfur. In addition, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan warned for similarities between the situation in Darfur and Rwanda. This claim was substantiated by reports with horrifying data of death rates by the United to

End Genocide and supported by the US and HRW that confirmed that mass atrocities took place (Dullaghan, 2014). Although Bush labeled the situation in Darfur as genocide in June 2005, the AU refrained from this term. They deployed the mission AMIS in 2004, where is focused on the African responsibility that didn't ask for help from outside the continent (Dullaghan, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: Remarkable to the situation in Darfur was that political, religious and human rights groups formed a 'Save Darfur Coalition' and the 'Genocide Intervention Network' where R2P was centralized (Dullaghan, 2014). This was important to involve the US and China and increased international attention from other NGO's since 2006. As of this point, the European Parliament called upon R2P of both the UN and the Sudanese government (Dullaghan, 2014). Subsequently, in August the UNSC adopted Resolution 1706, which was the first to make reference to the section R2P of the 2005 World Summit. However, instead of deploying a R2P mission the UNSC integrated the UN in the AMIS mission (Dullaghan, 2014).

Case 5- DRC

Situation: In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, Rwandan and Ugandan forces invaded the DRC in 1996. In 1999, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed between diverse African countries, to end hostilities (Eberhard, 2014). This was followed up by the involvement of the UNSC establishing the MONUC mission to supervise and implement the agreement. Under the auspices of MONUC, Joseph Kabila became the first democratically elected president of the DRC in 2006 (Eberhard, 2014). However, during his term in office gross human rights violations in the DRC created a humanitarian crisis. Plethora of minerals and resources in combination with lacking capacity of the Congolese government were underlying issues that fuelled conflict between rebel factions M23, Mai-Mai, LRA, FARDC (Eberhard, 2014).

Although the UN transformed its mission from MONUC into MONUSCO in 2010 to increase its effectiveness, rebel factions deployed mass rapes as weapon against the population that took place within miles of the UN peacekeepers base (Eberhard, 2014). Violations of human rights continued and negotiations stalled, which resulted in the establishment of the UN Intervention Brigade. This was the first offensive combat force that legitimized forcibly measures by the UN. In November 2013 where the M23 surrendered

and a peace deal was signed (Eberhard, 2014).

International action other than R2P: From the beginning of the invasion in the DRC, different NGO's monitored the situation and improvement on the ground until now. Examples are OHCHR, IDMC, HRW, AI, ICG Global Centre R2P and Refugees International (Eberhard, 2014). Although different NGO's were criticizing the failure of the UN to uphold their mandate (both MONUC and MONUSCO), R2P has not been invoked. With regard to the UNSC, resolutions and UN missions were established that used non-forcible measures (Eberhard, 2014). The Intervention Brigade was the first policy measure that legitimizes force, although it was not placed in the context of R2P.

Case 6 - Guinea

Situation: Since December 2008, Captain Camara as head of the junta took power in a military coup. His term in office was characterized by violations of human rights and the rule of law, denounced by HRW (ICRtoP, 2014). On September 28 2009, people from Guinea protested in a stadium against the presidential elections that would be run by the dictatorial Captain Camara (ICRtoP, 2014). At a certain point, governmental military forces came in to put down the demonstration. This resulted in a bloody fashion where 156 people killed, thousands of people were wounded and raped, which gave the impression of a country slipping into chaos by committing crimes against humanity (ICRtoP, 2014).

The government fractionalized and the international community (EU, US, ECOWAS, AU) rapidly responded by condemnation, mediation, arms embargoes, sanctions and threats of coercive measures (ICRtoP, 2014). Soon after, through the efforts of the AU and ECOWAS that called for an international commission of inquiry, a national unity government was formed in 2010. Although presidential elections in June appeared to be fraudulent, they unfolded peacefully in November 2010 (ICRtoP, 2014). However, tensions along ethnic lines arose of which the international community must remain attentive to respond rapidly.

International action other than R2P: In reaction to the call of the UN Commission of Inquiry (see below), the ICC soon after announced the launch of a preliminary examination to study the violations of human rights. To this end, the NGO Security Council Report reported the developments in Guinea (ICRtoP, 2014). With regard to the resumption of

ethnic clashes in 2010 the ICRC, OHCHR and AI reported the amount of victims (ICRtoP, 2014). In line hereof the ICG reported warns of a deteriorated situation and expressed its concerns over an imminent return of violence. The UNSC reacted by deploring the violence in Guinea (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: Two months after the demonstration, the UN Commission of Inquiry in Guinea reported the crimes against humanity that were committed on September 28 (ICRtoP, 2014). The R2P of state leaders was explicitly noted and for that reason there was called upon the ICC to investigate the prosecutors of violence. The French Foreign Minister Kouchner and the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton supported this statement (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 7 - Kenya

Situation: As many other African countries, Kenya experienced ethnic violence after rigged presidential elections were held in December 2007 (ICRtoP, 2014). Just as the case of Côte d'Ivoire, two coalitions were vying for government that were supported by ethnically, political constituencies. Both coalitions became responsible for more than 1000 deaths and 500.000 displacements (ICRtoP, 2014). One week later, mediation practices with the international community (Desmond Tutu, US, African presidents) failed until Ban Ki-moon was assigned as mediator to peacefully resolve the crisis. This led to the establishment of three power-sharing commissions, which internationally is praised as a 'model of diplomatic action under the R2P' (ICRtoP, 2014).

In August 2010, new elections were successfully held and pursuant to its stipulations, the IEBC as independent electoral institute coordinated the implementation of electoral reforms (ICRtoP, 2014). In addition, geographical reforms were implemented whereby Kenya became subdivided in 47 counties together with security and policy reforms of the Kenyan police. International attention had been increased to run the elections peacefully in 2013 (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: In the context of these reforms, AI and HRW published reports where the need for reform was noted and the steps that were taken to improve (ICRtoP, 2014). As such, when the elections approached in 2013 different organizations dispatched teams to assist the polls. Along with the organizational efforts,

Ban Ki-moon also called upon the Kenyan leaders to abide the international legal mechanisms. After the elections, a joint statement from the AU, EU and Carter Center confirmed that the elections were overall legitimate and that the results were internationally supported (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: The French Foreign Minister Kouchner appealed to the UNSC to uphold their R2P of as reaction to the violent outbreak after the elections in 2007. Likewise, Ban Ki-moon expressed his concern about the on-going violence and the UN High Commissioner Louis Arbour called on the R2P of the Kenyan government to abide its international human rights obligations (ICRtoP, 2014). Throughout the years, international efforts in Kenya remained where for example the UN Special Adviser on The Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng called on the Kenyan leaders to uphold their R2P (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 8 - Kyrgyzstan

Situation: April 7th 2010 marked the day of uprisings by the people of Kyrgyzstan (ICRtoP, 2014). This discontentedness was ethnically rooted and after this uprising, was exacerbated into full-scale street fighting. This sparked a massive refugee crisis in the country whereupon HRW, AI and the Minority Rights Group International strongly called for an interim government (ICRtoP, 2014). As a result, the interim-president Roza Otunbayeva asked for both the OCSE to deploy international force, and the Russian involvement to deploy troops and to help quell the violence. Russia deployed over 100 troops but instead of quelling the violence itself, Russia sent military vehicles to increase capacity of Kyrgyzstan to deal with the violence (ICRtoP, 2014). The OCSE also started their policing mission and on October 10 2010, national elections were peacefully unfolded in a coalition government (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: The UNSC condemned the indiscriminate violence and called for calmed and restoration of the rule of law. In reaction to the refugee crisis the UNHCR reported the enormous amount of displacements as result of the conflict (ICRtoP, 2014). In addition, the UNHCR and the WFP launched emergency programs to help the refugees. International reaction concerning the governmental situation, the ICG and HRW issued a joint letter to the UNSC to start an immediate policing mission in Kyrgyzstan

(ICRtoP, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: Besides the condemnation of the violence by the UN and many other organizations, a UN High Commissioner and the UN Special Advisers Francis Deng and Edward Luck expressed their concerns about the humanitarian situations in 2010 (ICRtoP, 2014). Moreover, they advocated the operationalization of the international community to uphold their R2P, which has been supported by the Global Centre for R2P. A letter from ICRtoP (2014) has substantiated this that was signed by nineteen organizations and sent to the UNSC to urge for immediate measures under R2P (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 9 - Iraq

Situation: Iraq has been dealing with many different types of conflict, rooted in political, social and ethno-religious cleavages (ICRtoP, 2014). More specifically, these conflicts often became interwoven just like the political exclusion of the Shias that came against the backdrop of sectarian violence between Shias and Sunnis. This conflict peaked in 2006 and 2008, despite the fact that the US was involved since 2003 under the guise of the UNAMI mission (ICRtoP, 2014).

Gradually, the Iraqi authority took over responsibilities since 2009 and democratic elections were held in 2010 (ICRtoP, 2014). But the political parties came to a deadlock and after the US left in 2011, Iraq ended up in a power vacuum that allowed armed groups to reassert themselves. As result, protest movements increased throughout the years and the up rise of the Sunni militant group ISIS eventually established the Islamic State in June 2014 (ICRtoP, 2014).

Nowadays, Iraq still deals with sectarian violence, protest movements, refugee crises and armed militant groups that commit crimes against humanity (ICRtoP, 2014). Moreover, the IS takes over lots of territory and control in a rapid pace which enforced the instability of the Iraqi government. In addition, many minority groups such as the Yazidi, remain targeted by Islamic militant violence (ICRtoP, 2014). This increased international concern on the humanitarian situation that the conflict will become a civil war. Nevertheless, last July there has been a hopeful political development whereby a new Prime Minister is selected who advocates unifying the Iraqi government (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: Ever since the 90's many organizations such as ICG, HRW, UNAMI and UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs have published reports about the humanitarian situation in Iraq (ICRtoP, 2014). Increased concerns are expressed by Special Representatives of the UN Nikolay Mladenov and Zainab Hawa Bangura who released a joint statement, condemning the acts of the IS. Although the situation nowadays is far from peaceful and stable, Obama announced boosting intelligence and reconnaissance missions in Iraq but refrains from sending troops (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: Global Centre for R2P called upon both the international community and the Iraqi government to uphold their R2P in 2014, just before the establishment of IS (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 10 - Libya

Situation: In February 2011, the Libyan population undertook political protests to end the term in office of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. From that moment, the protesters found themselves the target of mass atrocities of which Gaddafi had been announced to 'showing no mercy' and clearly expressed his intention to continue to violate human rights (ICRtoP, 2014). This message was so concrete that the international community took a strong stance from the beginning and massively condemned the situation. The crisis in Libya is a clear case in which R2P principles have been upheld on a decisive manner by prioritizing the protection of civilians (ICRtoP, 2014).

Soon after, civil society groups from all over the world referred to R2P and called for action, since more forceful measures appeared to be necessary to uphold R2P. In March 2011, the EU imposed sanctions, a travel ban, frozen assets and an arms embargo on Gaddafi and his loyalists, which was quickly followed by several member states (ICRtoP, 2014). At the same time, right after the protests begun, many Libyan people who initially worked for the Gaddafi regime joined the opposition and the NTC as interim government was established. This deteriorated a civil war between rebel forces and the pro-Gaddafi military (ICRtoP, 2014).

Subsequently more robust measures were deployed, where the UNSC affirmed the R2P of the Libyan government and adopted a resolution on February 26 2011 that imposed an arms embargo and travel ban (ICRtoP, 2014). On March 17th, a resolution was adopted where the non-fly zone was imposed, in cooperation with the UNSC to 'use of all necessary

means' that was supported by the NATO (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: Soon after the protests by the population, many organizations started monitoring and published reports about the situation. HRW, HRC, IOM, AI, HRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC and OCHA reported about find mass graves, death rates and fled people and called on the international community to act (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: Through an R2P lens, the international community firstly responded to Libya by employing a broad range of non-forcible measures of diplomatic efforts, arms-embargo, economic sanctions, travel ban and referring the case to the ICC. Moreover, UN Special Advisers issued press releases that called on the Libyan government to uphold their R2P (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 11 - Mali

Situation: An ethnic group called the Tuaregs formed a military group MNLA who sought official recognition and the right to self-determination in a northern part of Mali (ICRtoP, 2014). After the overthrow of Gaddafi's regime, many Libyan Tuaregs returned to Mali, heavily armed and steadily gained prominence since 2011. On March 2012 a group Malian soldiers unified, exasperated by the government's weak response to the MNLA, and successfully staged a coup. Thereupon the AU and ECOWAS suspended Mali's membership and imposed an arms embargo, travel ban and other sanctions (ICRtoP, 2014).

In addition to the MNLA, conflict arose resulting from clashes with Tuaregs and Islamic rebel groups in northern Mali, who punished the Tuareg people horrific (ICRtoP, 2014). ECOWAS sought assistance from the UN that was responded by the UNSC adopting a resolution in which the UN tasked the AFISMA mission. To this end, the defense capacity of Mali would be rebuild to primarily protect the population. The Malian transitional government did also request France to take military action, which was honored by the French president Hollande (ICRtoP, 2014).

In March 2013, the UNSC adopted a UNISMA mission composing both military and police personnel with a mandate to 'use all necessary means'. Although since June 2013 the way had been paved for presidential elections, different international actors remain worried (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: The UN reported many disappearances of civilians as a result from the clashes in 2013. Likewise, the FIDH, HRW and AI reported human rights violations during the French operation (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 12 - Nigeria

Situation: Nigeria has been dealing with inter-communal violence, political unrest, corruption, refugee crisis and an active rebel militant group Boko Haram for decades now (Burt, 2014). This illustrates the inability of the Nigerian government to protect its population and contributed to the current crisis. The country is both ethnically split between Muslims and Christians and along economic lines between north and south Nigeria (Burt, 2014). Since January 2010, tensions between Muslims and Christians increased. The New York Times formulated these tensions as separated from the Boko Haram activity (Burt, 2014).

Boko Haram is a rebel militant group originated in 2002 and their aim is to fully establish an Islamic State in Nigeria (Burt, 2014). Since 2010, after a police shooting in 2009 where 14 Boko Haram members were killed, their activities got international attention. They committed assassinations, suicide bombings and targeted media outlets and UN buildings by which they had a global reach. These activities aggravated in 2014 where their attacks become more intentionally targeted, for example school attacks and hostages (Burt, 2014).

Ever since, the Nigerian government has been unable to tackle these attacks and thereby failed to uphold their R2P. In reaction to the 2014 of Boko Haram activity, several European and African countries signed an agreement to organize a massive joint office by enhancing intelligence exchange (Burt, 2014). In addition, ECOWAS and the UN confirmed a partnership with the Nigerian government in a new Weapon Collection Program. Now, Nigeria is set to hold presidential election in 2015 that might exacerbate existing tensions (Burt, 2014).

International action other than R2P: Ever since 1999, HRW, FEMNET, WACSO, ICG, HRAN and Nigeria Security Checker have been publishing reports about the Nigerian situation (Burt, 2014). Since 2014, AI reported on the activities of Boko Haram and just as the Global Centre for R2P expressed their concerns about the crimes that are committed

against humanity. Likewise, in 2010 Ban Ki-Moon expressed his concerns about the Nigerian situation and in reaction to the attacks on a UN building in 2011 he conducted a global threat review. In addition, the UNSC condemned this attack and reminded member states on 'to ensure that measures taken' abiding international law (Burt, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: In March 2014, a speaker of the House of Representatives of Nigeria expressed his concerns and stated that the Nigerian government did not uphold its R2P. Likewise, in response to the school abduction, the WANEP issued a press release on behalf of 500 member organizations and called for urgent action and necessary steps in the context of R2P (Burt, 2014).

Case 13 – South-Sudan

Situation: South-Sudan gained its independency on July 9, 2011. Since December 2013, political divisions between the current and the former president exacerbated ethnic tensions, armed clashes and the risk for a civil war (ICRtoP, 2014). In addition to this inter-ethnic conflict that can be traced back to the 80's, armed rebel groups are committing human rights abuses and therefore also destabilize the region. The tensions between the president and former president intensified in December 2013, which were ethnically rooted. The fighting that broke out spread to the military headquarters and affected civilians and UN peacekeepers, some of which got killed (ICRtoP, 2014).

The fact that these fights and killings were partly carried out by armed youths was a sign that the conflict moved beyond soldiers into widespread inter-communal conflict (ICRtoP, 2014). In reaction to this, the UNSC adopted three resolutions from December 2013 to March 2014 imposing troops under the guise of UNMISS to protect civilians. In January 2014, after three years of hostilities a peace deal had been signed between the South-Sudanese government and the rebel group Yau-Yau (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: Organizations such as AI, OCHA, HRW, ICG and UNMISS documented the human rights violations (ICRtoP, 2014). Moreover, the Global Centre for R2P together with many other civil society organizations advocated the facilitation of mediation talks by the international community. With regard to nation-states, Norway and Ethiopia expressed their concerns about the humanitarian crises in South-Sudan. The AU did also echo this same statement but soon after took a stronger stance by

threatening targeted sanctions, which was followed by the US (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: The UN mission UNMISS stated that during the cycle of attacks in 2011-2012, the government was unable to uphold their 'responsibility to safeguard' their citizens. The UNSC did also call upon the government to take greater responsibility of their citizens (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 14 – Sudan (the northern region)

Situation: Besides the crisis in Darfur, Sudan is embroiled in several internal conflicts. An important root cause to these conflicts is the oil revenue (Eberhard, 2014). Because the government has been fragile, different rebel groups were capable exploiting oil resources and act violently. Another problem is the denial of citizenship of the Southern Sudanese people and the subsequent conflict with South-Sudan about each other's role in oil production, which clashed in 2012. This increased widespread mutinies out of social marginalization, economic disparity and unequal development (Eberhard, 2014).

In February 2012, as Tripartite Proposal was signed between the UN, AU and Arab League to deliver humanitarian aid in the region. However, this has been partly rejected by the Sudanese government and no humanitarian aid was realized. In reaction to this, the UNSC endorsed the AUHIP in May 2012, an African roadmap to end hostilities between South- Sudan and Sudan (Eberhard, 2014). Nevertheless, the UNSC remained divided on the issue. In May 2013 a joint military action was formed to overthrow the Sudanese government, which responded with gross force. However, in September conflict erupted again when civilians protested against the fuel subsidy cuts upon which the Sudanese government similarly responded forcibly (Eberhard, 2014).

International action other than R2P: Civil society organizations HRW, AI, UNHCR, FIDH OCHA, the Global Centre of R2P and the ICG have been publishing reports throughout the years, confirming the gross human rights abuses and war crimes that have been committed by different parties (Eberhard, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: In 2011, the Enough Project called upon the international community to uphold their R2P (Eberhard, 2014).

Case 15 – Sri Lanka

Situation: Since 1983, Sri Lanka has been dominated by civil war between two ethnic groups, Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority striving for independence (ICRtoP, 2014). In April 2009, several UN officials called on the Sri Lankan government to uphold their R2P. In addition, the Global Centre has invoked R2P in a joint letter to the UNSC for the R2P on behalf of many NGO's (ICRtoP, 2014). In reaction to this on May 19th 2009, a Sinhalese government offensive forced the rebels to end the fighting and the war ended. In 2010 Ban Ki-moon called for an investigation, upon which in May 2010 a report was released by the ICG (ICRtoP, 2014).

The Sri Lankan government has consistently defended addressing human rights violations at the end of the conflict with this investigation. Instead, the Sri Lankan president appointed the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), which have been heavily criticized by different international actors (ICRtoP, 2014). In 2011, the UN Panel released their findings of the investigation that strongly condemned the Sri Lankan government committing gross human rights abuses. Likewise, the Panel did also criticize the failure of the UN to take action to protect the Sri Lankan population. In line with this, in November 2012 the International Review Panel on the United Nations released a report that condemned the inaction of the UN during the conflict even more (ICRtoP, 2014).

In reaction to this, the UN introduced the The Rights Up Front Action Plan in 2013 where the state's responsibility is emphasized to protect its citizens (ICRtoP, 2014). In The Plan three elements are formulated in the context of R2P that are underpinned 'by the lessons learned from the past'. In the same year many NGO's such as AI, HRW, MRGI have been contributing to research in Sri Lanka and published many reports in 2013 about the violations of human rights. In spite of fierce opposition of Sri Lanka, in March 2014 the UN Human Rights Council launched an international inquiry to investigate the situation (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: From 2009, many civil society organizations have been expressing their concerns about the situation and promoted UN involvement in Sri Lanka. Since April the international pressure on the Sri Lankan situation increased (ICRtoP, 2014). As such, the UNSC released a press statement expressing their concerns about the situation but did not formally address the crisis. The EU did also express their concerns and

Canada increased its humanitarian aid in Sri Lanka. In the context of the investigation in 2010, different NGO's such as AI and HRW expressed the need for accountability for the crimes in Sri Lanka (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: Similarly, in April 2009 the Global Centre for the R2P wrote a joint letter in cooperation with many NGO's to the UNSC, invoking R2P and calling for a military intervention (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 16 – Syria

Situation: March 2011 is marked as the onset of the Syrian crisis, where Syrian people protested for the release of political prisoners and national security forces responded with brutal violence. The Syrian president Bashr al-Assad refused to halt his attacks and continued implementing reforms (ICRtoP, 2014). The civilian population was subject to both Assad's policy and human rights abuses that were mainly committed by the state-sponsored militia group El Shabiha. Alongside this violence, the lack of action by the international community caused shortages of food and healthcare in Syria (ICRtoP, 2014).

Assad's opponents started to organize themselves and called the presidential resignation in the fall of 2011 (ICRtoP, 2014). However, Syrian civilians also became subjected to attacks from these rebel groups, which made the Syrian conflict more sectarian. At the same time the UN Human Rights Council started investigating human rights violations by establishing an International Commission of Inquiry and confirmed human rights abuses in 2011 (ICRtoP, 2014). The UNSC together with other international actors were initially unable to reach consensus on decisive action to the conflict. After the six-point peace plan failed, introduced by Kofi Annan as Special Envoy of the UN, the UNSC deployed the UN mission UNSMIS to facilitate the peace plan (ICRtoP, 2014).

In 2012 a new coalition was formed from different opposition forces and became the Syrian representative. The Coalition became internationally legitimized and supported by international actors. However, this caused fragmentation of the Coalition between secular and Islamist groups (ICRtoP, 2014). In 2013 a rebel-on-rebel fighting between these groups marked the conflict, which made the Syrian conflict even more complex. In addition soon after several individual states (US, France, UK) announced that the Syria government used chemical weapons that UN inspectors confirmed two weeks later (ICRtoP, 2014).

Hereupon, the UNSC tasked the OPCW to implement a program of destroying these chemical weapons. In January 2014 an international peace conference was held with 30 states, the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition resulting in little progress (ICRtoP, 2014). In February the UNSC ensured access for humanitarian aid in Syria, in March a social media movement started and a statement was signed by over 30 art figures to assure humanitarian aid is realized. However, Assad's position nowadays seemed stronger than ever (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: Many NGO's have been publishing reports on the Syrian conflict. Examples are HRW, AI, UNHCR, International Rescue Committee, World Bank and Refugee International (ICRtoP, 2014). The EU took stronger measures by imposing economic sanctions, an arms embargo and visa bans since 2011. On national level, many actors supported the Syrian opposition economically, politically and militarily (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action to which R2P is referred or invoked: Different UN Special Advisers invoked R2P in 2012 for the first time. They called on the international community to take decisive action. Especially after the confirming the use of chemical weapons by the UN, the international community strongly voiced the failure of Syria to uphold their R2P (ICRtoP, 2014).

Case 17 – Zimbabwe

Situation: Ever since 2000, state security forces of Zimbabwe forcibly target civilians, primarily aid workers and political opponents (ICRtoP, 2014). This violence increased after the former president Mugabe loosed the elections. In the aftermath of the presidential elections held in 2008, Zimbabwe entered a violent, state-sponsored, political crisis. In reaction to this, humanitarian workers and students wrote a communiqué that called for effective international response and included R2P (ICRtoP, 2014).

A few months later the Elders, a group of renowned human rights activists, organized a fact-finding mission. This was coupled with the EU and a statement of the 'Friends of Zimbabwe' (UN, World Bank, African Development Bank) expressing grave concerns about the situation and called on the government's responsibility (ICRtoP, 2014). At the same time, WFM-IGP organized a roundtable with regional NGO's to discuss the relation

with R2P and the subsequent action that need to be taken. In September, Mugabe signed the Global Political Agreement although the current situation remains dangerous (ICRtoP, 2014).

International action other than R2P: From the onset of this crisis, HRW and ICG strongly condemned the violent acts that were being committed. Furthermore, the UN monitored the situation but did not undertake measures that effectively addressed human rights violations (ICRtoP, 2014).

8.2 Appendix II - Table of all 17 cases formulated by the ICRtoP

Case	Period of crisis/crises 2005-2015	R2P invoked by UNSC yes/no
1. Burma	2006-2014	no
2. CAR	2005-2014	no
3. Côte d'Ivoire	2010-2012	yes
4. Darfur	2003-2007	no
5. DRC	1996-2013	no
6. Guinea	2008-2010	no
7. Kenya	2007-2010	no
8. Kyrgyzstan	2010	no
9. Iraq	2006-2008 and 2011-..	no
10. Libya	2011	yes
11. Mali	2011-2012	no
12. Nigeria	2010-2014	no
13. South-Sudan	2013-2014	no
14. Sudan	2012-2013	no
15. Sri Lanka	1983-2009	no
16. Syria	2011-2013	no
17. Zimbabwe	2008	no

8.3 Appendix III – Coding schedules of each document of four cases

Document types

	First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Most recent Resolution	Press releases
DRC	Resolution 1592 30/03/2005	Resolution 2078 28/11/2012	Resolution 2098 28/03/2013	Resolution 2136 30/01/2014	Resolution 2147 28/03/2014	28/03/13 US Department of State
Darfur	Resolution 1556 30/07/2004	Resolution 1755 30/04/2007	Resolution 1769 31/07/2007	Resolution 1779 28/09/2007	Resolution 2173 27/08/2014	09/03/2006 Save Darfur Coalition
Côte d'Ivoire	Resolution 1962 20/12/2010	Resolution 1962 20/12/2010	Resolution 1962 20/12/2010	Resolution 1967 19/01/2011	Resolution 2162 25/06/2014	03/04/2011 International Crisis Group
Libya	Resolution 1973 17/03/2011	Resolution 1973 17/03/2011	Resolution 1973 17/03/2011	Resolution 2009 16/09/2011	Resolution 2174 27/08/2014	28/03/2011 President Obama

1. First UNSC resolution

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. Nation state	84 (91,3%)	19 (50%)	29 (87,88%)	45 (81,82%)	177 (81,19%)
2. Responsibility of the nation state	5 (5,43%)	2 (7,14%)	1 (3,03%)	7 (12,73%)	15 (6,88%)
3. Territorial integrity	1 (%)	2 (7,14%)	1 (3,03%)	1 (1,82%)	5 (2,29%)
4. State's security	-	11 (28,95%)	-	-	11 (5,05%)
5. External threats outside the state's boundaries	-	1 (2,63%)	-	-	1 (0,46%)
6. Principle of non-intervention	-	1 (2,63%)	-	-	1 (0,46%)
7. Legal equality of states	-	-	-	-	-
8. International system as anarchy	-	-	-	-	-
9. Political independence	1 (%)	1 (2,63%)	1 (3,03%)	1 (1,82%)	4 (0,46%)
10. Self determination (state sovereignty)	1 (1,09%)	1 (2,63%)	1 (3,03%)	1 (1,82%)	4 (0,46%)
Total	92 (100%)	38 (100%)	33 (100%)	55 (100%)	218 (100%)

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. International institutions	25 (18,38%)	18 (18,75%)	5 (8,62%)	18 (17,31%)	66 (16,75%)
2. Shared values and norms ('we' or 'us')	-	-	-	-	-
3. Importance of and referring to the UN	74 (54,41%)	48 (50%)	30 (51,72%)	28 (26,92%)	180 (45,69%)
4. Cooperation with (non-) state actors	8 (5,88%)	8 (8,33%)	3 (5,17%)	13 (12,5%)	32 (8,12%)
5. Responsibility of the international community	2 (1,47%)	-	1 (1,72%)	2 (1,92%)	5 (1,27%)

6. Protection of citizens	15 (11,03%)	15 (15,63%)	10 (17,24%)	28 (26,92%)	68 (17,26%)
7. Threat to international peace and security	3 (2,21%)	1 (1,04%)	2 (3,45%)	3 (2,88%)	9 (2,28%)
8. Collective security	-	-	-	1 (0,96%)	1 (0,25%)
9. Human rights and international humanitarian law	9 (6,62%)	6 (6,25%)	7 (12,07%)	11 (10,58%)	33 (8,38%)
Total	136 (100%)	96 (100%)	58 (100%)	104 (100%)	394 (100%)

2. Last UNSC resolution before the deployment of the UN mission

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. Nation state	84 (91,30%)	19 (50%)	57 (82,61%)	11 (73,33%)	171 (79,91%)
2. Responsibility of the nation state	5 (5,43%)	2 (5,26%)	5 (7,25%)	1 (6,67%)	13 (6,07%)
3. Territorial integrity	1 (1,09%)	2 (5,26%)	1 (1,45%)	1 (6,67%)	5 (2,34%)
4. State's security	-	11 (28,95%)	3 (4,35%)	-	14 (6,54%)
5. External threats outside the state's boundaries	-	1 (2,63%)	-	-	1 (0,05%)
6. Principle of non-intervention	-	1 (2,63%)	1 (1,45%)	-	2 (0,93%)
7. Legal equality of states	-	-	-	-	-
8. International system as anarchy	-	-	-	-	-
9. Political independence	1 (1,09%)	1 (2,63%)	1 (1,45%)	1 (6,67%)	4 (1,87%)
10. Self determination (state sovereignty)	1 (1,09%)	1 (2,63%)	1 (1,45%)	1 (6,67%)	4 (1,87%)
Total	92 (100%)	38 (100%)	69 (100%)	15 (100%)	214 (100%)

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. International institutions	25 (18,38%)	18 (8,75%)	10 (7,58%)	12 (17,14%)	65 (14,98%)
2. Shared values and norms ('we' or 'us')	-	-	-	-	-
3. Importance of and referring to the UN	74 (54,41%)	48 (50%)	66 (60%)	32 (45,71%)	220 (50,69%)
4. Cooperation with (non-) state actors	8 (5,88%)	8 (8,33%)	11 (8,33%)	6 (8,57%)	33 (7,60%)
5. Responsibility of the international community	2 (1,47%)	-	5 (0,38%)	5 (7,14%)	12 (2,76%)
6. Protection of citizens	15 (11,03%)	15 (15,63%)	30 (22,73%)	11 (15,71%)	71 (16,36%)
7. Threat to international peace and security	3 (2,21%)	1 (1,04%)	2 (1,52%)	2 (2,86%)	8 (1,84%)
8. Collective security	-	-	-	1 (1,43%)	1 (0,23%)
9. Human rights and international humanitarian law	9 (6,62%)	6 (6,25%)	8 (6,06%)	1 (1,43%)	24 (5,53%)
Total	136 (100%)	96 (100%)	132 (100%)	70 (100%)	434 (100%)

3. UNSC resolution deploying the UN mission

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. Nation state	84 (91,30%)	19 (50%)	121 (79,61%)	30 (83,33%)	254 (79,87%)
2. Responsibility of the nation state	5 (5,43%)	2 (5,26%)	8 (5,26%)	1 (2,78%)	16 (5,03%)
3. Territorial integrity	1 (1,09%)	2 (5,26%)	3 (1,97%)	1 (2,78%)	7 (2,20%)
4. State's security	-	11 (28,95%)	14 (9,21%)	1 (2,78%)	26 (8,18%)
5. External threats outside the state's boundaries	-	1 (2,63%)	-	-	1 (0,31%)
6. Principle of non-intervention	-	1 (2,63%)	2 (1,32%)	-	3 (0,94%)
7. Legal equality of states	-	-	-	-	-
8. International system as anarchy	-	-	-	-	-
9. Political independence	1 (1,09%)	1 (2,63%)	1 (0,66%)	1 (2,78%)	4 (1,26%)
10. Self determination (state sovereignty)	1 (1,09%)	1 (2,63%)	3 (1,97%)	2 (5,56%)	7 (2,20%)
Total	92 (100%)	38 (100%)	152 (100%)	36 (100%)	318 (100%)

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. International institutions	25 (18,38%)	18 (8,75%)	68 (18,18%)	42 (20,59%)	153 (18,87%)
2. Shared values and norms ('we' or 'us')	-	-	-	-	1 (0,12%)
3. Importance of and referring to the UN	74 (54,41%)	48 (50%)	168 (44,92%)	100 (49,02%)	390 (48,09%)
4. Cooperation with (non-) state actors	8 (5,88%)	8 (8,33%)	30 (8,02%)	22 (10,78%)	68 (8,38%)
5. Responsibility of the international	2 (1,47%)	-	2 (0,53%)	2 (0,98%)	6 (0,74%)

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6. Protection of citizens	15 (11,03%)	15 (15,63%)	70 (18,72%)	26 (12,75%)	126 (15,54%)
7. Threat to international peace and security	3 (2,21%)	1 (1,04%)	7 (1,87%)	3 (1,47%)	14 (1,73%)
8. Collective security	-	-	-	3 (1,47%)	3 (0,37%)
9. Human rights and international humanitarian law	9 (6,62%)	6 (6,25%)	29 (7,75%)	6 (2,94%)	50 (6,17%)
Total	136 (100%)	96 (100%)	374 (100%)	204 (100%)	811 (100%)

4. First UNSC resolution following up the UN mission

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. Nation state	71 (84,52%)	5 (100%)	81 (85,26%)	9 (64,29%)	166 (83,84%)
2. Responsibility of the nation state	9 (10,71%)	-	7 (7,37%)	-	16 (8,08%)
3. Territorial integrity	1 (1,19%)	-	1 (1,05%)	1 (7,14%)	3 (1,52%)
4. State's security	1 (1,19%)	-	3 (3,16%)	-	4 (2,02%)
5. External threats outside the state's boundaries	-	-	-	1 (7,14%)	1 (0,51%)
6. Principle of non-intervention	-	-	1 (1,05%)	1 (7,14%)	2 (1,01%)
7. Legal equality of states	-	-	-	-	-
8. International system as anarchy	-	-	-	-	-
9. Political independence	1 (1,19%)	-	1 (1,05%)	1 (7,14%)	3 (1,52%)
10. Self determination (state sovereignty)	1 (1,19%)	-	1 (1,05%)	1 (7,14%)	3 (1,52%)
Total	84 (100%)	5 (100%)	95 (100%)	14 (100%)	198 (100%)

	Libya	Côte d’Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. International institutions	8 (7,08%)	5 (8,47%)	27 (15,98%)	12 (17,65%)	52 (12,78%)
2. Shared values and norms ('we' or 'us')	-	-	-	-	-
3. Importance of and referring to the UN	59 (52,21%)	44 (74,58%)	86 (50,89%)	40 (58,82%)	229 (56,27%)
4. Cooperation with (non-) state actors	8 (7,08%)	5 (8,47%)	14 (8,28%)	8 (11,76%)	35 (8,6%)
5. Responsibility of the international community	4 (3,54%)	1 (1,69%)	3 (1,78%)	1 (1,47%)	9 (2,21%)
6. Protection of citizens	24 (2,12%)	2 (3,39%)	22 (13,02%)	4 (5,88%)	52 (12,78%)
7. Threat to international peace and security	1 (0,88%)	-	2 (1,18%)	1 (1,47%)	4 (0,98%)
8. Collective security	-	-	3 (1,78%)	-	3 (0,74%)
9. Human rights and international humanitarian law	9 (7,96%)	2 (3,39%)	12 (7,1%)	-	23 (5,65%)
Total	113 (100%)	59 (100%)	169 (100%)	68 (100%)	407 (100%)

5. Most recent UNSC resolution on each case

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. Nation state	38 (90,48%)	116 (89,23%)	143 (89,94%)	52 (80%)	349 (88,13%)
2. Responsibility of the nation state	-	6 (4,62%)	5 (3,14%)	7 (10,77%)	18 (4,55%)
3. Territorial integrity	1 (2,38%)	1 (0,77%)	2 (1,26%)	1 (1,54%)	5 (1,26%)
4. State's security	1 (2,38%)	4 (3,08%)	6 (3,77%)	1 (1,54%)	12 (3,03%)
5. External threats outside the state's boundaries	-	-	-	-	-
6. Principle of non-intervention	-	1 (0,77%)	1 (0,63%)	1 (1,54%)	3 (0,76%)
7. Legal equality of states	-	-	-	-	-
8. International system as anarchy	-	-	-	-	-
9. Political independence	1 (2,38%)	1 (0,77%)	1 (0,63%)	1 (1,54%)	4 (1,01%)
10. Self determination (state sovereignty)	1 (2,38%)	1 (0,77%)	1 (0,63%)	2 (3,08%)	5 (1,26%)
Total	42 (100%)	130 (100%)	159 (100%)	65 (100%)	396 (100%)

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. International institutions	5 (8,93%)	14 (6,25%)	66 (16,97%)	18 (7,23%)	103 (11,22%)
2. Shared values and norms ('we' or 'us')	-	-	-	-	-
3. Importance of and referring to the UN	32 (57,14%)	124 (55,36%)	190 (48,84%)	135 (54,22%)	481 (52,40%)
4. Cooperation with (non-) state actors	3 (5,36%)	13 (5,80%)	25 (6,43%)	11 (4,42%)	52 (5,66%)
5. Responsibility of the international	2 (3,57%)	6 (2,68%)	5 (1,28%)	5 (0,2%)	18 (1,96%)

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6. Protection of citizens	4 (7,14%)	36 (16,07%)	61 (15,68%)	64 (25,70%)	165 (17,97%)
7. Threat to international peace and security	3 (5,36%)	1 (0,45%)	6 (1,54%)	2 (0,80%)	12 (1,31%)
8. Collective security	-	6 (2,68%)	-	-	6 (0,65%)
9. Human rights and international humanitarian law	7 (12,5%)	24 (10,71%)	36 (9,25%)	14 (5,62%)	81 (8,82%)
Total	56 (100%)	224 (100%)	389 (100%)	249 (100%)	918 (100%)

8.4 Appendix IV – Coding schedules of all five document-types

1. Coding schedule of both realist and liberal discourse per document type on all cases

	First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution	Total
1. Nation state	177 (81,19%)	171 (79,91%)	254 (79,87%)	166 (83,84%)	349 (88,13%)	1117 (83,11%)
2. Responsibility of the nation state	15 (6,88%)	13 (6,07%)	16 (5,03%)	16 (8,08%)	18 (4,55%)	78 (5,80%)
3. Territorial integrity	5 (2,29%)	5 (2,34%)	7 (2,20%)	3 (1,52%)	5 (1,26%)	25 (1,86%)
4. State's security	11 (5,05%)	14 (6,54%)	26 (8,18%)	4 (2,02%)	12 (3,03%)	67 (4,99%)
5. External threats outside the state's boundaries	1 (0,46%)	1 (0,47%)	1 (0,31%)	1 (0,51%)	-	4 (0,30%)
6. Principle of non-intervention	1 (0,46%)	2 (0,93%)	3 (0,94%)	2 (1,01%)	3 (0,78%)	11 (0,82%)
7. Legal equality of states	-	-	-	-	-	-
8. International system as anarchy	-	-	-	-	-	-

9. Political independence	4 (1,83%)	4 (1,87%)	4 (1,26%)	3 (1,52%)	4 (1,01%)	19 (1,41%)
10. Self determination (state sovereignty)	4 (1,83%)	4 (1,87%)	7 (2,20%)	3 (1,52%)	5 (1,26%)	23 (1,71%)
Total	218 (100%)	214 (100%)	318 (100%)	198 (100%)	396 (100%)	1344 (100%)

	First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution	Total
1. International institutions	66 (16,75%)	65 (14,98%)	153 (18,89%)	52 (12,78%)	103 (11,22%)	439 (14,82%)
2. Shared values and norms ('we' or 'us')	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Importance of and referring to the UN	180 (45,69%)	220 (50,69%)	390 (48,15%)	229 (56,27%)	481 (52,40%)	1500 (50,62%)
4. Cooperation with (non-) state actors	32 (8,12%)	33 (7,60%)	68 (8,40%)	35 (8,60%)	52 (5,66%)	220 (7,42%)
5. Responsibility of the international community	5 (1,27%)	12 (2,76%)	6 (0,74%)	9 (2,21%)	18 (1,96%)	50 (1,69%)
6. Protection of citizens	68 (17,26%)	71 (16,36%)	126 (15,56%)	52 (12,78%)	165 (17,97%)	482 (16,28%)
7. Threat to international peace and security	9 (2,28%)	8 (1,84%)	14 (1,73%)	4 (0,98%)	12 (1,31%)	47 (1,59%)
8. Collective security	1 (0,25%)	1 (0,23%)	3 (0,37%)	3 (0,74%)	6 (0,65%)	14 (0,47%)
9. Human rights and international humanitarian law	33 (8,38%)	24 (5,53%)	50 (6,17%)	23 (5,65%)	81 (8,82%)	211 (7,12%)
Total	394 (100%)	434 (100%)	810 (100%)	407 (100%)	918 (100%)	2963 (100%)

2. Proportion realist as to the liberal discourse per document-type

	First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution
Total realist discourse	218 (35,62%)	214 (33,02%)	318 (28,19%)	198 (32,73%)	396 (30,14%)
Total liberal discourse	394 (64,38%)	434 (66,98%)	810 (71,81%)	407 (67,27%)	918 (69,86%)
Total both discourses	612 (100%)	648 (100%)	1128 (100%)	605 (100%)	1314 (100%)

3. Proportion realist as to the liberal discourse per case

		First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution
Libya	realist discourse	92 (40,35%)	92 (40,35%)	92 (40,35%)	84 (42,64%)	42 (42,86%)
	liberal discourse	136 (59,65%)	136 (59,65%)	136 (59,65%)	113 (57,36%)	56 (57,14%)
	both discourses	228 (100%)	228 (100%)	228 (100%)	197 (100%)	98 (100%)
Côte d'Ivoire	realist discourse	38 (28,36%)	38 (28,36%)	38 (28,36%)	5 (7,81%)	130 (36,72%)
	liberal discourse	96 (71,64%)	96 (71,64%)	96 (71,64%)	59 (92,19%)	224 (63,28%)
	both discourses	134 (100%)	134 (100%)	134 (100%)	64 (100%)	354 (100%)
DRC	realist discourse	33 (36,26%)	69 (34,33%)	152 (28,90%)	95 (35,98%)	159 (29,01%)
	liberal discourse	58 (63,74%)	132 (65,67%)	374 (71,10%)	169 (64,02%)	389 (70,99%)
	both discourses	91 (100%)	201 (100%)	526 (100%)	264 (100%)	548 (100%)
Darfur	realist discourse	55 (34,59%)	15 (17,65%)	36 (15%)	14 (17,07%)	65 (20,70%)
	liberal discourse	104 (65,41%)	70 (82,35%)	204 (85%)	68 (82,93%)	249 (79,30%)
	both discourses	159 (100%)	85 (100%)	240 (100%)	82 (100%)	314 (100%)

8.5 Appendix V – Coding schedules three periods throughout 2004-2015

1. Coding manual

The resolutions that are studied for all five document-types are deployed in a time period of 121 months. Each of the three categories is therefore concerned with the resolutions in a period of 40 months to obtain equal categories.

2. Category 1: 8/2004 – 11/2007

		First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution
Libya	realist discourse	-	-	-	-	-
	liberal discourse					
	both discourses					
Côte d'Ivoire	realist discourse	-	-	-	-	-
	liberal discourse					
	both discourses					
DRC	realist discourse	33 (36,26%)	-	-	-	-
	liberal discourse	58 (63,74%)				
	both discourses	91 (100%)				
Darfur	realist discourse	55 (34,59%)	15 (17,65%)	36 (15%)	14 (17,07%)	-
	liberal discourse	104 (65,41%)	70 (82,35%)	204 (85%)	68 (82,93%)	
	both discourses	159 (100%)	85 (100%)	240 (100%)	82 (100%)	

3. Category 2: 12/2007 – 3/2011

		First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution
Libya	realist discourse	92 (40,35%)	92 (40,35%)	92 (40,35%)	-	-
	liberal discourse	136 (59,65%)	136 (59,65%)	136 (59,65%)		
	both discourses	228 (100%)	228 (100%)	228 (100%)		
Côte d'Ivoire	realist discourse	38 (28,36%)	38 (28,36%)	38 (28,36%)	5 (7,81%)	-
	liberal discourse	96 (71,64%)	96 (71,64%)	96 (71,64%)	59 (92,19%)	
	both discourses	134 (100%)	134 (100%)	134 (100%)	64 (100%)	
DRC	realist discourse	-	-	-	-	-
	liberal discourse					
	both discourses					
Darfur	realist discourse	-	-	-	-	-
	liberal discourse					
	both discourses					

4. Category 3: 4/2011 – 8/2014

		First Resolution	Resolution before UN mission	UN mission	Follow-up Resolution after UN mission	Last Resolution
Libya	realist discourse	-	-	-	84 (42,64%)	42 (42,86%)
	liberal discourse				113 (57,36%)	56 (57,14%)
	both discourses				197 (100%)	98 (100%)
Côte d'Ivoire	realist discourse	-	-	-	-	130 (36,72%)
	liberal discourse					224 (63,28%)
	both discourses					354 (100%)
DRC	realist discourse		69 (34,33%)	152 (28,90%)	95 (35,98%)	159 (29,01%)
	liberal discourse		132 (65,67%)	374 (71,10%)	169 (64,02%)	389 (70,99%)
	both discourses		201 (100%)	526 (100%)	264 (100%)	548 (100%)
Darfur	realist discourse	-	-	-	-	65 (20,70%)
	liberal discourse					249 (79,30%)
	both discourses					314 (100%)

5. Proportion realist and liberal discourse on average per period

	Cat. 1 8/2004 – 11/2007	Cat. 2 12/2007 – 3/2011	Cat. 3 4/2011 – 8/2014
Total realist discourse	153 (23,29%)	295 (28,10%)	796 (31,81%)
Total liberal discourse	504 (76,71%)	755 (71,90%)	1706 (68,19%)
Total both discourses	657 (100%)	1050 (100%)	2502 (100%)

8.6 Appendix VI - Press releases on the UN mission

1. Coding schedule of both realist and liberal discourse of the press release per case

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. Nation state	87 (91,58%)	4 (66,67%)	10 (83,33%)	5 (100%)	106 (89,83%)
2. Responsibility of the nation state	5 (5,26%)	2 (33,33%)	2 (16,67%)	-	9 (7,63%)
3. Territorial integrity	-	-	-	-	-
4. State's security	3 (3,16%)	-	-	-	3 (2,54%)
5. External threats outside the state's boundaries	-	-	-	-	-
6. Principle of non-intervention	-	-	-	-	-
7. Legal equality of states	-	-	-	-	-
8. International system as anarchy	-	-	-	-	-
9. Political independence	-	-	-	-	-
10. Self determination (state sovereignty)	-	-	-	-	-
Total	95 (100%)	6 (100%)	12 (100%)	5 (100%)	118 (100%)

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur	Total
1. International institutions	7 (2,93%)	3 (16,67%)	1 (2,56%)	9 (40,91%)	20 (6,29%)
2. Shared values and norms ('we' or 'us')	132 (55,23%)	6 (33,33%)	9 (23,08%)	5 (22,73%)	152 (47,80%)
3. Importance of and referring to the UN	5 (2,09%)	2 (11,11%)	16 (41,03%)	2 (9,09%)	25 (7,86%)
4. Cooperation with (non-) state actors	22 (9,20%)	1 (5,56%)	2 (5,13%)	1 (4,55%)	26 (8,17%)
5. Responsibility of the international community	18 (7,53%)	4 (22,22%)	3 (7,69%)	-	25 (7,86%)
6. Protection of citizens	40 (16,74%)	1 (5,56%)	7 (17,95%)	4 (18,18%)	52 (16,35%)
7. Threat to international peace and security	3 (1,26%)	-	-	-	3 (0,94%)
8. Collective security	4 (1,67%)	-	-	-	4 (1,26%)
9. Human rights and international humanitarian law	8 (3,35%)	1 (5,56%)	1 (2,56%)	1 (4,55%)	11 (3,46%)
Total	239 (100%)	18 (100%)	39 (100%)	22 (100%)	318 (100%)

2. Proportion realist and liberal discourse in press releases per case

	Libya	Côte d'Ivoire	DRC	Darfur
Total realist discourse	95 (28,44%)	6 (25%)	12 (23,53%)	5 (18,52)
Total liberal discourse	239 (71,56%)	18 (75%)	39 (76,47%)	22 (81,48%)
Total	334 (100%)	24 (100%)	51 (100%)	27 (100%)

Press releases

Total realist discourse	118 (27,06%)
Total liberal discourse	318 (72,94%)
Total both discourses	436 (100%)

8.7 Appendix VII – Interview guide (Dutch)

Introductie

- *bedanken en verwelkomen.*
- *mijzelf voorstellen, wie ben ik en wat studeer ik.*
- *uitleg onderzoek: het onderzoeken van de lacune tussen theorie en praktijk omtrent het gebruik van R2P als internationale norm. Het doel is om een nieuw perspectief te bieden geven voor de functie van R2P in het internationaal politiek discours.*
- *Ethische toelichting: toestemming om het interview op te nemen, aantekeningen te maken, eventuele quotes te gebruiken in het onderzoek en of ik hierbij mag verwijzen naar de betreffende persoon.*

1. Wat vindt u van de verantwoordelijkheid die de internationale staten dienen te nemen volgens de VN-norm van RtoP
2. Hoe kijkt u tegen de relatie tussen enerzijds de verantwoordelijkheid van staat en anderzijds verantwoordelijkheid van de internationale gemeenschap aan?
3. Is het denkt u haalbaar om dergelijke internationale normen te praktiseren op wereldniveau?
4. Er is discussie over RtoP als opkomende norm. Ziet u een mogelijkheid dat deze norm genormaliseerd kan worden?
5. Zal de implementatie een top-down benadering blijven waarbij de VN de norm zal opleggen aan de samenleving?

6. Hoe ziet u de werking van R2P idealiter voor zich?
7. Op welk termijn ziet u R2P genormaliseerd worden? (Een aantal decennia, nooit of nu?)
8. Academische literatuur omtrent het gebruik van R2P laat zien dat de norm aangehaald wordt, maar niet in praktijk wordt gebracht. Ondanks dat dezelfde R2P principes van kracht zijn in verschillende cases, wordt R2P inconsistent ingeroepen. Dit stelt dat de internationale norm (nog) niet genormaliseerd is. Kunt u hier een verklaring voor geven?
9. Wat vindt u van alternatieve maatregelen om het gebruik van R2P te verbeteren, zoals de onafhankelijke institutie van de UN Watch, the responsibility to report en the responsibility while protecting?
10. Kunt u middelen/inzichten formuleren die kunnen bijdragen aan een consistentere gebruik van R2P?

8.8 Appendix VIII – Transliteration of the three interviews (Dutch or English)

1. Jaap de Wilde (respondent 3)

Introduction about who I am, what is the goal of the research and what is it expected to contribute to both the academic and political field. Furthermore, I ask the interviewees if I may record the interview to use quotes in my thesis and if I may refer to them personally.

I: Mijn eerste vraag is wat vindt u van de verantwoordelijkheid die internationale staten dienen te nemen volgens de norm van RtoP? Wat vindt u van het idee van de verantwoordelijkheid?

R: Ten eerste dien je een onderscheid te maken in hoe je dit moet beantwoorden, of je dit als een wetenschapper beantwoord of als iemand die in de samenleving staat. En wat ik vind, wat je daarvoor moet doen vind ik niet zo interessant als wetenschapper. Interessanter om te kijken waarom ze bepaalde dingen wel en waarom ze bepaalde dingen niet doen. En dan zie je dus dat er de afgelopen decennium het principe van RtoP is ontstaan waarvan het nog heel onduidelijk is wat het eigenlijk precies voorstelt. Dus op die manier zal je in je scriptie hier aandacht aan moeten geven, van hoe ... eigenlijk is het principe is er sowieso. Er wordt wel af en toe een beroep op gedaan in resoluties en daarmee kan je dus als je een discours analyse volgt zeggen van nou er is in ieder geval een concept wat is ge.... In een discours over de verantwoordelijkheid van staten. En dan vooral de verantwoordelijkheid van staten naar hun eigen bevolking toe, want daar gaat het om. En dan wordt het dus een signafier op een gegeven moment van een bepaald soort normatieve positie ten opzichte van staten. Dus op het moment dat je zegt, hier is RtoP in het geding dan zeg je dus eigenlijk tegen de regering dat ze hun verantwoordelijkheid niet nemen. En dat is een functie een speech act die je dan kan traceren in het discours. Wie hanteert die, op welk moment en dan kan je dat eigenlijk net zo analyseren als dat je een securitizing move zou kunnen analyseren. Als je de securitization theory toepast. En ik zou dus mezelf niet zozeer richten op de vragen moeten ze ingrijpen of niet, want dan wordt je dus onderdeel van het politieke debat. Dat mag je wel doen in je motivatie en in je conclusie, maar in je analyse is het interessant om te kijken hoe gaan ze hiermee om. En dan is het nog maar de vraag om te kijken, want RtoP is een van de opties die diplomaten hebben om in te brengen in discussies over concrete situaties. Maar ze kunnen het ook over een andere boeg gooien.

I: En vindt u het concept an sich wel wenselijk, of denkt u dat de norm überhaupt wel te behalen is?

R: Nou of ik het wenselijk vindt doet er dus verder niet toe. Ik stel vast dat het op komt in het

internationale systeem, in de internationale samenleving liever gezegd. En dat men dit dus gebruikt als poging op bepaalde problematiek vat te krijgen. Of ik het wenselijk vindt ja, dat is een heel ander punt. En dat is dus iets wat ja of of.. En ja, dat kan je dus ook vaak niet goed voorzien. Als het allemaal prachtige vele brengende processen werkt en opeens de wereld uitbreekt en denkt o wat fijn dat we dit concept ontwikkelt hebben. Maar ik vermoed niet dat dat het geval zal zijn. Ik neem aan dat we historisch voor blijven doormodderen over hoe we met elkaar omgaan in de wereld en dit is een van de methoden om te kijken of we elkaar daarin kunnen beïnvloeden.

I: Ik vind het wel aardig dat u dat zegt, want ik heb ook een artikel van u gelezen over de *Endurance of Sovereignty*, ehm... Waarin u dan heel benadrukt he, dat de soevereiniteit of eigenlijk bevraagt of dat nog een belangrijke rol speelt in de samenleving. En zou dat misschien ook een verklarende factor kunnen zijn waarom er nu een lacune is in eigenlijk het invoeren van RtoP? Of zou het juist kunnen helpen om juist vanuit state security, human security te kunnen waarborgen?

R: Nou... het hangt wat paradoxaal in elkaar, zonder soevereiniteit zou je nooit het begrip RtoP kunnen hebben. Want wie hou je verantwoordelijk? Soevereine regering. Dus eh, je hebt eerst soevereiniteit nodig en dan kan je vervolgens zeggen dat de actoren die die status mogen dragen, dus de regeringen, die kun je vervolgens aanspreken op de rechten en verplichtingen die aan die status vastzitten. En dat is een historisch proces. Enerzijds betekent soevereiniteit vrijheid, dat je een hele hoop dingen mag beslissen, maar aan de andere kant vinden we dat het ook een bepaalde mate van internationale en nationale verantwoordelijkheid impliceert. En dat laatste, die nationale kant, is sinds de Koude Oorlog in ontwikkeling. Past dus in de hele ontwikkeling van peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacebuilding. Nou, dan hebben we een regering en dan ... en dan willen we ook geen dictatuur dus dan willen we RtoP maakt als breekijzer om invloed uit te oefenen op regimes die we niet leuk vinden.

I: Ja, dat is een mooie invalshoek. Ja. Ehm, dat is interessant.

R: Maar het bevestigt dus de soevereiniteit, om hem ook weer ter discussie te stellen. Dus het is een paradox.

I: ja klopt ik heb het inderdaad ook in mijn scriptie verwerkt dat eigenlijk het hele concept RtoP ook eh, he op zichzelf paradoxaal is. Omdat het enerzijds heel erg de nadruk van soevereiniteit en dus de verantwoordelijkheid van staten benadrukt, maar anderzijds ook de internationale gemeenschap als verantwoordelijke stelt op het moment dat een staat niet in staat is om haar burgers te beschermen.

R: Precies. Maar dan wordt de kernvraag, wie beslist of eh.. Of RtoP tekort schiet? Wie gaat daarover? Dan zit je voor een deel weer bij de veiligheidsraad en de hele discussie die daar speelt. Republiek of Mali, hangt van de verhoudingen in de Veiligheidsraad af. Wat je ook met z'n begrip kan doen. Nou en daarnaast heeft het een functie van naming en shaming waarbij andere betrokken actoren en landen. Je kan dus zeggen van nou wat daar gebeurt is een schending van.. het probleem daarbij is dat het principe juridisch niet zo hard is he, dus een schending van het principe is het moeilijk om eh.. Vast te stellen wat het nou precies inhoudt. Dus er zit een sterke politieke lading aan het concept.

I: Ja. Maar en. Het is. Wat u zegt, ehh, he uiteindelijk komt het neer op de VN Veiligheidsraad en politieke verhoudingen daarbinnen. Doelt u dan ook op eigenlijk het geopolitieke belang dan groter weegt dan het humanitaire belang? He, want vanuit RtoP wordt natuurlijk het humanitaire belang als kern gezien, als leidend. Maar is in praktijk dat vaak niet aangehaald.

R: Jawel. Nee dat hangt er dus vanaf hoe je het inkleurt. Kijk, als jij wil dat er vanuit de internationale samenleving gereageerd wordt dan zit je vast aan de VN structuur en dan zit je dus vast aan de historische compromissen die in die organisatie bekrompen liggen. Je kan ook buitenom werken, ik vond het wel grappig. Jij had in je inleiding staan dat we Rusland moeten betichten van eh, van de invasie...

I: Ja, haha ja.

R: Maar stel je kan dus inderdaad ook zeggen van Rusland past hier gewoon het RtoP principe toe. Want de Russische bevolking heeft te weinig rechten en bewegingsvrijheid in Oekraïne en de regering daar is zwak en zwalkend. En ze vragen om hulp dus de regering van Oekraïne kan niet bieden....

I: Ja ook interessante invalshoek, ja.

R: Dus.

I: Alleen is dat natuurlijk helemaal niet..

R: Dat is dus volstrekt in lijn met RtoP om je beleid in te verdedigen.

I: Ja alleen is het natuurlijk wel een ehh, precies wat u zegt, buiten de VN veiligheidsraad

omgegaan. En kan het..

R: Ja en dan zeggen ze dus dat hier zo onverantwoordelijk met onze bevolking wordt omgegaan dat ze niet gaan wachten op de veiligheidsraad.

I: Nee. Nee precies.

R: Nou daar heb je in Amerika ook wel voorbeelden van.

I: Ja. En waarom zou dan de Veiligheidsraad achterblijven? Waarom zouden zij niet helpen? Ehh.

R: Nou dat is de hele vaststelling van de permanente veiligheid met vetomacht in de veiligheidsraad. Dus als in dit geval, is het ondenkbaar dat Amerika en Frankrijk akkoord zullen gaan met een ehh een militaire interventie van Rusland in Oekraïne.

I: Ja, dus het blijkt..

R: Want met dezelfde reden staat Rusland geen militaire interventie in Syrië toe.

I: Nee, dus het is uiteindelijk komt het dan toch neer op de politieke belangen en de..

R: Ja dat is dus een onderdeel daarvan. Ja. En dat kan je dan dus wel analyseren in termen van securitization van nou blijktbaar is er ... in de veiligheidsraad in het collectief als essentieel vraagstuk om nou even te behandelen voor handen ineengeslagen worden.

I: Dus dat dat dan een gebrek is aan RtoP.

R: Ja, het is geen gebrek aan RtoP maar het is dan gewoon niet ernstig genoeg.

I: Nee. Nee. Ok. Ehm. Ik schrijf ondertussen even wat steekwoorden op hoor.

R: Ja.

I: Even kijken.

R: Het kan best wel dat een individueel land het heel erg vindt, die ziet dan wel

overeenstemming. Bijvoorbeeld over Mali, nou ja dat vinden ze ook niet zo ernstig maar daar zijn dan weer minder directe belangen op het spel, die een rol spelen dus nou ja dat mag dan wel.

I: Ja. Ja en wat ik ook wel het idee heb, want in mijn scriptie vergelijk ik de casus van Libië en Congo met elkaar.

R: Ja.

I: En wat ik ook wel ondervind is dat, ehm de keuze ook vaak afhangt van het rendement wat uit zonnemissie gehaald kan worden. En nou ja, mijn onderzoek, nou alle informatie die ik nu over Congo heb verkregen laat toch wel zien dat het zulke diepgaande problemen zijn dat een RtoP missie nou ja.. Ook wel kijkend naar een casus in Afghanistan toch wel zo kostbaar is dat er eigenlijk nou ja, economisch gezien er geen geld is omdat ten eerste op te zetten en ten tweede ook rendabel te houden.

R: Ja. Nou laat je niet beetnemen door dat soort argumentaties. Je kan wel zeggen het is hartstikke complex, maar Libië is ook hartstikke complex en daar weten ze nog steeds niet hoe het verder moet. En ehh, neem een ander voorbeeld, Afghanistan. Daar zouden we dan wel geweten hebben hoe het moet maar kijk hoe dat is achtergelaten. En Iran is ook nog steeds compleet... Waar het meer om gaat is waarom gebruikt men dat soort argumenten, waarom noemt men het complex. 'het is zo complex, dan kunnen we het maar beter niet doen'. Nou, misschien is dat wel, heeft dat wel een hele andere functie dan waar de woorden werkelijk voor staan.

I: Ja.

R: Dus, je moet wat dat betreft ehhh, eigenlijk altijd heel sceptisch..

I: Sceptisch.

R: ...Staan tegenover de taal die men in officiële documenten en in officiële speeches gebruikt.

I: Ja. Ja. Ja. Ja dat ben ik met u eens, ja.

R: En wat daar natuurlijk doorheen speelt is als we echt willen weten hoe de machtspolitiek dynamiek werkt, dan moet je nog even 20 jaar wachten tot er wat archieven vrijkomen. Want, een heleboel is gewoon natuurlijk niet in de openbaarheid, is geplastificeerd. Dus wat voor afspreken

precies tussen bijvoorbeeld Amerika en Rusland gemaakt worden..

I: Dat weten we niet. Nee, misschien zijn er wel allang tienjaren plannen voor gemaakt, dat zou zomaar kunnen.

R: Ja, maar kijk naar Oekraïne, wat erg lijkt op eh totaal geen zin heeft in Oost Oekraïne en heel blij is met de Krim en het daarbij wil laten. Maar dan kunnen er wel relaties op de grond zijn die hem toch gewoon dwingen om binnenlandse politieke redenen, om toch verder te gaan. Maar je hebt dus goede kans dat Amerikanen met Europeanen hebben afgesproken van nou ja goed joh, die Krim, hou het maar.

I: Ja, ja.

R: He en dan moet je verder ... ofzo he, dat kan heel makkelijk maar dat weten we pas over 20 jaar.

I: Ja. Ja, maar denkt u wel dat het uiteindelijk uit gaat komen? Dat het transparanter gaat worden?

R: Ja hoor, je hebt meer van die dingen. Je hebt bijvoorbeeld eh, crisis tijdens de Koude Oorlog, de Praagse Lente 1968. Nou toen schreeuwden alle westerse landen moord en brand in de media en die defensiebegrotingen moesten allemaal omhoog en dat zijn ze ook gegaan want kijk maar dan laat die Russen het gezicht zijn. Want ze wilden met hun eigen troepen Nou 20 jaar later komt uit archieven dat de NAVO van tevoren keurig was ingelicht van die actie en ze zeggen ja ga je gang maar. Het zal symbolisch troepen uit Zuid-Duitsland hebben teruggetrokken om duidelijk te maken van wij gaan ons hier niet tegenaan bemoeien.

I: Ja. Ja.

R: Dus dan zijn er gewoon andere belangen in het spel in dit geval gewoon we willen geen oorlog in Europa. Maar het is wel een hoger goed dan ehh, het lot van Praag.

I: Ja, ja. En dan komt het eigenlijk uiteindelijk neer op een heel select groepje mensen die dan dit beslist en dan wel of niet in gang zet.

R: Ja, ja. maar het geeft dus ook aan dat je dus bij, bij het discours wat we wel kunnen zien je dus vooral niets op Moet volgen. Je moet vooral tussen de regels doorlezen en kijken van nou wat zou dit kunnen betekenen? Het kan gewoon zijn wat ze zeggen, maar het kan ook heel goed iets

anders zijn. En daar kom je achter door te kijken wat voor functie heeft een bepaalde uitspraak. Wat is er nou, wat gebeurt daar, door het probleem op een bepaalde manier te presenteren.

I: Ja precies, dus hoe hoe ja precies. Dus hoe iets in dit geval, gesecuritized wordt en waarom dat op deze manier wordt gedaan. Wat interessant is daarom ook, dat heeft u denk ik niet gelezen. In mijn scriptie vergelijk ik Congo met Libië en Libië wordt heel, heel duidelijk de verantwoordelijkheid in speeches van Sarkozy en Obama de verantwoordelijkheid van de internationale gemeenschap benadrukt. Terwijl aan de andere kant in Congo waar eigenlijk natuurlijk heel veel dezelfde, al dan niet ergere praktijken zijn gebeurd, heel erg duidelijk de nadruk wordt gelegd op de verantwoordelijkheid van de staat. Dus van Congo zelf.

R: Ja, ja.

I: En dat is een heel gek ehm, hele andere functie krijgt het daardoor natuurlijk.

R: Ja, ja. nou het heeft natuurlijk met de situatie te maken. Kijk Qaddhafi moest gewoon met pensioen gestuurd worden, de dictators die laten zich niet met pensioen sturen. Dus dat gaat altijd met geweld, dat zag je bij Mubarak ook. En eh, dan ga je de rebellen steunen en dan hoop je maar dat die rebellen solide genoeg zijn om iets, die verantwoordelijkheid uit voort komt. Congo is de situatie inderdaad dat de rebellen wel zo duidelijk zijn wie je daar zou moeten steunen en ehh. En verder is het gewoon nabijheid. Ik bedoel, Congo ligt niet aan de Middellandse Zee en heeft geen gas, olie en gas. En Libië wel.

I: Nee. En natuurlijk eh, Rwanda en Oeganda..

R: ... Dus dan komen er gewoon andere belangen bij waardoor je denkt van ja dan moeten we dit toch als een urgenter probleem definiëren dan Congo.

I: Ja Ja. Maar dan gaat het dus eigenlijk wel voorbij aan het hele normatieve aspect. Als ik dat hieruit kan concluderen.

R: Ehhh, ja maar je moet dus wat dat betreft wat langer nadenken over wat de functie van dat soort landen zijn in de wereldpolitiek. Een is mooi idealisme zo van kijk wat zou de wereld mooi zijn als iedereen zich verantwoordelijk gedraagt.

I: Ja precies.

R: Maar ja als dat zou kunnen, hadden we die wereld allang natuurlijk.

I: Ja, ja.

R: Dus dat is niet een nieuw idee. En dus moet je kijken van nou wat het een beroep op dat soort waarden waar je wat tegen kan geven. Je kan wel tegen een politieke praktijk zijn, en dan kan je niet zeggen van nou nee hoor dat vind ik een dom begrip.

I: Nee, nee normatief nee precies.

R: Dus hetzelfde wat ook voor human security en andere dat je denkt. Ja die spreken voor zich. Net als vrede, wie is er nou tegen vrede? Niemand. Maar ja dat is nou weer het slechte begin. En eh, ja want mijn vrede is een andere dan die van een ander en dan hebben we dus het volste recht om daarvoor te strijden. Want ja, het is de hoogste waarde en normen.

I: Ja.

R: Dus die functie van die waarden en normen die is dus niet zozeer wat ze inhoudelijk precies voorstellen. Dat speelt wel een rol, maar daarnaast is het onderdeel van politieke bewegingen en politieke ontwikkelingen.

I: Ja. En ziet u dan bijvoorbeeld, nog even terugkomen op de praktisatie van RtoP. Bijvoorbeeld, er zijn ook alternatieven of aanvullingen gegeven he, een betere werking van RtoP?

R: Ja, ja.

I: Waaronder bijvoorbeeld he, even heel abstract het vergroten van accountability.

R: Ja.

I: Of he, het belang van eh, monitoren. Waarvan ik persoonlijk.. Nee dat mag ik natuurlijk eigenlijk niet zeggen in een interview, haha. Ehm, of he, veel meer groter belang aan preventie technieken. Bijvoorbeeld UN Watch dat je een institutie binnen de VN houdt die toeziet op de, dat de RtoP normen goed he... De RtoP doelstellingen goed worden aangehaald. Is daar, ziet u daar dan nog ruimte voor?

R: Nou kijk ik vind het op zich heel goed dat er serieuze mensen proberen als er een geding op tafel ligt, om te kijken van nou in hoeverre kunnen we dat optimaliseren.

I: Ja, ja.

R: En dan hebben we natuurlijk stakeholders die dat willen en daar belangen hebben en dat is op zich een goede zaak. Maar dan nog moet je afwachten hoe dat uitwerkt.

I: Ja.

R: Dat eh, je eh, ja dat geldt voor de hele mensenrechtenagenda.

I: Uiteraard.

R: En goed dat we een universele verklaring hebben, en dat we dus die discussie over mensenrechten hebben. Maar ja, je houdt er niet mee tegen dat in een aantal landen de Sharia wordt ingevoerd.

I: Nee, nee.

R: En eh, dus ja. Hoe je dat moet beoordelen dat is een hele hachelijke zaak. Daar kan je gewoon ... over hebben, maar om te zien of er nou echt progressie in zit of stilstand of dat het in een draaimolentje ronddraait dat is. Ja dat is heel moeilijk om vast te stellen.

I: Ja ok.

R: Daar kan je eigenlijk alleen maar discussie over hebben. En dan hoop je als wetenschapper dat als we er maar genoeg discussie over blijven hebben dat er dan ook aandacht voor blijft in de praktijk en dat je daardoor dan toch iets opschiet.

I: Ja.

R: Maar of dat echt zo is dat weten we natuurlijk niet.

I: Eigenlijk een eh pessimistische inslag, haha.

R: Nou ja..

I: Kritisch, kritisch haha.

R: Ja in feite, haha. Natuurlijk, ja.

I: Eigen, eigen supremacy van een wetenschapper.

R: Ja maar nee maar dat denk ik ook een beetje. Je moet er in ieder geval in je analyses moet je dus een soort eh, afstand bewaren van wat je observeert. En natuurlijk mag je daarbij betrokken zijn, emotioneel en politiek. Dat mag ook wel naar voren komen. Maar dat moet los staan van wat je observeert, in zekere zin.

I: Ja.

R: dat is een ideaal, dat lukt nooit helemaal.

I: Nee dat is natuurlijk ook altijd discutabel als rol van wetenschapper, ook in eh.. het hele idee van securitization dat je als wetenschapper, als observeerder an sich ben je natuurlijk ook al onderdeel van het debat.

R: Tuurlijk.

I: Dat ben je altijd. Dus het is nooit objectief en neutraal.

R: Dat is ook de kritiek die vanuit Critical Security Studies op de school is gekomen en eh, zo van ja je ontsnapt niet aan je eigen deelname van het proces en dat is natuurlijk ook zo. Alleen daar kan je verschillende dingen mee doen. Je kan het heel erg... stoppen en je kan het ook zeggen van nou ik blijf toch vooral observeren wat andere zeggen en dan vervolgens bepaalde methodologie analyseren.

I: Ja.

R: En dan krijg je bepaalde inzichten in het proces. En dat is natuurlijk nooit objectief maar het kan wel bijdragen aan het debat.

I: Ja, precies. Interessante invalshoek. Nou ik heb eigenlijk..

R: Maar ik zou dus zeggen in de discussie een ding wat ik wil noemen..

I; Ja nee heel graag.

I; Dat past ook wel in dezelfde ontwikkeling als die van het internationaal strafhof en anderen waarin er een.. Eigenlijk na de Koude Oorlog een steeds sterkere neiging is om regeringsleiders individueel aansprakelijk te stellen..

I: Ja.

R: En dat is wel, dat vind ik wel een interessante ontwikkeling in de wereldpolitiek. En ook in de betekenis van de soevereiniteit, dat eh de verschuiving zit in van wie is nou eigenlijk verantwoordelijk voor wat er gebeurt. En dat is wel, dat leidt tot allerlei nieuwe vraagstukken. Want een heleboel verantwoordelijkheden zijn ook gewoon institutioneel.

I: Ja. Ja maar dan kom je, dat is natuurlijk een interessante want dan kom je natuurlijk eigenlijk weer uit op de VN.

R: Ja.

I: Als he, politieke politie die wel zo wordt genoemd maar ook vertegenwoordigd wordt door staten. Dus dat op zich al een probleem is, dat kan dan dus al niet werken. He als je het zo stelt.

R: Nee precies. Ja ja. Dus eh, ja nou ja dat is een ontwikkeling die je wel in de gaten moet houden. Je ziet ook rare dingen, je zou kunnen zeggen dat nu al bijna acht jaar lang Obama verantwoordelijk is voor Guantanamo Bay.

I: Ja in een unipolair..

R: En daar is hij eigenlijk voor aansprakelijk maar hij kan wel zeggen van ho is even, nee dat komt door de Senaat hier kan ik niks aan doen.

R; Ja, het zit vast.

R: ; He dus, dat soort.. op dezelfde manier zal Assad zeggen ja ik moet helaas wel op die rebellen schieten, dat wil ik niet maar ze rebelleren dus ik heb geen keus.

I: Ja, nee. Maar goed, want u zegt he aan de ene kant is het een ontwikkeling om eigenlijk soevereine staten verantwoordelijk te houden. Maar gaat dit dan ook niet gepaard met de internationalisering. Want blijkbaar is er dus een mechanisme in gang gezet die tot stand brengt dat de internationale gemeenschap, wie dat dan ook mag zijn het daar legitiem is om bepaalde natiestaten verantwoordelijk te mogen houden. Dat idee dat dat mag.

R: Ja.

I: Dat is natuurlijk een internationaal.

R: Ja, dat is ja. dat past in onze huidige tijd. We mogen geen oorlog meer voeren he, net als de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Dus je mag niet meer zeggen ik val jou binnen omdat ik jou graag wil binnenvallen. Dus je krijgt steeds andere legitimerings-constructies om toch gewoon geweld te gebruiken. En daar hoort, misschien dan wel een mooi beschavingsproces... Dat alles wordt opgedoekt. En daar hoort dus bij dat we dat legitimeren in termen van mensenrechten, of human security of responsibility to protect. Maar het legitimeert uiteindelijk vormen die er optreden.

I: Ja, ja.

R: En dat is denk ik reden om dan maar kritisch te kijken ja, wat houdt dat optreden dan precies is en waar leidt dat toe. En dan, en verder interessant om te zien van wat is de normatieve context waarin dit blijkbaar zinnig is om dit zo te zeggen.

I: Ja nee heel goed. Ik heb veel stof om over na te denken. Ik vond het een leuk interview.

Afsluiting, woord van dank en nogmaals vragen eventuele quotes te gebruiken. Tot slot de mogelijkheid bieden mijn scriptie in te zien na de voltooiing.

2. Mient Jan Faber (respondent 1)

Introduction about who I am, what is the goal of the research and what is it expected to contribute to both the academic and political field. Furthermore, I ask the interviewees if I may record the

interview to use quotes in my thesis and if I may refer to them personally.

I: Nou dan zal ik met mijn eerste vraag beginnen. Wat vindt u van de verantwoordelijkheid die internationale staten dienen te nemen volgens de VN norm van 'responsibility to protect'?

R: Vraag het nog een keer want.. Wat vindt u van de verantwoordelijkheid, van..

I: Sorry, ja..

R: Zegt me niks.

I: Hoe de internationale norm, dus het idee dat staten een norm tot stand hebben laten komen waarbij ze vinden dat enerzijds staatssoevereiniteit de verantwoordelijkheid heeft om haar eigen burgers te beschermen. En anderzijds op het moment dat dat niet lukt, de internationale gemeenschap wie dat dan ook is, de verantwoordelijkheid heeft om dan in te grijpen.

R: Ja kijk ik, je moet gewoon naar de geschiedenis kijken van het begrip. Als er een genocide dreigde of een massale slachting, dan hadden sommige landen de neiging om te zeggen dan moet ik gaan ingrijpen.

I: Ja.

R: Dat was een (onverstaanbaar). En eh, maar de vraag was of dat het enige argument was waarom ze wilde ingrijpen. Of dat ze ook nog een andere agenda hadden. En dat heette dus humanitaire interventie en humanitaire interventie dat kon je dus ook zonder toestemming van de Veiligheidsraad doen.

I: Ja.

R: Nou en toen hebben ze op een gegeven moment gezegd ja daar wordt misbruik van gemaakt. Dus we moeten iets anders bedenken en toen zijn ze met dat concept gekomen, de responsibility to protect. En daar zit de VN er dus wel bovenop en de willekeur is weg. De vraag is natuurlijk in hoe vele het er dan worden in de situaties die dat vergen, of dat het toch veel en veel ingewikkelder wordt omdat je geen eenstemmigheid in de Veiligheidsraad hebt. Nou en daar is Libië tuurlijk een prachtig voorbeeld van in de zin dat het, hoe half het was. Dat ze wel even meegingen enzovoorts maar dat het achteraf toch de spuigaten. En dus je kunt je de vraag stellen, is dat ingrijpen van de

internationale gemeenschap in situaties die dat nodig hebben is dat wel geholpen met de responsibility to protect.

I: En als u denkt aan het idee van ehh.. We besluiten met z'n allen dat de internationale gemeenschap verantwoordelijkheid draagt op het moment dat een staat daar niet toe in staat is, denkt u dat dat voldoende draagvlak is om dat te houden? Want we zien natuurlijk dat afgelopen decennium er heel veel conflicten zijn geweest waarbij uiteindelijk niet wordt geïntervenieerd door de internationale gemeenschap.

R: Al die woorden zeggen niks. Wat je in de praktijk namelijk ziet is gewoon een soort eh, een belang van landen. En je hebt in de jaren 90 dat Bosnië conflict gehad en dat, Balkan conflict en daar eh, hadden de Europese landen natuurlijk een groot belang bij. Om dat op te lossen, want die mensen stroomden en masse Europa binnen. Dus er moest wat gedaan worden. En dat was nou net in die tijd dat je ook idealistisch dacht en toen hebben ze 'save areas' ingesteld. En dat is eigenlijk een toepassing van de responsibility to protect. Srebrenica (onverstaanbaar). En vervolgens werd Srebrenica een enorme mislukking, mede door het optreden van de Nederlandse regering die tegen hun eigen militairen zei toen de Serviërs kwamen: je hoeft ze niet te beschermen hoor. Je mag ze gewoon uitleveren. Met alle gevolgen, met het gevolg dat ze vermoord werden. En toen is het hele concept is daarmee naar de verdoemenis gegaan, dus er is niet zo vreselijk veel over. En je ziet het bij Syrië ook, daar is een burgeroorlog gaande daar wordt op grote schalen gedood en iedereen zegt eh, die roept: ach en wee. Maar niemand doet wat. En dus..

I: Ja, nee. En waarom niet?

R: Omdat men de prijs van interventie niet kan berekenen. Men weet niet wat het kost, als je daar een keer in gaat zitten nou ja enfin. De Balkan heeft dat geleerd, Afrika heeft dat hier en daar ook geleerd. Rwanda heeft geleerd dat als je er helemaal niet in gaat zitten dat dan iedereen wordt vermoord. En Dallaire, de generaal die er toen zat, die heeft tot op de dag van vandaag er nog gewetenswroeging om dat ze niet ingegrepen hebben. En, maar dat is wel de situatie, je doet het niet. Want je kunt het ze, je weet niet waar je in terecht komt, je kunt je er niet goed op voorbereiden. Er zijn allemaal excuses waardoor de internationale gemeenschap toch uiteindelijk toch zegt: het enige terrein waar we wel wat kunnen doen is in post-conflict situaties. Dus de doden, de graven liggen vol..

I: Preventie.

R: En dan kunnen wij (onverstaanbaar) en alles wat er vernietigd is, dat kunnen we proberen weer te laten functioneren.

I: Maar dat is dan ook meer peacebuilding toch? Dus het opbouwen na..

R: Voor zover restauraties iets met vrede te maken heeft.

I: Ja.

R: Dat waag ik me ten eerste te betwijfelen. Ik bedoel al die problemen, al die idealistische notie die in de VN op gang zijn gekomen, dat die een voor een sneuvelen. De wereld zit zo niet in elkaar.

I: Nou ja, als ik het zo mag zeggen he, kijk u zegt uiteindelijk is er geen belang bij de natiestaten en dus wordt er door de internationale gemeenschap niets gedaan. Maar is dat dan een gebrek aan een soort, accountability want de staten worden dus blijkbaar niet door niemand niet accountable gehouden. En de VN Veiligheidsraad is dan in dit geval de politie die dat bepaalt. Maar die bestaat natuurlijk ook uit staten zelf, dus is dat dan misschien het probleem? Dat er een. Zou er misschien, zou dan de oplossing zijn dat er een extern instituut die bepaalde mensen accountable houdt, bepaalde staten? Want dan zou je bijna zeggen dat geopolitieke belangen groter wegen dat human security.

R: Ja de vreemdelingen (onverstaanbaar) van de Fransen en ja dat heeft natuurlijk doorgaans de beste resultaten.

I: Ja.

R: Dat zijn gewoon jongens die op school zich zeer slecht gedragen, die halen ze op en die worden dan allemaal in kampen gestopt. Die worden een half jaar getraind en dan zijn ze.. ik heb het in Bosnië meegemaakt, die waren veruit de jongens die de dingen voor elkaar kregen. Als er ergens bonje was dan sturen ze die jongens erop af. En die wisten van knokken, die hadden hun hele leven lang niks, ik zeg hun hele leven maar vanaf zo.. niks anders gedaan dan met hun vriendjes.

I: Geïndoctrineerd.

R: Nou ja die waren opgegroeid zo in die sfeer. En die waren vervolgens getraind, getraind en nog 's getraind en zij waren toen ook nog eens in zoverre gedisciplineerd dat ze konden naar in dit geval

naar Bosnië om daar een aantal echte klussen op te lossen. En dat deden ze.

I: Goed?

R: Ja nou ja in die zin, het zijn klussen he, ze lossen het probleem niet op. Maar op een gegeven moment gebeurt er iets dramatisch en er moet opgetreden worden. Dan sturen ze die jongens er naartoe en die rammen dan de zaak in elkaar.

I: Ja.

R: Nou dat is natuurlijk ook gewoon, dan heb je het gevoel van: dat is toch vreemd.

I: Ja, haha hoe kan..

R: Haha..

I: Totaal niet vanuit de staat..

R: En je kunt ook niet naar de, binnen de VN...

I: Verantwoorden.

R: Veiligheidsraad dit aan de orde stellen. Dit komt er gewoon bij. Dus het zijn de krachten van buiten die op de ene of andere manier zo hier en daar, ongevraagd maar desalniettemin de orde terugbrengen. Niet omdat ze zo graag vrede willen...

I: Dat is een interessant.

R: Want ze zijn geïnteresseerd in het vechten, daar zijn ze voor opgeleid. Maar het een kan het gevolg zijn van het ander. En dat hangt af van hoe de omgeving eruit ziet, want in de Balkan bestond de omgeving uit allemaal landen die de militairen (onverstaanbaar) die niet kwamen om te vechten maar wel kwamen om te beschermen en save areas en zo meer. En dat konvooi natuurlijk goed beschermde maar zij een extra iets nodig hadden en dat waren deze (onverstaanbaar). Althans voor de Fransen betreft, de Nederlanders mochten daar natuurlijk niet aankomen, maar waren wel jaloers.

I: Konden wij dat maar ja.

R: Het is dus een beetje dramatisch, dat heb ik mij wel sterk gerealiseerd in de betreffende (onverstaanbaar) jarenlang.

I: Ja, ja het is ook een vrij.. Ik wil het bijna pessimisme noemen, dat het idee van idealisme daar toch wel aan voorbij gaat. Dat misschien R2P te idealistisch is om praktijk, om het in praktijk te kunnen waarmaken. Want wat u nu zegt komt dan toch op eigenlijk hele nationale of zelfs lokale bewegingen.

R: Destilleren steeds weer, ik heb me indertijd ontzettend sterk gemaakt begin jaren '90 hier in Den Haag om naar Bosnië te gaan. Om daar ook een safe area in te richten. We hebben daar campagnes voor gevoerd, zelfs demonstraties georganiseerd en zo en daaraan bijgedragen aan het feit dat ze dat inderdaad gingen doen. (onverstaanbaar) redelijk goede kennis, plaatsgenoot van de eerste konvooi. Daar heb ik veel mee gepraat en zo en die was in die jaren minister en die liet zich gewoon overtuigen. En zijn vriendjes, want zo gaat het meestal.

I: Ja.

R: Dat zijn de beste contacten, al die diplomaten dat is allemaal flauwekul. Allemaal kletsen ze er een tijdje over en dan komen ze met een gezamenlijke verklaring en daar staat dan drie keer niks in en dan gaan ze weer naar huis en zo.

I: Gebakken lucht.

R: En dan zijn ze blij dat ze het gedaan hebben, maar er komt niks uit. Wat eruit komt gebeurt altijd langs andere wegen. (onverstaanbaar) en daar zag je dus van eh, toen met Srebrenica dat je inderdaad dingen op een heel persoonlijk niveau met elkaar kunt bespreken omdat je elkaar kent. En als je mensen uit die regio kent en zo dan komt het alleen maar dichterbij en krijg je ook, er komt dus een andere dimensie die een minister in dit geval zover brengt dat hij zegt van het is ok. Hij kan er natuurlijk met zijn vriendjes erover praten maar hij moet vervolgens ook wat gaan doen en dat doet hij omdat hij inderdaad vriendjes heeft en daardoor geïnspireerd. En, maar voor de rest is het, ik bedoel Srebrenica was naar mijn orde een succes, het had een succes kunnen worden, als de Nederlandse regering de simpele moed gehad had om tegen een paar mensen te zeggen: je hebt nou 500 van die moslimmannen op de compound gehad en dat moest je van de VN, en die laat je er niet meer af. En dat is wel afgestuurd, die zijn wel er dus wel afgestuurd en dat is een schande. Daarvoor

zou Nederland voor in de gevangenis terecht moeten komen als je een gevangenis voor landen hebt. Dan zou heel Europa erin zitten, maar zo ging het wel. En er zijn dus andere omstandigheden, er zijn eigenlijk hele simpele maatregelen die genomen moeten worden om iets te redden nadat al heel veel is misgegaan in dit geval dus 500 mannen. En juist omdat je in een situatie zit waarin al zoveel is misgegaan, mag dat laatste ook misgaan. Dus geef je ook toestemming aan je eigen commandant, stuur ze maar weg.

I: Maar dan zegt u dus, willens en wetens. En dat..

R: Ja dan doe je het dus hele bewust, waarbij je dus de schijn ophoudt dat als die mensen geëvacueerd worden ja weliswaar de mannen van de vrouwen gescheiden enzovoort, maar wellicht komt het allemaal nog goed. Want dat is onze verantwoordelijkheid. Dat jij die mensen hebt aangeleverd, daar zet je dan een soort streep achter. Dat was dat, dan gaan we dat hoofdstuk in en dan is dat jouw verantwoording van hen, wij zijn nergens voor verantwoordelijk. Ik denk dat we verantwoordelijk zijn voor de dood van die 500 man en zo want die hadden we op de compound moeten houden. En dat hebben we niet gedaan en mijn stelling is dus als je niet van, kijk de praktijk leert he. Je kunt een nieuw recept kun je initiëren dat is de responsibility to protect of hoe je het ook maar noemen wil, maar de praktijk leert of zo'n recept werkt. En of zo'n recept wordt toegepast en als het niet wordt toegepast kun je het vergeten. Als het recept niet werkt kun je het doorstrepen. Als het recept wel werkt heb je een kans dat het inderdaad iets, dat het gebruikt wordt. Dat het op een andere plekken belandt.

I: Maar goed, zegt u dan het ligt aan het gebrek van toepassing aan het recept? Of een gebrek aan het werken?

R: Het is belangrijk de politiek (onverstaanbaar). Dat wil zeggen, kijk als je save havens neerstelt dan weet je zeker dat je moet verdedigen, militairen gaan dan mee.

I: Ja, heel concreet.

R: Dus dan in het geval van nood zal er een gevecht, zal er gevochten worden en dat gebeurde ook. Alleen niet op het laatste moment dat het echt nodig was, toen gebeurde het niet meer. Voor het geval het überhaupt het was uitgelokt want dat weet je niet he. En dat was niet nodig want alleen (onverstaanbaar) mensen eigenlijk. Dus ja je zit wel in een soort, je maakt dus een aantal mislukkingen. En dan, die mislukkingen leiden er niet toe normaal gesproken dat je daarvan leert. Nee die mislukkingen leiden ertoe dat je ze voortaan vermijdt. En dat je dus zegt van doe dat dus

nooit meer dan kunnen we ook niet meer in zo'n situatie belanden. En dat is kennelijk erg politiek en dan krijg je dus een vorm van peacekeeping die eigenlijk (onverstaanbaar) is, denk aan Mali. (onverstaanbaar) hier en daar en zo vliegen we wat rond en we zetten in de tussentijd een geweldig sterke compound op in een redelijk safe gebied enzovoorts en dan worden ze geëerd door de.. Ik heb, ik ben lid van de Partij van de Arbeid en fractielid IJskes ik weet niet of je die kent, lid van de Tweede Kamer die heeft een paar jaar lang heeft ze zo'n defensiekring om zich verzameld en daar liet ze alle generaals opdraven, dus één voor één. En ik heb die sessies bijgewoond, een stuk of zeven en ik heb dus zeven maanden lang volstrekt dezelfde verhalen aangehoord, want die generaal vertellen natuurlijk allemaal hetzelfde. En die hebben allemaal op missies gezeten en die zijn allemaal zeer moedig geweest en ik trek dat niet meer. Maar desalniettemin, en die worden dus op handen gedragen. En je denkt dan van: waarom gaat het dan mis als alles zo goed gaat. Waarom hebben we dus missies aangesteund, missies geconstrueerd waar zeg maar de safety van onszelf zo van het maximum wordt gegarandeerd en we kunnen niet te veel slachtoffers hebben of eigenlijk helemaal geen slachtoffers.

I: Ook om het te kunnen verantwoorden naar het volk.

R: Ja. Dus dat we daar, dat we ergens in een soort systeem terecht komen waarin je een tijdje ergens bent, waar je een aantal dingen doet die ongetwijfeld nuttig zijn, die ook risico's met zich meenemen. Maar daarna ga je weer terug, maar je wordt nooit als het ware.. Als je echt in dat soort conflictgebieden een verschil wil maken, dien je je toch in sterkere mate te identificeren met de mensen in het land. Anders gaat het niet. En dat loont nu helemaal niet, we zijn complete buitenstaanders.

I: Ja, externe.. maar als ik het dan goed begrijp, ziet u dus eigenlijk de mislukkingen van in de jaren '90 even grofweg gezegd als, die ervoor hebben gezorgd dat het nu ondanks dat R2P er nu is, die het nu heel erg bemoeilijken om een peacekeeping missie te starten? Omdat we dus veel voorzichtiger zijn, we zijn veel terughoudender we zijn veel minder echt interventie en veel meer.. nou ja.

R: We zullen nooit meer safe areas doen. Omdat het in Srebrenica door onszelf mislukt is. Het is gewoon een incepta, ook zo in een van die (onverstaanbaar), die erna aan de beurt was gelukt is, geldt dat helemaal niet. Dat het in Srebrenica mislukt, dat is het verhaal geweest van die oorlog en daarmee is dat afgelopen. Dus één land in de NAVO zeg maar Nederland, die daar altijd tegen zal stemmen als dat soort geluiden opkomen en spreekt daar met algemene stem dus het komt er niet meer door.

I: Nee.

R: En dus de responsibility to protect..

I: Haha, zo mooi in de volksmond..

R: Responsibility to protect, die hebben we niet.

I: Die bestaat dus eigenlijk niet.

R: Die, daar kunnen we helemaal niks mee. En nogmaals het is dus gekomen omdat we de humanitaire interventie niet wilde want dat (onverstaanbaar) op en dan gaat het ene land het andere land bezetten onder het mom van humanitaire interventie. Dus moet het allemaal via de VN lopen en als het via de VN loopt nou dan wordt het een hele moeizame discussie en nou ja enzovoort enzovoorts. Dan kunnen we allemaal besluiten, het wordt weg.. Eh geserveerd zal ik maar zeggen. En eh..

I: En dat is op zich wel een aardig bruggetje naar mijn scriptie, ik heb er nu wat onderzoek naar gedaan..

R: Om 's, om één zijopmerking een hele belangrijke zelfs. R2P, weet je hoe je dat schrijft, afkort?

I: Ik doe met ja, een 2 of met een 'to'.

R: Een R en dan een 2 en dan een P.

I: Haha over belangrijke zaken..

R: Ja is belangrijk, haha.

I: Zelfs daar is volgens mij al een discussie over, hoe we het afkorten.

R: Ja want jij deed het anders namelijk zag ik in die notitie die je me toestuurde.

I: Ja het verschilt in verschillende documenten.

R: Ja je moet heel consequent zijn, je moet gewoon die wiskunde kant aanhouden..

I: Ja?

R: Ja die blijft beter hangen, die is overtuigender..

I: Dat is meer een formule, haha. Een consistente formule, hier R2P. Wat ik wilde vertellen, ik heb er nu wat onderzoek naar gedaan naar hoe nou ja, R2P beter gewaarborgd kan worden of beter aangehaald kan worden en daar zijn dus verschillende ideeën over. En een voorbeeld wat ik net al even aanhaalden is bijvoorbeeld het vergroten van de accountability.

R: Vergroot?

I: Het vergroten van de accountability, als soort van controlerende macht om ervoor te zorgen dat het principe van R2P wordt nageleefd. Of bijvoorbeeld, ik weet niet of je kent van..

R: Maar, maar de responsibility van wie? De internationale gemeenschap?

I: Ja dat is dus de vraag, van ja de internationale gemeenschap. Stel dat je, ik denk nu helemaal out of de box hoor, dat je bepaalde banden hebt met een bepaald land of dat je weet dat een bepaald land financieel gezien in staat is om een dergelijke R2P missie op te zetten. Dat je dan zulke landen accountable houdt om, of verantwoord stelt om te zorgen dat er iets mee gebeurt. Een ander idee is ik weet niet of u de UN Watch kent? He dus een onafhankelijke institutie die er op toeziet dat überhaupt de principes worden toegeleefd of nageleefd bedoel ik. Dus denk u dat dat kan werken of het alsnog..

R: Nou aan de enige wat je ziet, maar wij wij, dat komt nooit in ons land door (onverstaanbaar) is in Afrika waar de meeste oorlogen zijn. De Afrikaanse Unie heeft natuurlijk de beste, is veruit de beste in het benaderen van dat soort problemen en het sturen van troepen. Daar wordt heel weinig over gerapporteerd hier in de Westerse kranten, die doen het aan de lopende band in allerlei landen.

I: Interessant, ja.

R: En die zijn erop, dat gaat niet altijd goed enzovoort. Maar er gaat ook een hele hoop, in Nigeria is daar een hele sterke concentratiepunt in. He die zijn daar en in het statuut staat het ook, dat zij he, en die hebben het ook opgepakt. Die zitten ook veel dichterbij de werkelijkheid dan de mensen in New

York die natuurlijk misschien weten ze daar waar Afrika ongeveer ligt, maar dan houdt het toch ook wel op he. En, maar die zitten er middenin die wonen daar.

I: Is het dan betrokkenheid?

R: Ja, die hebben daar hun le..

I: Dus toch ook lokaal..

R: Legermacht die ze daar naartoe sturen en lokaal wordt gemobiliseerd en zo en die treden in die landen op.

I: Maar dat is een interessant idee.

R: En dat betekent dus een model, het model is een regionaal model als je er wat mee wil doen. En een internationaal model werkt niet, heel slecht omdat je dan al dat gesodemieter krijgt met de Veiligheidsraad en weet ik wat van vetorechten enzovoort en zo meer. Het móet lokaal worden opgepakt. Het probleem aan de andere kant is daarbij is de, zijn de rijke landen zal ik maar zeggen, de noordelijke landen zijn niet bereid te betalen.

I: Ja precies.

R: Want die moeten wel gewoon wat doen he, om op de een of andere manier zonder dat ze een zee, een vinger in de pap krijgen. Want laat die Afrikanen het echt zelf doen want die kunnen het veel beter dan wij.

I: Omdat die erin zitten, ja.

R: Ja want die kennen de cultuur, enzovoort en zo meer. Die weten wie wie is en dus, laat, geef hen alle credits die ze nodig hebben maar dat betekent dus ook financieel.

I: Dus eigenlijk meer ook een soort van.. Donor

R: En ga er niet bij zitten als je je centen geeft: dan mag je wel dit doen en niet dat doen. Je moet daar gewoon een pot van maken en die laat je zelf beheersen. En als ze daar tien jaar mee geknoeid hebben van wat er mogelijk is dan zeg je na tien jaar gewoon: jongens jongens jongens en dan begin

je weer opnieuw. En ja, wij knoeien natuurlijk ook aan de lopende band. Maar ik maar ja..

I: Maar ja is dat haalbaar? Eh, een pot maken? Zonder..

R: Kijk in Afrika heb je helemaal niet (onverstaanbaar). In Afrika is in die zin natuurlijk ook buitengewoon interessant omdat je ziet dat ze heel lang is die Europese invloed daar heel groot geweest, ze hebben daar de kolonies. Die is in zekere zin nog aanwezig in een aantal gebieden, in een aantal landen. Maar geleidelijk aan zie je dat China Afrika overneemt.

I: Ja.

R: China heeft niks met internationale (onverstaanbaar). Die kan nooit (onverstaanbaar). Die staat er helemaal buiten. Maar je kan je dus afvragen of China niet steeds meer een eigen bijdrage levert aan de stabiliteit van Afrika, doordat ze daar een soort diepgaand in hebben geïnvesteerd. En dat maakt allemaal andere krachten vrij om allemaal andere dingen te doen enzovoort. Maar in China wordt het ook van belang dat Afrika daar bewust mee bezig is. En moet je niet naar dat soort landen..

I: Mechanismen?

R: Kijken, die erg geïnteresseerd zijn om wereldwijd aanwezig te zijn, dat daar toch ook een nevenfunctie aan vast zit die meehelpt en die ons uit die silly discussies haalt van: eens in de zoveel tijd moeten we weer een (onverstaanbaar) zitten want we hebben een leger en die moet wat te doen hebben en zouden we niet een keer naar dat land kunnen gaan of iets van de VN Veiligheidsraad. Dat is allemaal zo'n kinderspel heb ik het gevoel van we moeten nu eenmaal dat doen..

I: Dus u haalt mijn hele scriptie onderuit?

R: Wij hebben.. haha, hier zit een man die de oorlog nog heeft meegemaakt.

I: Juist interessant, daarom juist leuk om met u te praten. Ik kan me dat heel goed voorstellen. Ik merk zelf dat ik nog wel in een heel kansrijk perspectief mezelf aanleer omdat het anders nu al ophoudt.

Afsluiting, woord van dank en nogmaals vragen eventuele quotes te gebruiken. Tot slot de mogelijkheid bieden mijn scriptie in te zien na de voltooiing.

3. Wolfgang Wagner (respondent 2)

Introduction about who I am, what is the goal of the research and what is it expected to contribute to both the academic and political field. Furthermore, I ask the interviewees if I may record the interview to use quotes in my thesis and if I may refer to them personally.

I: Dan begin ik eigenlijk maar met de eerste meest voordehand liggende vraag, vindt u, hoe, vindt u het wenselijk dat er een internationale norm is met het idee in dit tijdperk op het moment dat de staatssoevereiniteit, dat de staat wordt de verantwoordelijkheid benadrukt om zelf hun eigen burgers te beschermen. En op het moment dat dat niet kan is de internationale gemeenschap verantwoordelijk om hier in te grijpen. Denk u dat dit draagvlak heeft, is dit goed, of is dit ja?

R: Oke, ehm. To the first version of the question is it nice to have, is it good to have it is almost impossible to say no. I mean it is about protect human beings, human security et cetera. So it has a strong appeal so I would certainly not argue that is a bad idea and if you take a longer-term perspective the institution of sovereignty has always been changing. And is always been interpreted and reinterpreted in what exactly it means en entails and that it is increasingly about responsibility of governments towards their own population. It makes perfect sense as longer-term trend and it also makes sense normatively. Ehm, the problem, the trick is a little bit that not as an abstract idea but as a political movement it is very closely attired to one group of actors in the international system. So it is liberal democracies that can most easily accommodate this idea in their basic value system. Ehm, but of course they also bring in their own interests and this often leads to problems of double standards et cetera. Since you ask about 'draagvlak' that's the problem, because ehm this undermines the idea of having a new universal norm that is obligatory for all states. That is pretty clear criterion on which conditions states should take action. But then you have politics interpreting the application of this norm and that's a different story and has alienated quite a view states in the last couple of years.

I: And am I hearing that in that perspective it is a problem of accountability? So ehm.

R: Well I think it is a bit a problem of empathy on the card of say the liberal democratic states and the liberal democratic community. If you take Libya for example, that is a..

I: Ja, that is the case I am... yes.

R: R2P case. And yes it makes perfect sense that you help a lot of people who are extremely vulnerable and threatened during these civil war. But at the very same stage on the basis of this entitlement of the United Nations to (onverstaanbaar) resolution, also just armed paths of the rebels. And also used air powers strategically to help the rebels advance. And that is not R2P in my reading. And in my.. I think this is symptomatic for the larger problem that liberal democracies tend to say that: well we have a humanitarian crisis so everyone should be obliged to help us on a R2P Security Council resolution. Once we have it, we let the good guys win and the good guys are those we like because they are the opponents of this dictator et cetera. And I think that many governments and many state leaders have really difficulties understanding what the problem is and that's in my interpretation that is the problem. That too many people have not enough sensitivity for the legitimate concerns of (onverstaanbaar) player such as Russia and China and they are.. There is a tendency to denigrate because they are not ruled democratically and have all kinds of other problems probably. But in the current system they are legitimate actors in the international law and some of their interpretations of what R2P entails might be quite accurate actually.

I: But then the concept of R2P might become a liberal democratic principle from the Western country. So it's not global in that sense?

R: Yes, yes. I mean, normatively I would always distinguish where does the norm come from, whether it has universal applicability. Where human rights for example, it also merges somewhere in the West, it is a complicated genesis but obviously I would say it is universally applicable. So it is not a problem that this is per se a Western norm. But it is really the politics of interpretations applying the norm that creates a lot of frictions and difficulties.

I: So idealism versus politics.

R: Yes. Yes.

I: Haha, unfortunately. And so within these politics, you illustrate the normative desirability but you also illustrate the practical problems with the implementation. How can these be bridged? Or isn't it bridgeable?

R: No I mean, it has to be bridged by procedures. And in principle the procedures are in place. Because even when there is a new norm of R2P, the monopoly of the United Nations Security Council to authorize use of force remains. And as you know I'm sure from some drafts of the 2000 report to the United Nations endorsement this have been the decisive changes to retain the United

Nations Security Council authority. And I think it makes sense because this is also problem to politicking of course. But it is a safeguard against the self-entitlement to looks like R2P to us so we do whatever we think is justified. And that's a bit problematic.

I: Problematic. And ehm..

R: And just to add briefly..

I: Yes of course.

R: The second way of this gap would be a public discussion, critical voices and this thesis can be part of this. Not the one single statement..

I: Academic contribution.

R: But this is one of the key merits of liberal democracies that they allow these debates and there are critical voices that you can read from papers and hear from talk shows and just have them discussed at universities. And that is important because it contributes to the necessary self-reflection on what R2P actually is and what it's not.

I: Well it is interesting you're posing it because I did some background analysis about this subject as alternatives on R2P or improvements of R2P. And what you often hear is what I already said, a problem of accountability. But you also hear the idea of institutions, like the UN Watch that observes the procedure of R2P. So it observes the compliance with the R2P principles. So it should be observed that might be the most independent way to see that R2P principles are observed and that they are still part of the debate. Because what you often see the last ten years since R2P is invoked, a lot of cases are perfectly applicable on R2P or the other way around, but they are not invoked. So how can it be, is it about interests or is it about like a balance of costs and benefits. Is it too expensive when we looked at the history and is that the main incentive to not invoke R2P? It seems to be it. So is an independent institution then a good alternative or?

R: Well, yes it sounds attractive. But I think in practice it creates a similar problem for this institution because we nominate any experts would be highly contested. So who do take? Mient Jan Faber or whoever, they all have their history and they all have a political position. So in that sense I think that this mutual ground does not really exists. So I think it remains a political issue.

I: But can it contribute, I mean when we look at the Security Council now where the decision-making is the main organ. Again, they are represented by states and their state's interests so that's a problem, a paradox. Can it be overcome, can it be improved by such an institution. Or, as Mient Jan Faber said a few hours ago, he was proposing an idea of local responsibility. So more individual responsibility, like you and me as a civilian, as citizens of Holland have the responsibility to lifeline with victims of conflict areas. So a whole different abstract, away from institutions.

R: Yes. This is all short of the use of the force I guess. And short of the use of force you can do all kinds of interesting things. So importing victims, engaging some sort of development aid exercise. But of course it is not a matter if R2P is often narrowed down to the question of the use of force part. Of course it is broader than this, but the use of force part is the most contested part. And that is usually what the discussion evolves around. And this problem, this problem immediate suggestion doesn't help.

I: So it's no good comparison? It is no good alternative to eh, achieve the goals that will not be achieved by R2P. It's like a whole different idea, is that what you are saying?

R: Yes, I mean it also makes sense to discuss R2P in the broader context of military interventions and maybe humanitarian interventions. And part of this can easily be framed as a good idea and doing good and doing all good kinds of things.

I: Idealistic? Yes.

R: Yes. But then it is also quite clear that it's subject to all kinds of very practical constraints, including the legitimization of sending troops to domestic audiences. And this comes to all kinds of constraints and this is very difficult to steer and manage in a way. So once you got this all rolling that Libya say in this case military intervene it comes to a dynamic of its own. So you have liberal publics that are agitate and wants to see punitive strikes against Syria, or all kinds of other things. And this debate is often detached from considerations of what it really brings to the people, what it really contributes to the human security et cetera. So this is a dynamic of its own that is difficult to control once it's launched.

I: And how can it be controllable?

R: I don't think it can. It is just an effect of political life this is how it is. This is one of the most important reasons to be hesitant to use military force, including R2P missions. I mean the record

with Libya I think is very very mixed. I wouldn't say it is a clear success story of R2P.

I: But then is it possible to have a success story of R2P then? If you include the effects of politics to use force?

R: Yes, good question. I mean I wouldn't have a ready answer. There should be more people working on this question I think but there are a very few. So everything is pretty tentative. Yes I think that there are cases that come pretty close to successful intervention. Like India in what's now Bangladesh in the '70s or was it Tanzania invading Uganda? Also '70s. There are a couple of cases and then even the Balkan cases, all in all I think look pretty good. But even they have the, the Kosovo intervention have.. I mean the standard narrative is that yes there was a genocide going on and need to intervene and stopped it. But most genocidal action started after the bombing began, so this is very difficult to translate into nice narrative...

I: In a success story.

R: A successful intervention. And this brings me back to this liberal complacency that still this is a very accepted storyline. (onverstaanbaar) stopped it.

I: So it might also be, correct me if I'm wrong, that the involvement of international community of external states.. A reason for them to not involve might be because they might contribute to even worsening the conflict. Is that..

R: Yes. Yes, yes.

I: Because in the case of Kosovo of course they are getting associated with the genocide, which happens after the bombing.

R: Yes, the case of Kosovo was also the decision to use air power only..

I: Yes and no field force.

R: Exactly, boots on the ground, ground troops. You have the same of course for Libya and Syria where no one seriously considered ground troops. And that's a severe limitation. Sometimes the worst you can do I think is do it half way, with Syria. So you did enough to more or less signal to the rebels: please this guy is so bad and we consider helping you.

I: Framing it.

R: Yes so they start engaging in facilities and at the very moment when Assad is almost in the position to squelch the rebellion, the arms embargo is lifted with enough arms within to put them on a par. But ultimately this is as of now it is prolonging the suffering from many many people. And it doesn't look like there will be a good ending or a toppling of Assad. So this half way, look (onverstaanbaar) support, ehm.. Is in my view really the worst outcome you can have.

I: A diverse outcome?

R: Diverse yes. So put differently, I mean it's , I wouldn't go on (onverstaanbaar) this. I think having Assad won the conflict for years ago is probably more a humanitarian solution than having conflict go to (onverstaanbaar).

I: Yes. Than it is also a cost-benefit balance?

R: Yes, if you..

I: Or it's reputation of the international community might be?

R: Yes, yes.

I: Like ehm, gezichtsverlies?

R: Well that's a different aspect even, so the cost-benefits can be... cost-benefits really in terms of human to human so how many people will die in this..

I: Like quantitative, yes.

R: In one or the other option taking. Losing faces is a different consideration I would say. Apparently also in the case of Syria of the things, the red line being drawn by Obama et cetera. Yes, that's losing face, or not losing face.

I: And can it be, because I hear you are putting it in a broader context of the last forty years, which humanitarian interventions did succeed and which didn't. And what interests are thereby involved.

Do you see contribution to the fact that there is such a principle as R2P? Or is it more like an excuse or a legitimization or isn't it contributing at all? Do you see like a difference when R2P invoked according to the conflict?

R: You mean that the history of? Interventions? Yes?

I: Well, I I I hear you speaking about different interventions in the forty years.

R: Ok yes. If the interventions help to bring about R2P?

I: Well no. Does R2P help to, to get more interventions or not? Like have an effect on the international are of intervening.

R: Ok, yes. I think it already has had that. So Libya has been the case, Kenya.

I: Libya was the only one.

R: Yes Kenya is I think, Kenya is actually R2P..

I: Is it? O,

R: I thought so yes. I've come across the Kenyan case in articles by Bellamy, heard about Alexander Bellamy?

I: Yes but I mean.

R: And I think Kenya is a case as well. It is an interesting one because it was a, it was before it escalated to a full-scale civil war. So that's also interesting because it was successful in the sense but there was an intervention earlier on. And it prevented a larger escalation. But I'm not sure at this stage how many more applications there will be because I think that the Libyan case added so much to the doubts of China and Russia that they will think twice and three times and four times..

I: So in a negative way.

R: Yes yes.

I: I wanted to say something different, cannot come up with it. Yes ok. I think, I'm just going through my questions. O yes, I don't know I'm not sure I didn't got too much in to it yet. But I read some of your articles that were concerned about the cultures of control. Can it also be applicable on this, in the face of states who break the international rules?

R: Yes, exactly.

I: The international rule of R2P?

R: Yes, I mean this..

I: Is it like an example?

R: Broadness of the cultures of control emerges from this LLM program on international security, that I do with my colleagues in international law about the (onverstaanbaar) in particular. And as a kind of follow-up on this project, which had to do with broke states in particular, we want to study a little bit the question of punitivity and the Syrian case. So punitivity..

I: What is punitivity?

R: I mean, let me say it differently. When the Syrian, when there was a debate on whether to strike or to have punitive strikes against Assad after the use of the make of weapons. We found it very interesting because under international law in the United Nation system you must not carry out punitive strikes. And you can defend yourself you might be able to intervene from humanitarian purposes, or R2P purposes but certainly not for punitive purposes. You must not use force for punitive purposes and yet there was discussed wide openly. And we found that interesting and we are now looking into where this comes from and what the implications are. And it relates to these cultures of controls and as there is yes I mean punitivity is often linked to abusing and to even to feelings of revenge. And apparently these sentiments are still around so for example when these chemical weapons use became public, there was a real sentiment that Assad deserves to be punished and deserves to suffer punitive strikes et cetera. So that is interesting, because this also tells us something about international community. Because according to one theorist I have been reading a lot recently, Emile Durkheim?

I: Yes, of course.

R: His argument is that punishment in general doesn't bring any results so punishing criminals doesn't make them better people. Punishing students in school doesn't help, so why is it done? It's done not because it brings anything for the punished, but because it reaffirms the community values. And if we assures everyone else but this is still a valid norm. Like the chemical weapons to go..

I: So it s is like a one-way traffic actually? It is to feel ourselves..

R: Yes it's ehm.. When he makes this contribution more than a hundred years ago it was really also quite provocative.

I: Yes I can imagine.

R: Punishment is not about achieving anything it is not about the torrent it is really about you know reaffirming community values. And when he made it a view to domestic societies and voted iron looking into the idea f sphere of the international values that are reaffirmed by sanctions and by punitive strikes et cetera. So it is a way of, of building an international community by demonstrating that certain norms are essential and you must not violate them and sovereignty is no free ticket to squash your own populations et cetera. So in that sense yes, I mean this there is a link to this project of these cultures of control.

I: Yes. Interesting perspective to use I guess. In a way that is also what I am thinking in my thesis, in my conclusion it might be that R2P is just a, een deken? Like a blanket? Or like a something to wrap it in.

R: Yes, yes.

I: To legitimize violence. In a way.

R: Yes yes yes. Yes of course yes.

I: And that it might be to eh, to moralize your own behavior as a Westerns state or a liberal democracy, a democratic state instead of how it's illustrated now of course as an international norm that should be enhanced by everyone.

R: Yes yes yes.

I: And it's still going to be, it's not like it. I'm not sure but something I can imagine will come out.
Interesting, yes I think I have enough information.

R: Ok good, you're welcome.

I: Thank you very much.

*Afsluiting, woord van dank en nogmaals vragen eventuele quotes te gebruiken. Tot slot de
mogelijkheid bieden mijn scriptie in te zien na de voltooiing.*